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Abstract 
 
Nowadays, agricultural prices are highlighted around the world combined with, as 
alleged collateral effects, hunger and malnutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
However, today SSA has around 47,5 percent of rural population in extreme poverty 
while between 1990 and 2005 when food prices were stable and low, extreme rural 
poverty in SSA involved around 64.6 percent of population. 
We assume that the undernourishment or starvation continued in SSA because there the 
misery persisted. Poverty reduction is the only way to the end hunger in Africa. Also, 
for an agricultural country in SSA the best way to solve the problem of poverty is 
through agricultural development.  
By “agricultural country” we mean a country that have no significant reserves of 
mineral resources, thereunto the development should happen through agricultural 
development. 
Our analysis is based upon a sample of nine countries in SSA – Burundi, Ghana, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe – the so called SSA – 9.    
Thus, we have built up a model trying to answer to the question of how the agricultural 
gears in SSA – 9 were moving between 1990 and 2005, and assess how the agricultural 
growth could reduce rural poverty. We used a system of recursive rather than 
simultaneous equations: a recursive model is a special case of an equation system where 
the endogenous variables are determined one at a time in sequence. 
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The most important result is that the main tools that had a strong relation with poverty 
reduction in SSA – 9 were legislation on property rights (PR), access to the credit 
system, Human capital and infrastructure. 
The debate about policies implication is very important since our timeline is between 
1990 and 2005, i.e.  a period characterized by relatively stable international agricultural 
prices . So, excluding this very important element, price, we could analyze what the 
low-income countries in SSA may do to develop their agriculture. 
One of the conclusion is that an excessive and somehow “artificial” stress may have 
been attributed to the education level in the past (World Bank 1998, Easterly et al. 
2001) and this may continue not to help poverty reduction. Our model shows that there 
is a hierarchy among policies that may reduce rural poverty.   
Firstly, property rights or land tenure (PR) together with political stability (PS) have 
always started or destroyed the progression of rural poverty reduction.  
Secondly, the macroeconomic context, mainly the development of an efficient credit 
system (DCPS), should go together with the improvement of education level (HCPRI). 
Thirdly, the endowment in terms of infrastructure installed and its evolution over time 
play an important rolein supporting the economic evolution of rural population. 
The better the answers, the more efficient the country was (and will be) in reducing 
poverty. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
I use “we" and “our" in my thesis as a gesture of respect to the research community. 
This convention is part of my attitude towards that community. He, She and They are 
used as a reference of the context without any gender discrimination. 
Learning how poverty reduction in rural areas can be optimized was motivated by many 
goals, such as: academic, intellectual and personal reasons. 
After this introduction, in the second chapter of this thesis we start describing the 
context that we were placed in when this research began and the motivations of the 
research; in the same chapter we explain the definition of rural poverty and the different 
situations around the world; subsequently we describe the main economic agents in 
rural areas, agriculture and its principal actors like farmers, governments and 
international traders; finally we explained how the agriculture can reduce poverty and 
the thoughts of most important authors in this area.  
In the third chapter we outline the aim of our research, and we explain the choice of the 
sample for the econometric analysis; in other word we explain why we decided to deal 
with a selection of SSA countries and we explain why, in our opinion, it is not a good 
choice trying to assess the effectiveness of poverty reduction policies in countries that 
have contradictory profiles and lack of data.. 
In the next chapter we describe shortly the main social, economic and politic 
characteristics of the nine low-income countries in SSA selected for the econometric 
analysis. In the fifth chapter we have decided to make a special report about the Ghana 
case; this analysis has been possible thanks to the availability of regional data and a 
specific paragraph describing Ghana’s poverty trap case. We believe that an 
econometric model like our, always needs a field check in order to better evaluate if 
assumptions and implication do really make sense in the real world. And this paragraph 
has proven to be useful to this aim.  
The most important part of this thesis is the sixth chapter, where we highlight the main 
points of the existing theories, we explain our proposal of a new model and we describe 
all the steps connecting agricultural development and policies to poverty reduction. 
Finally we present the econometric results of the new complete model.  
13 
 
In the seventh chapter we describe more in dept all results for every single country 
considered in the complete analysis, i.e. the nine SSA countries, and we discuss the 
results indicating which one of the so called “agricultural linkages” in SSA could 
happen and when these linkages are more important than agricultural growth to poverty 
reduction. Furthermore these linkages can be optimized with policy implications as 
property rights (PR), access to credit (DCPS) and infrastructure (INFR). 
Major conclusions are supported also with three empirical cases: the United Republic of 
Tanzania’s case, Uganda’s case and Ghana’s case. In the final section of this chapter we 
talked about possible paths to develop agriculture in SSA – 9.    
In the final chapter we conclude with a few words on the best route to agricultural 
development and poverty reduction for the low-income countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and we indicate the limits of the model and suggest paths for future research. 
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2. THE ISSUE OF AGRICULTURE AND POVERTY REDUCTION:  
A SHORT REVIEW 
 
2.1 The modernity of a traditional issue  
This research started in 2010; we were living a scenario similar to that of the 1970s, 
with all commodities prices, such as oil, soybean, maize and wheat, soaring. But there 
was a different relationship between cause and effect. 
The oil crisis or "the shock oil prices" in 1973 had “one beginning” when the members 
of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) took one political 
decision that made the oil price shoot from around USD 3 in 1973 to USD 12 in 1974. 
The world economy was largely dependent on petroleum and, as a main consequence; 
we saw high inflation and low growth of GDP around the world. 
The high commodities prices in 2008, instead, were caused by a pool of factors that had 
triggered the process as the strong GDP growth of emerging markets, the decline in the 
value of the dollar, low stocks of commodities, huge foreign exchange reserves in 
emerging countries like China and so forth.    
As a result, in 2008 prices brought up many concerns in the agriculture environment: 
among the main anxieties there were farms costs, the shortage of new agriculture 
frontiers and price volatility. The food prices rocketed between 2007 and 2008 but 
plummeted after that, and soared again on 2011 (chart 2.1). 
Chart 2.1: FAO food price index. 
Source: FAOstat 
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However, with the high costs of intensification of agriculture techniques, the western 
institutions realized that there did not exist more land to increase agriculture activity in 
developed countries; hence to feed the world agriculture had to be developed in other 
sites. But also the so called emerging countries in Asia do not have “stocks of land” 
either; that is why food demand in Asia is growing more than food supply. 
The increase of the purchasing power not only in Asia but also in Latin America raised 
the demand for meat; moreover, developed countries and emerging markets began to 
introduce and develop many biofuels policies, stressing even more the debate about land 
resources, food, feed and biofuels.  
The increase of demand for commodities mainly by Asian countries and the information 
about new biofuels policies stimulated commodities prices, according to many authors. 
But as we said, the world in 2010 was different from the world in 1970, with the 
transmission of information made easy by internet, politicians receive more pressures 
from public opinion and, on the other hand, the public opinion could be lead to draw 
hasty conclusions, because we now live in the “over info phenomenon”. 
Information was supplied by the media and also the academic world. The public opinion 
was divided into several groups: those in favour of agricultural subsidies, price-fixing of 
agricultural commodities, reduced consumption of meat and those against biofuels 
policies. On the other hand we have groups against of agricultural subsides, the 
environmentalists, who are in favour of renewable energy policies, and so on. But 
curiously they all pointed out that their ideas would lead to the reduction of hunger in 
Africa. 
The hunger problem in Africa has always been described from a western point of view 
and the following stylized facts have been identified by major sources:  
 The African people were benefited by the importation of cheap food due to 
farm's subsidies of many OECD countries (FAO 2009).  
 The African countries were the most prejudiced by agricultural prices volatility 
(FAO 2011).  
 WWF on line report, recommends lowering meat and dairy consumption 
because that can help to balance food and feed demands.  
16 
 
 The experience of the 2007-08 food price crisis and the current price volatility in 
many international food markets have showed a number of weaknesses in 
relation to biofuel policies (G-20 meeting, 2010). 
 The agricultural subsidies coming from developed countries did not allow 
African farmers to compete and develop their domestic market (FAO 2009). 
 Renewable energy policies are the best tools to develop the marginal land in 
developing countries (IEA 2009). 
But, in particular, this delicate roundabout among food, feed and biofuel in SSA was 
faced very well by the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science 
and Technology of Development (IAASTD 2009), that showed a series of problems in 
SSA. An assessment concludes that many questions remain unresolved as far as poverty 
and food security are concerned (figure 2.1), but they will continue working to find 
points of synergy between bioenergy, development and agricultural sustainability in 
SSA. 
The other line of thinking confronted the hunger in Africa with a less ideological and 
more pragmatic point of view. The undernourishment or starvation continue in SSA 
because there, the misery persists. Poverty reduction is the only way to the end the 
hunger in Africa (Lipton 1977, Lipton and Ravallion 1993, Roemer and Gugerty 1997, 
Delgado et al 1998, Mellor 1999 and 2001, Quibria 2002, Thirtle 2003, Timmer 2005, 
Ravallion and Chen 2007, Janvry and Sadoulet 2009), Anderson 2009 and Heady et al 
2010). 
Also all authors agree that for an agricultural country the best way to resolve problem of 
poverty is through agricultural development. Hence, we started this research looking for 
data about poverty, development of the agriculture sector and the linkage between them. 
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Figure 2.1: SSA food, feed and biofuel. 
 
Source IAASTD page 88 
 
2.2 Rural Poverty: measurement and issues  
Poverty implies a state of privation and lack of necessities for a person which 
subsequently reduces the possibility of fulfilling basic needs in modern society for food, 
health, education and housing. When poverty is widespread in a society or country, with 
chronic intensity or for a long time, it produces costs in all areas of the economy and 
makes growth performance unfeasible. In other words a country with chronic poverty or 
prolonged poverty could have social instability, shortage of skilled labour, poor quality 
of life and low health status (Barro 1998). 
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The World Bank has been working to define the concept of poverty since 1979. In 1985, 
they created a system to compare purchasing power across countries and therefore also 
to measure poverty in a comparable way: the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange 
rates used to convert the international line into local currencies. Furthermore, the 
poverty line from 1985 was of USD 1,00 a day while since 2005 the average daily 
income measuring extreme poverty has been USD 1,25 a day. Thus, when identified the 
poverty line refers to those people who would still not be able to eat the minimum 
amount of nutrition necessary for their daily life, if they were to use their entire budget 
to buy food (World Bank).   
The number of people worldwide living below the line of extreme poverty was reduced 
in absolute numbers from 1.815 billion people in 1990 to 1.371 billion people in 2005, 
representing a reduction from 41.6 per cent of the population in 1990 to 25.2 per cent in 
2005 (World Bank). 
Focusing on the poverty distribution in 2005, statistics show that 71 per cent of these 
people living below the extreme poverty line in the world were living in rural areas 
against 80 per cent in 1990. Despite this historic shift towards urbanization, in 1990 
around 57 per cent of the world population was living in rural areas, against 51 per cent 
in 2005, thus a half of population still lives in rural areas. 
Despite the positive results in poverty reduction in rural areas, searching the tools which 
contributes with rural poverty reduction can be useful. First of all, poverty mostly 
concentrates in rural areas and its reduction can prevent or reduce the social instability 
in developing countries. Secondly, developing countries suffer terrible collateral effect 
of poverty, like, for example, shortage of skilled labour; if rural poverty is reduced, the 
education level will improvement, thus, breaking down this paradigms. Finally, poverty 
reduction in rural areas also means an improvement for urban areas, as suggested by the 
dualism theory.      
Comparing the incidence of world poverty in rural areas, we noticed a different 
geographical distribution. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has the worst performance in 
comparison with other traditional poor areas (Chart 2.2). Rural poverty in SSA has 
increased in absolute numbers from 172 million people in 1990 to 306 million in 2005, 
and the percentile of poverty in rural population also increased, bouncing from 51 per 
cent in 1990 to 61 per cent in 2005.  
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The second region with lowest performance is South Asia (SAS); here, between the 
same sixteen years, poverty grew, in absolute numbers, of 35 millions of people, but the 
percentage of poor populations in rural areas decreased from 55.9 per cent to 45.2 per 
cent. 
SSA is also distinguished from the rest of the world by the forecast for the rural 
population. In current projections (FAOstat), the population in SSA rural areas will still 
rise while all others regions will decrease their rural population. The SSA rural 
population will not decline until 2050 (chart 2.3); at the same time SSA has an 
enormous quantity of arable land which is underused: FAO (2001) estimated that SSA 
has 2,4 billion hectares of land and in 2000 roughly 20 per cent of this potential arable 
land was cultivated.  
 
Chart 2.2: Percentile of rural extreme poverty 
Source World Bank where: EAP is East Asia and Pacific, LAC is Latin America and Caribbean, MNA is Median East and North 
African, SAS is South Asia, SSA is Sub-Saharan Africa and WLD Developing World.  
In other words, SSA is the singular set region in the world, it has the higher level of 
rural poverty in the world, a huge amount of arable land stock, and the demographics 
rural data will have provoked strong stress in the socio-economic environment. 
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Chart 2.3: Rural population by regions and decline points (million people) 
Source FAOstat ; SSA is Sub-Saharan Africa, LAC is Latin American and Caribian, MENA is Median East and north Africa, Eastern 
Asia include China, Southern Asia include India.   
 
2.3 Agriculture: different developments paths    
The winning agricultural policy for a country in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century was to protect 
local agriculture, because it guaranteed urban development and, consequently, the 
country began to develop. Here is the last great example: during Japan’s “take off” 
(1877- 1905) its agriculture policy assurance farm product rose 31 per cent faster than 
farm input price from non-agriculture (Lipton 1977). 
In the 21
th 
century, efficiency has become a prerequisite of agricultural business, and 
agriculture chains involved a complex network. Agro-industrial enterprises, to compete, 
have reduced the costs and have improved the quality of their products, with a new and 
strong infrastructure
1
 such as: competition between markets and others distributions 
channels, the issues of long-term viability as the markets related with the cities (chain of 
kilometer zero) and, mainly with wholesale markets and cities with a population of less 
than half a million people. 
 
                                                          
1
 See Suply Chain Management (SCM) with particular reference to the agro-industrial domain FAO 2007 
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In the others words, the old political winner, with subsidies and protectionism, could 
lose in this century: the world is changing, and therefore developed countries, as well as 
emerging countries and developing countries should also change. Between the two 
biggest agricultural markets, the US and the EU, the last is the most closed and 
protected but it is changing. European agriculture is not as heavily protected and 
isolated from the international markets as it once was (Canali 2008). 
Many interactive processes determine the agricultural dynamics of the world food 
demand and supply: land resources, agro-climatic conditions and socio-economic 
pressures as population growth, availability access to technology and development. In 
the last four decades the world has changed its own average growth in terms of: 
aggregate yield, arable land, production, population and, as a consequence, per capita 
production (table 2.1). 
The agricultural per capita production had a trend shift in the 2005/06 harvest: for the 
first time after the Second World War, the gross production agricultural index in the 
world overtook the gross per capita production index in the world (FAOstat).  
Table 2.1: Exponential trend growth rates of the world.  
Exponential Trend Growth Rates 1970 – 90 1990 – 2007 2007 – 17 
Production 2.20 1.30 1.20 
Yield 2.00 1.10 0.80 
Area 0.15 0.14 0.39 
Population 1.70 1.40 1.10 
Per Capita Production 0.56 0.11 0.02 
Source: USDA Agricultural Projections to 2017, calculated by Interagency Agricultural Projections Committee see 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/274758/oce20081a_1_.pdf        
The main players of agriculture, the US and the EU, reduced agricultural research and 
development, thus contributing to the slowing growth in crop yields. Governments and 
international institutions maybe have neglected the effects of economic growth in 
emerging markets and in developing countries (USDA 2008). 
So while on one side (developed countries) agricultural production showed a slow, on 
the other side (developing countries) while production was not increasing because of the 
lack of investments in this sector, demand was steadily increasing due to continuous 
increase in population and improvements in per-capita income in many big countries 
(like China, India, Brazil, etc).  
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With a simple subject-matter, either reducing the agricultural subsidies, decreasing the 
agricultural research and continuing to raise the demand, the commodities price will 
increase. This scenario happened and created opportunities to new players, who, thanks 
to the intensification of the supply and low-cost production, contributed to rebalance the 
agricultural market, i.e. Brazil leaped from the 10
th
 at the rank in 1999 to the 3
th
, largest 
agriculture exporter in the world in 2009 (WTO 2010). 
New agricultural players were not the only novelty in these recent years: the agricultural 
globalization process was too; it also accelerated by the opening of agricultural markets. 
The final result was a phenomenon similar to the one of the 1970s-, i.e. commodity 
prices rocketed and caused inflation around the world. 
But as we said in – paragraph 2.1 – this current trend had different links between cause 
and effect. In the 1970s, the imbalance among traditional supply countries and new 
importers countries of agricultural goods led to this scenario.  
Developed countries contributed indeed little in population growth rates, less than 8 per 
cent between 1990 – 2005, and then economic growth was half of the developing 
countries, besides the kcal consumption per capita rose 3 per cent compared to 8 per 
cent in the developing countries; however the developed countries, historically, had 
been developing almost all agriculture technologies. 
Without new global leaders to develop agricultural technologies, and conjunctural 
factors such as the declining global demand for stocks, rising oil prices, changes biofuel 
policies, the declining value of the dollar and the foreign accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves (USD), some countries have been able to increase food commodity 
imports. These created conditions have set the stage for the increase in food commodity 
prices since 2006/07 (table 2.2) and to the following price bubble. 
Thereby a window of opportunities was created and some emerging countries grabbed 
it, but most of developing countries did not. Since the demand was increasing more than 
supply in non-developed countries, many local and international companies here have 
invested in research. As a result the global average rates of yield grew more rapidly in 
these countries between 1990 and 2005 (table 2.3). 
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As to the four most important agricultural commodities such as maize, wheat, rice and 
soybeans, traditional producing countries, mostly developed countries, had 
unrecognizably low performances (in few cases they were half of the average global 
growth). These differences, however, were also due to the completely different level, in 
absolute terms, of the average yields (table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.2: Causes leading to the last price bubble of 2007/2008.  
Causes leading to the last price bubble 
 Factors 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 
Demand Increasing population + economic growth + rising per capital consumption 
Supply  Slowing growth in agricultural production 
Demand  Declining stocks of food 
commodities 
Supply  Rising crude oil price 
Demand  Dollar devaluation 
Demand  Large foreign 
exchange reserves 
Demand  Biofuels 
policies 
Supply  Rising 
farm costs 
Source USDA Agricultural Projections to 2017 
 
Table 2.3: Yield growth rates for selected crops by 1990 – 2005. 
Group Maize Wheat Rice Soybeans 
World* 1,84 0,73 0,99 1,34 
All countries** 1,51 0,36 0,93 0,75 
Low developing countries*** 0,65 2,15 2,16 0,00 
Developing countries*** 2,10 0,82 0,81 2,08 
Developed countries*** 1,48 0,06 0,54 0,00 
Source FAOSTAT 2012 * worldwide, calculated by author: ** Sum of, low developing countries, developing countries and 
developed countries. *** low developing countries with income per capita (PPP) USD 980,00 or less that have entire time series, 
developing countries with income per capita (PPP) between USD 981,00 and USD 11.900,00 that have entire time series and 
developed countries whit income per capita (PPP) more than USD 11.901,00 in 2005 that have entire time series.       
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Most of this increase in yields had been implemented by the so called “developing 
countries”, from Latin American to South-Eastern Asia. In Latin American the 
improvement of productivity come mainly from Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, on the 
other hand South-Eastern Asia brought up countries as China, Malaysia and Vietnam. 
The first block, the Latin countries, have used the improvement to increase the surplus 
and consequently the exportation, while the second one, South-Eastern Asian countries 
have used it mostly to benefit the domestic market, because consumption in these 
countries increased as well as agricultural goods production. 
 
Table 2.4: Yield ton/hectare for selected crops in 1990 and 2005  
Group Maize Wheat Rice Soybeans 
Year 1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005 
World* 3,68 4,84 2,56 2,85 3,53 4,09 1,90 2,32 
All countries summed** 3,66 4,59 2,87 3,03 3,55 4,08 1,62 1,82 
Low developing countries*** 1,70 1,87 1,90 2,05 1,82 2,51 0,98 0,98 
Developing countries*** 2,58 3,52 2,19 2,48 3,48 3,93 1,47 2,01 
Developed countries*** 6,72 8,37 4,52 4,56 5,35 5,80 2,46 2,47 
Source FAOSTAT 2012 * worldwide, calculated by author: ** Sum of, low developing countries, developing countries and 
developed countries. *** low developing countries with income per capita (PPP) USD 980,00 or less that have entire time series, 
developing countries with income per capita (PPP) between USD 981,00 and USD 11.900,00 that have entire time series and 
developed countries whit income per capita (PPP) more than USD 11.901,00 in 2005 that have entire time series.       
 
Finally, the so called low developing countries were the ones that lost the window of 
opportunities between 1990 and 2005. This group was represented principally by SSA 
countries, which cannot carry out agricultural developments to international and 
domestic market either. 
 
2.4 Rural poverty reduction: evidences and issues  
In all the history of humankind agricultural developments led to the improvement of 
welfare, social development and poverty reduction: Egypt in 2000 BC, India and China 
in the 17
th
 century and the western countries after 1800. Adam Smith wrote in 1776 
“The Wealth of Nations”, which described the capitalist transformation of English 
agriculture through the division of labour and increased productivity, thus driving the 
earliest stages of urban-industrial transformation.  
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Modern literature confirms the importance of agriculture: agriculture is the most cost 
effective investment a developing country can do, thus we assume that the support of 
agriculture is the better strategy for poverty reduction (Timmer 2005), (Lipton and 
Ravallion 1993), (Mellor 2001 and 1999), (Quibria 2002), (Roemer and Gugerty 1997), 
(Janvry and Sadoulet 2009), (Anderson 2009), (Headey et al 2010) and (Thirtle 2003). 
Paradoxically, economic growth and poverty reduction lead to declining relative 
importance of the agricultural sector. However the links between different activities 
within rural economies allow the exploration of the effects that growth. In others words, 
agricultural investments are the main tools to reduce the poverty, rural economies 
depend on local demand and the characteristics goods, and these are affected by price or 
productivity changes and finally their tradability and local production.  
Factors like supply elasticities and labour inputs are affected by and improve the 
distribution of income within the rural urban economies. In a logical reasoning the 
growth of urban output depended on the growing transfer of food from rural areas for 
the increasing urban workforce; this urban labor force reduced the proportion of income 
that was spent on food when rural productivity increased, and the fall of food prices did 
not affect landlords profit because they earned on the scale of production.  
Absolute poverty, i.e. people that live with an average income equal or less than USD 
1,25 a day, would refer to people who have receive the most direct benefits from the 
development of agriculture, because of the straightforward relationship between food 
price and workforce developed. This means that who has a tight budget can eat better if 
the price of food declines and wellbeing will rocket indeed if earning improves.    
The government of Nepal has instituted the “Agricultural Perspective Plan” (APP) whit 
a great result: the percent of the rural population falling under the poverty line declined 
from 49 percent to 14 percent in the 20 years (Mellor, 1999). Timmer (2005) argued 
that ...“no country has been able to sustain a rapid transition out of poverty without 
raising productivity in its agriculture sector”.... 
So we assume that the development of agriculture is the best way to reduce rural 
poverty, but political stability, macroeconomic policies, natural resources and human 
capital, are affecting the whole social-economic environment. Thus, differences in rural 
population, as density, GDP per capita, availability of credit and rural framework, lead 
to different outcomes. 
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First of all, although agriculture growth demonstrably reduces misery, it cannot 
guarantee social equality. Roemer and Gugerty (1997) found an increased social 
inequality in Latin America while developing agriculture in the 70s and 80s, and 
showed the elasticity of poverty reduction declined over the years, proving Kuznet’s 
(1955) and Barro’s theories (1998).  
Kuznet’s curve has been based on cross-country estimates of the relationship between 
inequality and per capita national income. These empirical studies showed the countries 
which have low incomes have inequality indices low too; when average incomes are 
higher, the indicator of inequality increases too, to a certain point, but the sign of the 
relationship is reversed and indicators of inequality decrease and growth continues, 
forming an inverted U.  
Barro argued that inequality, when prolonged, hinders or makes growth performance 
unfeasible, in other worlds keeping inequality high could translate into: social 
instability, shortage of skilled labor, poor quality of life and low health status. 
Governments must manage the surplus resources produced by economic growth and 
apply in better conditions of health, education and infrastructure, to maintain the levels 
of growth.   
Another important factor is the link between productivity and poverty. Janvry and 
Sodoulet (2009) found relevant differences, between productivity and poverty 
reduction, among the three big players in the 20
th
 century; during the so called “green 
revolution”. As to the elasticity of rural poverty reduction with respect to cereal yield, 
there was an increase of 1 percent equal to – 5,1 per cent of rural poverty in China, - 1.2 
percent in India, and – 0,6 percent in Brazil in 1990s (figure 2.2). At the same time, in 
China inequality soared, in India, instead, have improved their inequality index and 
Brazil the inequality remain stable 
2
 in 1990s. 
Another aspect of rural poverty reduction is the regional level or the so called agro-
ecological zone (AEZ). The three big agricultural countries – Brazil, China and India – 
have great dimensions and some states or provinces have particular settings and cannot 
reduce rural poverty at the same level of national performances. 
                                                          
2
 Sources:  Brazil inequality by  U.N. website,  India inequality by Fan, Hazell and Thorat (1998), China 
inequality by Ravallion and Chen (2007) 
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The geographic position or few natural resources, which offer low potential for 
agriculture, are the main hindrances to develop agriculture and reduce the poverty in 
some places as: Maranhão north-east Brazil (Lipton, 1977), Guangxi central China 
(Ravallion and Chen, 2007) and Bihar north-east India (Fan, Hazell and Thorat, 1998). 
These areas are suffering from the so called “poverty traps”. 
When a region has the poverty traps, it cannot develop at the same speed as the rest of 
the country: geographic position or shortage of natural resource reduce the development 
capacity, and also interfere negatively in the socio-economic environment and as a 
consequence, rural poverty reduction has not happened. 
Figure 2.2: Cereal Yields and Rural Poverty 
S
Sources Janvry and Sadoulet (2009) pg 3. Poverty date from Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (2007) using a $ 1.08/day poverty line 
in 1993 PPP; yield data from FAO (2006) Note: Observation are for 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002       
To summarize, rural poverty reduction depend on many factors working together, such 
as, the linkage capacity between farmers and all the rural population, links between 
rural and urban areas, agricultural productivity, income distribution policies, geographic 
position and natural resources , thus there does not exist a panacea.  
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3. THE FOCUS OF THE RESEARCH  
As we saw in the previous paragraphs – 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 – SSA is the only region in 
the world that has all these features: fragile food security system, increased extreme 
rural poverty, undeveloped agricultural environment with low productivity and weak 
linkages between farms and non-farm business and constant growth of rural population.    
This research has, as its main goal, to assess the relationship between poverty reduction, 
agricultural productivity and socio-economic environment in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The first hard decision was about the database; in general African countries have a 
shortage of statistical information produced by themselves; their national statistical 
offices have often many problems and their data are generally quite poor. But also 
western and international institutions have asymmetric information about African 
countries. 
Perhaps that is because they use different methodologies; for example between 1990 
and 2010, the simple data about per capita GDP were different when coming from the 
UN, FAO and the World Bank. 
However we decided not to enter in this debate, thus we used the database of various 
institutions, but only the data that we consider as their core business, as follows’: for the 
World Bank and IMF, macroeconomic data; for FAO and IFDA, rural data; for the UN, 
health and education data. In case two institutions had the same core business, but 
different data, we always consider the first option i.e. World Bank and FAO.       
Secondly, the important decision was about the time series; we were aware that the 
2008 price bubbles could have “contaminated” our results Hence, we considered that 
“permanent changes” or structural changes should be measured, because they changed 
the entire agricultural global scenario and can be perennial; on the other hand when we 
talk about “temporary changes” or cyclic movements, as 2008 bubble prices, this effect 
should be considered in a different way. 
Thereby, while attempting to leave the model “more pure or less contaminated”, we 
used the time series 1990 – 2005, between these sixteen years, the agricultural prices 
were quite stable and the globalization was already in place and increasing with all its 
consequences. On the other hand, when a price bubble needs to be analyzed using 
econometric tools, a completely different database is needed, and the main issues are 
necessarily different from the one that we address here. 
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3.1 The aim of the research 
SSA followed different paths from the others areas in developing, it showed weakness 
to build links between farming and non-farms economies and urban areas, many 
authors
3
 assume that the SSA non-tradable goods, like services, cannot increase the 
productivity, consequently they are not widely consumed and they do not produced 
welfare. 
The statements are true, the SSA data show that the links between agriculture growth 
and rural poverty reduction have been worse worsen than in the rest of the world. Why 
does not SSA only develop agriculture sector? Perhaps the current literature has made 
the same mistake in SSA that did it in Latin American countries in the past, “mixing 
apples and oranges”. 
Nowadays it is clear that Mexico has a different socio-economic environment from 
Central American countries as Guatemala, Honduras or El Salvador, as much as Peru, 
Ecuador and Bolivia are very different from Chile, Argentina and Uruguay.  
Following this idea, we dealt with the problem and looked for three answers: What are 
the agro-business and socio-economic environment like in SSA? What does agricultural 
growth mean? And which is the profile of poverty that the agricultural sector is not 
reducing? 
First of all, many problems remain in SSA, like land tenure, labour and credit, severe 
difficulties in raising the agricultural market. Meanwhile, the agro-business is directly 
affected by agro-climatic conditions, population density, human capital and 
infrastructure; all these factors can have positive or negative influences. Exogenous 
factors too, like international prices, can or cannot have a low impact if the internal 
environment does not have appropriate stimuli.    
This complex environment, rule out the possibility to agree with “western institutions” 
that continue saying: The roots of the low performance of SSA agriculture are also well 
known: monopolistic and monopsonistic government positions, lack of incentives to 
perform, political interference, overstaffing and patronage, contradictory objectives, 
poor staff management and training, poor capital of investment corruption and so on. 
                                                          
3
 (Timmer 2005), (Lipton and Ravallion 1993), (Mellor 2001 and 1999), (Quibria 2002), (Roemer and 
Gugerty 1997), (Janvry and Sadoulet 2009), (Anderson 2009). 
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Between the 49 countries in SSA it is relativity easy to find out facts that contradict 
these statements: the monopsonistic government position have worked well in Ghana’s 
cocoa market and helped to reduce the rural poverty from 48 per cent in 1990 to 20 per 
cent in 2005, moreover the agricultural free market of Nigeria has shown an increase in 
rural poverty from 50 per cent to 64 per cent. 
On the other hand, South Africa had an agricultural production per capita with a 
performance worse than average African countries. Between 1990 and 2005 it fell four 
percent, while the average African countries growth was 12 per cent (FAOstat). 
However, South African indexes – capital of investment, corruption level and human 
capital level – are much better than in average African countries. 
As a result of this conundrum, we assumed that, to find the way to develop the 
agricultural sector, we cannot put together countries with great differences of mineral 
resources and GDP per capita income.  
Abundance of mineral resources led African countries to “mineral diseases” like the 
Dutch disease, according to Ndulu and al. (2008 page 26), thus these countries have a 
lower interest in agricultural development. 
On the other hand, the huge different of GDP per capita income implies the use of 
different tools for agricultural development or agricultural supply, because the 
agricultural sector has different weight and function in different countries, like Burundi 
which, in 2005, had a GDP per capita income of USD 154,00 or Equatorial Guinea, 
with USD 13.521,00 per capita the same year; it is obvious that the macroeconomic 
environment is something else.  
SSA has 49 countries, of which 47 have fairly good record data in international 
institutions like the Word Bank, FAO, UN and IMF. It has an area of 24.300.000 sq. 
kilometers and around 1000 languages spoken, 29 different eco regions (Peel et al 2007) 
and natural and mineral resources distributed in a non-uniform way. All these aspects 
and many others items, as the demographic situation, prevent us from talking about SSA 
as a homogeneous region.  
Therefore we cannot use the same tools or models, for all the countries together, to 
explain the agricultural sector and its developments, because agro-business and socio-
economic environment among these countries are very diverse. 
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Secondly, agricultural growth means whether a country is able to increase its 
agricultural output. Currently, there are many ways to measure it, those that are more 
widely accepted are; gross or net agricultural productions, gross or net agricultural 
productions per capita and total factor productivity (TFP).         
The gross or net agricultural productions, is the FAO index of agricultural production, 
that  ...“show the relative level of the aggregate volume of agricultural production for 
each year in comparison with the base period 1999-2001. They are based on the sum of 
price-weighted quantities of different agricultural commodities produced after 
deductions of quantities used as seed and feed weighted in a similar manner...”4 The so 
called “gross” represents all agricultural production and so called “net” represent all 
agricultural production without feed production. 
The gross or net agricultural productions per capita used the same methodologies, but to 
obtain per capita index you divide the production index by the local population. For a 
country that depends of the agricultural sector or has a high fertility of population or yet 
has a delicate scenario about food balance trades, the gross agricultural production per 
capita is more appropriate.     
All the indices of the country, regional and world levels are calculated by the Laspeyres 
formula
4
. Production quantities of each commodity are weighted by 1999-2001 average 
international commodity prices and added for each year. To obtain the index, the 
aggregate for a given year is divided by the average aggregate for the base period 1999-
2001.   
The agricultural TFP growth, measured by Solow (1956) and/or Bauer (1988), is the 
portion of output explained by the amount of inputs used in a production. Its level is 
determined by how efficiently the inputs are utilized in production. The decompositions 
of TFP could be added to the system of equations to be estimated, this equation 
provides information as to productions or costs function. 
However, all these methodologies are not necessarily connected with implications in 
terms of food safety and food security, expecially in SSA. Although in computable 
general equilibrium model (CGE) many simplifications are often considered acceptable; 
one of these states that, with agriculture growth, the food security will be resolved, 
                                                          
4
 See FAOstat methodologies 
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because these agriculture goods will be consumed or exported, the exportation creates 
the possibility to import other goods or foods that the country need. However it is quite 
clear that in many cases agricultural growth does not mean improvement of food 
security or food safety; for example, in SSA food security improved between 1990 – 
2005, while the productivity did not; on the other side, agricultural productivity 
increased very fast in Asia but food safety did not. 
But in small economies, mainly the agricultural African countries, are not fit for the 
CGE and its logics of equilibrium for goods (De Melo and Robinson 1989), 
Furthermore, after ten years this thesis was confirmed by Delgado et al (1998), who said 
that SSA countries usually show a mismatch between the income of export and 
domestic consumption, the so called “linkages paradigm”.    
In the others words, agriculture growth is the increase of any outputs of agricultural 
goods, used for food, feed or energetic market as biofuel, in one country. However it 
seems, agricultural productivity growth per se is not sufficient to resolve food security 
in SSA countries.  
To resolve the issue of food security it is often necessary also to change the behaviors of 
governments, like Brazil or China showed. Hence, the aim of this research is to find out 
whether agricultural growth can help farmers and rural population to overtake the 
poverty line, and/or what else is needed. 
However, both previous issues are great importance in this case, because almost all SSA 
countries have problems with food safety and many have troubles also with food 
security. Among the two, we believe that food security is the most important issue.  
But again, for a country that depends of the agricultural sector or has a high fertility rate 
of its population or yet has a delicate scenario about food balance trade, the gross per 
capita agricultural production (API) is a useful index to be evaluated and therefore we 
use API in this research.     
Finally, our aim was to match our main concern, food security, and the profile of 
poverty researched. The World Bank defined and classified two profiles of poverty. The 
first one is the poverty line; this represents people that have an income until up to USD 
2,25 a day (PPP 2005), according to this line people are able to eat every day if use all 
their budget to buy food. 
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But in the extreme poverty line there are people with an income below USD 1.25 a day 
(PPP 2005): whether or not those people use their entire budget to buy food, they are 
still unable to eat the minimum amount of nutrition necessary; in others words, for these 
people the food security does not exist. 
Thus, our research focuses on the extreme poverty line problems, and how agricultural 
growth can help people improve their earnings and overtake the extreme poverty line. 
 
3.2 The objective of the empirical analysis  
In order to build up a model that may work well with reference to SSA countries we 
must follow three premises: 
 We cannot use the same model to explain the agricultural sector and its 
development, with all SSA countries together. 
 The agricultural growth means increase of any agriculture goods output – food, 
feed and biofuels – but in a country with high demographic expansion the gross 
agricultural per capita production index (API) is more appropriate.  
 We should define the profile of poverty, because each poverty line group has 
different needs. 
As we are aware, to build a model that works well in SSA, we should have countries 
with very similar GDP per capita income and mineral resources, because governmental 
tools will be similar. At the same time these countries should have the minimal socio-
economic environment conditions allowing agricultural activities to develop well. 
In the second precondition we used one non-academic and unorthodox but very simple 
indicator with empirical results: the attracting power of western enterprise of agro-foods 
in SSA countries and we created an index
5
 from 0 to 5 (table 3.1) and (figure 3.1). 
While western institutions have problems to understand SSA environment and have had 
limited success, instead the westerns companies have had great performances in their 
investments there (OECD 2008). 
Therefore, if private capital is more flexible about rules and has more ability to forecast 
the development and earn profit, the analysis of private capital movements is useful to 
show where the agricultural environment is more favorable. 
                                                          
5
  Countries with more than 500 thousand people. 
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Table 3.1: The SSA attracting power. 
The SSA attracting power 
5 Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
Swaziland, Lesotho and South Africa 
4 Kenya, Malawi, and Namibia 
3 Senegal, The Gambia, Cameroun, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania 
2 Madagascar, Angola, Gabon and Burkina Faso 
1 Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Eritrea 
0 Guinea Bissau, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Ethiopia 
Source author  
Figure 3.1: The SSA attracting power  
 
Source: OECD Development Center (2008) based on Jeune Afrique (2007).  
Hence, we followed these three criteria; first, good socio-economic agricultural 
environment, second non abundant mineral resources and finally similar income GDP 
per capita; we thus found the following countries: South Africa, Botswana and Namibia 
because in 1990 they had GDP per capita higher than USD 1000,00.  
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Other criteria that we thought in the begain of this research was GINI index, the index  
is named after its developer, Corrado Gini an Italian statistician. GINI measures the area 
between the Lorenz curve and the hypothetical line of absolute equality, a society that 
scores 0.0 or 0 on the GINI scale has perfect equality in income distribution, on the 
other hand the score 1.0 or 100 indicates the total inequality in other words in this 
hypostatical country only one person corners all the income. 
But GINI index showed not fit to describe the rural environment situation or identify the 
rural poverty levels, also our research looking for tool to reduce the rural poverty line 
we not assess the inequality. Disparity between rich and poverty is very important but is 
not our subject, and GDP per capita income is more effective tool to selected our 
sample, as we showed the next chart, furthermore west institutions using frequently 
USD 1000,00 per capita as border between developing and low developing countries. 
 
Chart 3.1: Link between GINI index and rural poverty line. 
 
Source: World Bank data. *GINI Zimbabwe 1995 and ** GINI Botswana 1996 
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Chart 3.2: Link between GDP per capita income and rural poverty line 
 
Source: World Bank data 
 
Also, we removed Nigeria and Kenya because, amongst their export goods, the mineral 
resources as oil and iron are the main products. But we kept another country that has a 
great dependence on copper exports: Zambia was maintained, because it has changed its 
economic profile and the percentage of arable land in this country has been growing 
faster than in other countries.  
The market share of Nigeria’s export was made up by 95 percent petroleum or 
petroleum products in 1990, while the arable land grew 6 percent between 1990 and 
2005. Kenya’s exports depended, for 48 percent of revenue on oil and iron and the 
arable land rose less the 1 percent in the same period. On the other hand, Zambia's 
exports relied on 60 percent of revenue on copper, but the arable land increased more 
than 9 percent between 1990 and 2005(IMF and FAOstat). 
Lesotho has an economy based on re-exporting manufactures goods (drawback) mainly 
with South Africa and mining and quarrying, thus also Lesotho could not fit for this 
model.    
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Therefore, up to this step we had; Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe, to create a model that assessed the role of agricultural productivity and 
the socio-economic environment in low-income countries. As we know the linkages 
paradigm hinders the socio-economic environment in SSA (Delgado et al 1998), 
however, as we know too, the small agricultural countries can develop better when they 
increase international trade. 
Thus, with the aim of leveling the group and reaching the largest possible number of 
countries, we used the gravity model, to fit the poll. 
The Gravity Equation or so-called gravity model is now fashionable; it was originally 
used by Tinbergen (1962) and has become common; it explains the volume of trade 
between two countries. In a nutshell, the trade will be directly proportional of their 
GDPs and inversely to any trade barriers, distances, uncertainty exchange rate or 
cultural differences (Chen, 2002 and Cho et. al, 2002). 
With the aim of increasing the number of surveyed countries, we researched and 
highlighted commercial treaties, the GDP and population sizes, geographic position and 
regional culture (Gravity model), besides the agro-food index, non-abundant mineral 
resources and similar GDP per capita. We arrived to 8 countries in southern Africa: 
Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. These SSA – 8 represents 63% of all agricultural low-income 
countries in SSA, 75% of all agricultural low-income countries with 7 or more 
agricultural westerns companies and, finally, they represents 84.7% of the all rural 
population of the so called “agricultural low-income countries” 
Among these 8 countries there are 4 commercial treaties - Despite the appearance that 
the treaties are a kind of “private” trading arrangements, customized to fit specific 
economic circumstances like energy sectors. These treaties are: African Economic 
Community with 53 members (AEC) that involve the 8 countries; the Southern African 
Development Community with 15 members (SADC) which include Malawi, 
Mozambique, U.R. Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; The East African Community, 
with 5 members (EAC) which include Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and U.R. Tanzania 
and The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, with 20 members 
(COMESA) that involve Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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Some authors do not believe in African regional trades; Foote (2009) explained that all 
African integration treaties have statistically had negative effects, because endogenous 
concerns as civil wars, political and monetary stability, added up which African 
economies which still rely disproportionately on exporting commodities outside Africa, 
these inhibit, according to Foote, all possibilities to improvement regional trades.   
Three reasons contradict his argument: first of all, in Foote’s case he picked up all 
African countries and all goods, while our assumption was that mineral resources 
usually have as main goal the developed countries and the emerging market, rarely 
regional trade. This decision certainly affected the model, thus this result are not useful, 
in our opinion, to analyses the agricultural environment.    
Secondly, the agricultural goods in African countries have large volumes of informal 
imports, mainly between neighboring countries since ethnic links are more important 
than bureaucratic permissions (UN 2005). However, the official numbers, between 2005 
and 2010, showed that regional trade using EAC, COMESA and SADC treaties had 
great importance in agricultural business. 
Among the imports, the three main agriculture commodities had a significant percentile 
within the intra-trade blocks; maize was 71,45 percent in 2005 and 72,3 in 2010. Rice 
was 38,14 percent in 2005 and 42,44 percent in 2010. Wheat reached 28,13 percent in 
2005 and 23,88 percent in 2010 (Makochekanwa 2012). 
Finally, IMF (2005) and World Bank (2004) agree that regional trade arrangements are 
the most promising way to development of African countries; with relatively small 
investments in regional ports and roads, the use of joint tenders to help secure key 
imports at more favorable prices and cooperation on various monetary and financial 
matters, all African economics will develop very fast. Hence, the similar GDP sizes, 
geographic position, population sizes, similar regional culture and mainly the 
commercial treaties are good items to fit our sample.     
Out choice of limiting the analysis to these selections of countries has been based upon 
economic and technical issues. First of all African countries are not similar enough 
interns of economic structure: for example, few of them have an economy strongly 
based on oil or mineral resources (like Libia and Nigeria, for example). 
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On the other hand, the availability of a reasonable data set and a “reasonably” stable 
economic and political context, was also needed in order to attempt to evaluate the 
effects of other variables (i.e. the one of our interest). 
Furthermore, this sample also belongs to or has a great link with the same agro-climatic 
zones as AW and CAW
6
 types (figure 3.2), which supposed that agriculture could work 
at the same speed, if all external factors were the same as socio-economics environment. 
It was impossible to introduce the Republic Democratic of Congo and Angola because 
they have huge mineral resources. 
Thus, our criteria for the choices were: 
 Good economic environment conditions of agriculture: we used the attracting 
power of western enterprise of agro-foods in SSA countries (OECD 2008). So 
our sample reduced from 47 to 37 countries in SSA (table 3.1). 
 Secondly, similar GDP per capita – less than USD 1000,00 in 2005 – and non 
abundance of mineral resources (table 3.2);, we divided them in three groups. 
Labeled as agricultural, mining and manufacturing countries, and we consider 
the list of export goods to do it. 
 The same or similar agro-climatic zones (figure 3.2) 
 Strong similaritiesamong countries in terms of GDP, population sizes, 
geographic position, alike regional culture and linkages by commercial treaties. 
Hence, using these assumptions we have 8 countries – Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, 
The Agrisystem Ph.D. program contemplated the experience abroad, and during our 
experience at The ICCO in London, we had the opportunity to investigate deeply the 
international cocoa market and among main cocoa producers there are some African 
countries, whereof Ghana showed more details about the rural economy.  
Then, with a more detailed database, it was possible to write an especial chapter about 
regional economy and type of crop, their paybacks, and we can observe whether the 
“poverty trap” theory is confirmed (Lipton 1977, Ravallion and Chen 2005 and Fan, 
Hazell and Thorat 1998). 
                                                          
6
 See Peel et al 2007 methodology 
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Also, we added Ghana in the model, because Ghana has the same, agro-climatic zone, 
the similar GDP per capita, non abundance of mineral resources and a good agro-
economic environment, despite it has not indications that among Ghana and others eight 
countries did belong on the same gravital model, between 1990 and 2005. 
 
Table 3.2: The profile of SSA countries  
Income per capita in 
2005 
Exporting mainly 
Agricultural goods 
Exporting mainly 
Mining and quarrying 
goods 
Exporting mainly 
Manufacturing goods 
More than USD 
10.001 
 Equatorial Guinea  
Between USD 1.001 
and USD 10.000 
 Angola, Botswana, 
Congo Republic, 
Gabon, Namibia and 
South Africa****. 
Swaziland***. 
USD 1.000 or less Benin, Burundi, Cote 
d’Ivoire*, Ghana*, 
Malawi, 
Mozambique*, 
Rwanda, Uganda, 
United Republic of 
Tanzania*, Senegal* 
and Zimbabwe. 
Burkina Faso**, 
Cameroon, Central 
African Republic**, 
Congo Democratic 
Republic, Guinea, 
Kenya,  Liberia, 
Madagascar** 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
and Zambia** 
Togo*** and 
Lesotho. 
Source: calculated by author with the World Bank database and CIA data base. 
*agricultural country with mineral resources,** mining country with agricultural resources,*** manufacturing country with mineral 
resources and **** mining country with manufacturing resources 
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Figure 3.2: The SSA, agro-climatic zones 
 
Source: Koppen-Geiger climate type map of Africa  
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4. THE NINE LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
UNDER SCRUTINY  
 
In this chapter we provide a synthetic view for each country, highlighting few aspects: 
colonial era, political and social situation until 1990, current geographic condition, 
macroeconomic data, education and health systems, infrastructure data, rural scenario, 
main crops, major international partners and finally GDP share mobility.    
 
4.1 Burundi  
Under the Belgian colonial administration until 1962, Burundi was officially 
administrated by the United Nations (U.N.) between 1962 – 1966, but the civil conflict 
began in1965. After Burundi’s independence, the country lived in a civil war regime 
until June 1993, when it had the first free and fair elections in post-independence 
(Bundervoet et. al. 2008)     
With peace and the cease-fire agreement undersigned for all ethnicities in 2002, 
Burundi’s history started again. In spite of this, the political stability has been 
improving since 1996, with the creation or recreated of national institutions as the 
Judiciary and Legislative ones. 
With an area of 27.834 square kilometers Burundi has sixteen provinces and a terrible 
performance when we talk about rural poverty reduction. In 1990 the number of people 
living below the poverty line in rural areas was 36,2 per cent but in 2005 was around 
70,68 per cent (World Bank data).     
The income per capita in current USD plummeted from USD 199.26 in 1990 to USD 
85,64 in 2003 when it began to rise and arrived at USD 107.87 in 2005. During this 
time the agricultural gross per capita production index fell from 128,68 in 1990 to 99,07 
in 2005. Among these sixteen years the agricultural trade balance was weaker and 
during 2002 and 2004 it was negative (chart 4.1). Burundi faced the hard reality of the 
food security throughout 1997 until 2001.  
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Chart 4.1: Burundi macroeconomic environment  
 
Source: Agricultural trade balance and gross per capita produciton index by FAOstat and rural poverty line and GDP per capita by 
The World Bank data. 
In the rural environment poverty is widespread, with the average farms sizes smaller 
than 1 hectare, household without land tenure or access credit. The land tenure system 
in Burundi started to move after 2007, although talking about land right in Burundi 
means bring up of the civil war feelings. It is a delicate topic and the changes will be 
slow.    
Burundi has many macroeconomic problems that reduced access to credit; the percentile 
of domestic credit to private sector by GDP in 1990 was 8,61 percent and 2005 was 
22,26 percent. IFAD (2008) estimated that rural economy had reached around 4 percent 
in 2002, nevertheless in this year the World Bank said that the domestic credit to the 
private sector represented 31,10 percent of GDP. 
This scenario showed that, if Burundi’s government resolved the macroeconomic 
problems, it would not improve the rural access to credit. In effect, if it had the money, 
banks would need the guarantees to lend money and without land tenure the farmers 
hardly offer guarantees.   
However, the micro-farms phenomenon is increasing, for two basic reasons; firstly, the 
increasing density of population pushes to the reduction of farm’s dimension. The rural 
density soared from 572.4 people per square kilometer of arable land in 1990 to 705,8 
people per square kilometer of arable land in 2005 (World Bank data). 
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Secondly, the arable land areas shrunk very fast in the 1990s because, while the civil 
war was happening, the rebel and government forces were burning crops and fields. The 
rebels had burned coffee trees because they were trying to reduce government income, 
and the government forces had burned or stole food crops (Human Rights Watch reports 
1998). After the civil war, the fields, degraded or abandoned were not recovered and the 
erosion by rainfall and wind is continuing to reduce the arable land in Burundi. 
The good news comes at education level: we noticed that, in 1990, less than 40 percent 
of adult population was literate, but the gross school enrollment ratio at the primary 
level rose from 70,59 percent in 1990 to 88,24 percent in 2005. It indicated important 
progress to improve literate level of the country. 
On the other hand, health situation has not improved, life expectancy at birth was, in 
1990, 46,22 years and 47,75 years in 2005. The infant mortality rate was estimated at 
110 per thousand live births in 1990 and 98,5 in 2005.  
The situation was made worse by the HIV/AIDS pandemic: the official data indicate 
that about 4 percent of the population was infected between 1990 – 2005. But IFDA 
estimated that around 13 percent of population was HIV/AIDS positive in 2005.       
Government data report all the people that used health public system and did an HIV 
test that resulted positive. On the other hand IFAD picked up data their own through 
field work and ONGs information. Anyway, the Burundi health system did not 
improved between 1990 – 2005 for simple and severe reasons, like a narrow budget and 
the very inflexible heritage the civil war produced: in 2002 around 25 percent of the 
adult population had some kind of mutilation caused by the war
7
 and the poor 
infrastructure in Burundi.     
The infrastructure in Burundi is similar to others low income country in SSA. Many 
problems reduced the competitiveness of Burundi environment business, as electricity 
supply and its prices, water systems that has insufficiencies water supply in dry months 
and the transport system. 
 
 
                                                          
7
 See Republic of Burundi “Poverty Reductions Strategy Paper – PRSP 2006. 
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All these factors are relevant, but among these the transport system is more important to 
enhance of agricultural production. Because low costs of transport to help the tiller to 
leap from subsistence agriculture or “food crop” to agriculture trade or “cash crops”, the 
farmer should reduce costs of input and output. 
On the other hand, electricity and water supply are not relevant to enhances Burundi’s 
agriculture. Farmers in Burundi use a very low standard of agricultural techniques, they 
do not use electricity: during 1990 – 2005, around 85 percent of rural household was not 
supplied by electricity. Despite the importance of water in agriculture in Burundi, this 
resources does not come by irrigation, basically the water comes by rainfall, with a 
mean of mm 103,66/month between 1990 – 2005. The number of rural household that 
had water supply systems was smaller than 15 per cent. 
Although even transport is fundament to improve the agriculture trade, the Burundi 
transport did not improve during 1990 – 2005. Burundi does not have rail lines and its 
road density shrank from 52,03 kilometers of road per 100 square kilometers of land 
area in 1990 to 44,27 kilometers in 2005.           
The geographic position limited Burundi’s agricultural development: a landlocked 
country usually has problems with international trade, high costs of transportation, 
negotiation with neighbour; in this case, Burundi also had high costs of neighbour 
transportation and some conflicts. 
With a small domestic market Burundi face more vulnerable indeed. The country 
macroeconomic index worsened very quickly after 1996, with an international embargo 
that isolated Burundi between 1996 – 1998 (chart 4.2). 
Current, the main partners to goods exportation are, Germany (15.7%), China (10.5%) 
Sweden (9.5%) and Belgium (9%) all are traditional agriculture goods importers, 
Instead Burundi import energy and manufactory goods from Saudi Arabia (16.8%), 
Belgium (8.2%), China (7.5%) and Uganda (7.4%) according CIA data. 
The UE 27 is the major trade partner for Burundi; it represented, in 2005, 25.2 percent 
the Burundi international trades. But the UE 27 import basically coffee and tea and 
export mainly machineries and products for the chemical industries. In other words the 
UE 27 imported in 2010 USD 26.3 million and exported USD 81.7 million. 
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Chart 4.2: Burundi total donnors (ton)  
 
Source: Bundervoet et al 2008. 
 
However, the regional commercial has been increasing very well in the last years. 
Between 2005 and 2011, the African Economic Community (AEC), The East African 
Community (EAC) trade grew on average by 3,8 percent and 4.6 percent per year 
respectively (IMF data). Despite the limited data we assume that Africa’s regional trade 
could be more profitable for African countries than traditional north – south 
commercial.      
The environment business in Burundi has so many hurdle that it is almost impossible to 
fight with northern industries and survive. Burundi’s businessmen are trying competent 
with SSA countries that are members of the commercial treaties.  
World Bank (Doing Business 2012), showed that, to export a container FOB from 
Burundi costs USD 2.965 and it takes 35 days to travel from Bujumbura and reach a 
port, but which agricultural product is fit to wait 35 days and supported this high cost? 
Similarly, importing is even more difficult and costs USD 4.855 and need 54 days from 
a port to Bujumbura. 
The main crops in Burundi between 1990 – 2005 were: bananas with average 25.44 
percent of area planted dry beans 22.91 percent and maize with 10 percent, all used as 
crops food or subsistence. The two main exporting agriculture goods, coffee and tea, 
had on average 2.71 percent and 0.65 percent of area planted respectively (chart 4.3). 
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Chart 4.3: Burundi main crops     
 
Source: FAOstat 
On the other hand, in the United Republic of Tanzania, a member country in booth 
commercial treaties AEC and EAC, the export container cost is USD 1.255 it takes half 
the time of the Burundi, just 18 days, from port to Dodoma, and importing a container 
costs USD 1.430 and takes 24 days to do reverse path. 
Although Burundi economics has been changing since 2000, the services value 
overtook the agricultural value of the GDP percentage; as a rule, agricultural GDP share 
lose weight when a country develops, off course Burundi has started over its history 
recently but the trend of the GDP share brought up good signals (chart 4.4). 
 
Chart 4.4: Burundi percentile of GDP share  
 
Source; The World Bank data  
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4.2 Ghana 
Ghana is located at the West African coast and gained independence in 1957, but until 
1960 the status of Ghana was that of a “commonwealth realm”, in other words it was a 
sovereign state within the Commonwealth of Nations that currently has Elizabeth II as 
its reigning constitutional monarch. With a national referendum in 1960 Ghana was 
declared a republic. 
In February 1966 the first president was deposed by a military coup, and then in 1969 
the so called “second republic” started. Ghana suffered very much with “cold war”, 
because Ghana has a strategic geographic position and was leaning toward the US, 
USSR and national interests. 
After 35 years of independence in November 1992, “the fourth republic” started and 
this was followed by a continuous economic growth which produced more social and 
political stability; however, this economic growth did not prevent the last civil conflict 
between Konkombas and Nunumbas ethnicities, which happened in 1994 and had 
around 2000 casualties. Despite this terrible incident, Ghana social environment has 
been improving year by year. 
Ghana has 238.537 square kilometers in total land area and 10 provinces and the best 
performance in SSA when the subject is rural poverty reduction. The rural poverty fell 
from 48 percent in 1990 to 20 percent of the rural population in 2005 (World Bank 
data). 
Even so, the rural poverty level fell very sharply, the GDP per capita income made a 
peculiar rally in current USD: in 1990 it was USD 397.88, in 2000 it was USD 259.71 
and in 2005 stood at USD 495.39. Similarly, the gross per capita production index 
followed the rural poverty line lead, with inversed function and grew constantly from 
55.15 in 1990 to 99.97 in 2005. Although the gross per capita production index in 
Ghana has been growing constantly, the agricultural trade balance has been fluctuating 
irregularly for these sixteen years (chart 4.5). 
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Chart 4.5: Ghana macroeconomic environment      
 
Source: Agricultural trade balance and gross per capita produciton index by FAOstat and rural poverty line and GDP per capita by 
The World Bank data.  
 
The rural environment in Ghana have had good progress, despite the fact that the rural 
population  grew by nearly 20 percent from 9.5 millions of people in 1990 to 11.4 
millions of people in 2005, rural poverty declined from 4.5 millions of people to 2.3 
millions of people in the same period, thus Ghana’s agricultural have showed its 
strength.  
Anyway, Ghana has a land tenure system to build and currently land tenure scenario is 
very complicated. Different interpretations about land tenure between central and local 
governments and indigenous traditional have created a land tenure systems with “6 
different regimes of land tenure” which is not easy to sort out.  
Awanyo (2009) gave a thorough explanation of the complex subject: the relations 
between farmer land investments and land tenure (figure 4.1),“...That social identities 
created a scenario unease to understand that point of view the west countries...”, he 
claims that the whole system cannot change with new laws, it will lead to new civil 
conflicts. However, he says that the current land tenure system and bank needs are 
incompatible and they have blocked rural credit access. 
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On the other hand Ndulu (2008) has a very firm position, the lack of transparency of the 
land tenure process in SSA has as main goal to reduce the autonomy of citizenship, 
because access to land is strongly related to the ability to escape from dependence on 
the state, hence the citizen could have freedom of choice in multidimensional characters 
as political, cultural and social. “...Without institutions stronger, SSA countries have 
preferred the maintenance the land tenure insecurity”... (Ndulu, 2008). 
The modern literature shows a disparity of opinions about the solution to this problem. 
Platteau (2002) said that land titling does not necessarily impact on the investment 
behaviour of farmers, if a country or region has good opportunities, created by 
macroeconomic environment, the farmers’ behavior may change form passive to 
proactive behaviour and they will do investments.  
On the other hand, Besley’s analysis (1993) holds that the farmers’ investments will 
increase, whether the government investments spread in rural areas or they promote 
land security. Thus the governments of SSA have two ways to develop rural areas; 
either do great investments in rural area like China or they create a good socio-
economic environment that gives guarantees to the private sector.    
The apparent dichotomy among the authors and issues above disappeared in the 
particular situation of Ghana. In the same comfortable macroeconomic environment, 
with hardly no land tenure system, some farmers have been investment and others have 
not. In overall numbers the farmers invested and agricultural land areas increase from 
126050 square kilometers in 1990 to 149500 square kilometers in 2005, the agricultural 
land areas was rising around 1 percent by years.  
We assume that, if the land tenure process was resolved, the rural areas would undergo 
very good modifications, however it is also true that the six different regimes of land 
tenure are mutually respected by central and regional governments and also by 
indigenous traditions, this has contributed to creating a scenario with more security and 
peace in rural areas. 
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Figure 4.1: Ghana land tenure system  
Source Awanyo 2009 page 148  
On the other hand, with clear rules of land tenure, possibly Ghana’s rural environment 
will follow the U. R. of Tanzania and Zambia’s8 path, which improve indeed their rural 
credit access. Ghana expanded the domestic credit to private sector in 1990, reaching 
4.92 percent of the GDP, while in 2005 it stood at 15.54 percent of the GDP, but rural 
credit access was stagnant.  
Land rights may open the possibility of the rural credit, although Ghana is an 
agricultural country, with 55% of the work force and 60% of the population in rural 
areas.  
                                                          
8
 IFAD Zambia 2004 and IFAD United Republic of Tanzania 2007. 
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The rural Ghanaian people usually do not have guarantees to get loans, 87.1% of males 
and 91.9% of females in Ghana indicated with guarantees for loans only their name, in 
others words, nothing. As a result the average 95 percent of application was refused in 
2005. Only 1.8% of males and 0.8% of females, in rural areas, had indicates with 
guarantees their land (GLSS5). 
While in land rights Ghana has few problems, in education level Ghana is better than 
the SSA average, the adult population literacy corresponded in 1990 to around a half of 
the inhabitants and the gross school enrollment ratio to the primary school level was 
70.49 percent. In 2005 this index leapt to 90.3 percent. In others words, 90 percent of 
the pupils of school age were attending school in Ghana. In spite of good national 
numbers, the public investments in education are concentrated in regions where there is 
political (Accra) or economic power. 
Between 1990 and 2005 public investments per capita in education in northern Ghana 
were smaller than in others regions. We know that the problem does not only education 
investments, but also Ghana’s division; the regional problems between Accra, the 
Eastern region, the Western region, Central and Northern regions are historic, structural 
and cultural
9
.      
Besides, Ghana’s slavery history created deeper scars between the north ethnicities, 
enslaved, and the south ethnicities, that were involved in the slave business. 
Furthermore, in the past, different natural ecosystems lead to different economic 
environments that were accentuated with more investment in southern than northern 
regions. Finally, the higher education investments in southern regions created a kind of 
barrier to stop the emigration from north to south.    
Only 30.2 percent of Ghana’s population speaks official language: English. In the rural 
savannah only 8.5 percent is literature in English and 10.1 percent of Ghanaian speaks 
English, in Accra 61 percent is literature in English and 80 percent speaks English 
(GLSS5). 
 
                                                          
9
 See Destombes J. 1999 (Nutrition and Economic Destitution in Northern Ghana 1930-1957) 
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Ghana’s government is trying to change this situation10, but at present Ghana is divided 
as follows: Most of people from the northern only speak Frafra’s, in the center of the 
country Brong and Adan’s, in the east of the country, Ewe finally in the capital, Accra, 
people speak Ga’s. In the others words, communication is still is an invisible barrier to 
immigration flows and can be explained by the separation of the country. 
Some things are changing because - in despite of difficulties- the people from the north 
are attracted by the idea of moving to the south, and choose predominantly to settle in 
the Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions, overloading the local health system (Geest, 
Vrieling and Dietz, 2010).    
The whole health system is not working well in Ghana but the national and regional 
numbers have the same shape, when we talk about life expectancy at birth the index 
worsened, it was 57.32 years in 1990 and 56.53 years in 2005.        
The infant mortality rate, instead, and the life expectancy at birth improved their 
numbers and fell from 75 per thousand live births in 1990 to 55,4 in 2005. But the infant 
mortality rate is not egalitarian by regions. The Upper West province had the worse 
result with 110 per thousand live births and Accra has the best one with 43 in 1990. The 
scenario worsened in 2005, Accra infant mortality rate fell to 31 per thousand live births 
and Upper West level grew to 115.  
Finally, the percent of adult population infected by HIV/AIDS in 1990 was around 0.6 
percent and doubled in 2005 with 1.2 percent of adult population infected. By showing 
the data, we assume that positive HIV results have stronger links with human behavior 
than the socio environment as; good health system, education level and public 
information campaigns or support. 
Upper West and Upper East have the worst numbers of the national ranking in 
education level, health system, government investments, poverty incidence, but the 
percentage of adults infected in 2005 had 1.1 and 1.2 respectively and the virtual 
regions like Accra and Eastern that have good performance in social environment had 
the adult population infected level was 2.3 and 3.7 percent, one-to-one (GLSS5).  
                                                          
10
 See Blunch 2008 
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The infrastructure of Ghana is another factor that clarifies the level of life quality there, 
Ghana has the huge infrastructure gaps between regions. Among the ten regions the 
access to water, electricity and roads is very disproportion. 
Around 39.5 percent of households in Ghana had access to the water supply in 2005, but 
Accra’s households served represented 84.3 percent, the others regions as Eastern, 
Central, Western and Ashanti around 12 percent of families had access – this regions 
the so called “forest region”. On the other hand, the region so called “savannah 
ecosystem” that is represented by three regions, Upper East, Upper West and Northern 
only 5.9 percent of households had access to the water supply. 
The Electricity supply had the same profile, 49,2 percent of household had access in 
2005. Accra had 88.1 percent of household assisted, the forest region around 32.4 
percent and in the savannah region only 16.6 percent of household had access to 
electricity (GLSS5). 
Ghana’s roads density has the same profile as the water or electricity supply, national 
level was 24,15 kilometers of road per 100 square kilometers of land area (World 
Bank).  
Ghana has a relativity modern economic if compare with the SSA average, the 
merchandise trade as a share of GDP leap from 42.72 percent in 1990 to 98.17 percent 
in 2005. As explained Ghana export basically primary products, its principal partners 
are; the Netherlands (11,7%), the U.K. (7%), France (5,7%) and the U.S. (5,6%).  
On the other hand it imports main capital equipment and petroleum the principal 
partners are: China (16%), Nigeria (15%), India (5,6%) and the U.S. (5,6%) according 
to CIA data.  
However the EU 27 is the largest trade partner of Ghana, representing 27.4 percent of 
all Ghana trades. Ghana imported USD 2.25 billion and exported 1.31billion (Euro 
STAT data).       
The seven main crops in Ghana occupied more than 73 percent of the arable land in 
2005. Cocoa beans represented 28.43 percent of the area, and its area grew 16 percent, 
between 1990 – 2005. Cocoa crops were following by maize and cassava with around 
11.5 of the area each. Nevertheless the crop which grew the most was groundnut; with 
an increase the 38 percent in its area, and oil palm had great performance growing by 11 
percent in its area (chart 4.6). 
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Chart 4.6: Ghana main crops  
 
Source: FAOstat 
The widely accepted hypothesis is that vis-à-vis the economic developed, the social 
environment improved, the share of agriculture GDP should decline during this 
economic phenomenon (Lipton and Ravallion 1993, Roemer and Gugerty 1997, 
Delgado, et al 1998), but it is not working in Ghana. Ghana produced welfare, the 
poverty in rural areas was reduced but agriculture’s GDP remained firm, the GDP share 
changed sharply in 1993, just because, Ghana’s calculation methodologies had changed 
(chart 4.7). 
Chart 4.7: Ghana GDP share 
 
Source; The World Bank data  
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4.3 Malawi 
Nyasaland won independence on July 6, 1964. But between 1962 and 1963 it joined a 
kind of federation, the Commonwealth of Nations with Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) 
and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), that was dissolved in 1963 and the country 
changed the name for Malawi.    
The first Prime Minister Dr. Banda declared in his first month as ruler, “one party, one 
leader, one government and no nonsense about it”. In 1971 he affirmed himself 
president for life and consolidated the authoritarian rules. After violent protests that 
started in 1992, Malawi had the first free election in May 1994, so Banda’s era ended 
after 30 years.    
Currently Malawi has three regions, Northern, Central and Southern, the country has 
118.480 square kilometers with a particularity, more than 20 percent of the country or 
24.400 square kilometers of the country area is water surface, mainly composed by 
Lake Malawi that is the biggest, Lake Malombe, Lake Chilwa and Lake Chiuta.   
The data about poverty line during Banda’s dictatorship are always estimated, the NGO 
ActionAid said that, in 1990, 51 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty and 
the World Bank data show which in 1998 it reached a peak with 66,5 percent of the 
population living below the poverty line, after 1998 the poverty started to decline. 
At the same time GDP per capita made a rally between 1990 – 2005 in 1997 it reached 
its highest point with USD 248,67, in 1990 was USD 198,99 and in 2005 USD 201,79 
(World Bank data). The agricultural gross per capita production index (API) started to 
grow significantly after 1994; with the end of Banda dictatorship, this trend kept 
following gradually until 2001 when it started to decrease (chart 4.8). 
The rural environment in Malawi changed completely with the end of the program so 
called "The Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation" (ADMARC), which 
was created in 1971 and provides farmers with inputs and output of market with a major 
focus on improve the food security level. ADMARC finished in 1988 with the end of 
monopsonistic government position. 
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Chart 4.8: Malawi macroeconomic environment 
 
Source: Agricultural trade balance and gross per capita produciton index by FAOstat and rural poverty line and GDP per capita by 
The World Bank data. 
When ADMARC collapsed, the food security problem increased because the 
opportunities for small farmers that had no access to the credit market shrunk, mainly in 
remote areas.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, to respond to social problems, the government created 
Agricultural Sector Adjustment Program (ASAC), which basically introduced hybrid 
maize through subsidies to improve the yield and at the same time the government gave 
the permission to plant tobacco for small farmers, which was a prerogative of farms of 
states. 
However, this government attempt was blocked for two reasons; the droughts years 
between 1990 – 1993, and the suspension of western trades and financial aid. Unlike the 
Burundi embargo, which isolated that country between 1996 – 1998, in Malawi’s case, 
the western countries denied the international Malawi trades, but, with the help of 
Mozambique government, the humanitarian aid continued. 
The effects of the international embargo were the end of Banda's era and the downfall of 
the entire agricultural sector; without government subsidies or access to credit, with no 
access to international market and due to the continuous arrival the foods by 
international donation, the agricultural business was practically disintegrated. 
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After the democratic government, the Malawian assumed the government and the 
subsidy program began; this gave vouchers to small farmers to buy seed and fertilizer in 
the free market (IFAD 2009). However, the domestic credit to the private sector in 
Malawi, compared with the share of GDP declined from 1990, with 10,94 percent of 
GDP share to 7,91 percent in 2005 (World Bank data). 
The traditional problem, with the land tenure system, is present also in Malawi; this has 
simple rules from colonial era and maintained by the Banda government. Malawi has 
three categories of controlling land as: Public land, Private land and Customary land 
(Matchaya 2008). The main problem is that around 66 percent of land tenure remains 
under customary tenure, government land were 21 percent and only 13 percent of farms 
had the formal deal of the land (Malawi government 1997). Customary land that was the 
exception to the rule nowadays is the common rule. 
Nevertheless, the Malawi macroeconomic problems have forbidden the growth of the 
credit market and government accounts have a historic huge deficit which has dragged 
down all the opportunities to development the credit market; this problem caused, for 
example, the max-devaluation – 50 percent – of Malawi currency in 2012 second IMF.         
In spite of many macroeconomics difficulties, the education level in the country 
improved, until 1995 as in slow-motion at an average 2,6 percent per year, between 
1990 – 1995 it skyrocketed, in the firsts years of democracy the growth was on average 
5,6 percent per years. Between 1995 – 2005 the gross school enrollment ratio at the 
primary level rose from 71,53 percent in 1990, to 128.17 percent in 2005.  
On the other hand, the health system in Malawi showed awful numbers, the main threat 
being the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Western institutions have different statistics about it, the 
most optimistic said that the national rate of infection among adults remains near 11 
percent (IFAD 2009) and the most pessimist believed that adults infected were 20 
percent in 2005 (UN 2005). 
This disparate of numbers is justified because Malawi's health system has problems 
about management database and sometime the sources of the government have more 
than two data about the same subject. Malawi government report (1997) showed that 
AIDS produced 650.000 orphaned, on the other hand the site of Malawi government 
displayed very different numbers, it talks about 120.000 orphaned in 1998. 
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Anyway, with a faulty health system and indigenous behavior, the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
increased and reduced the work force in agricultural, created serious problems about 
land heritages
11
; furthermore this phenomenon reduced indeed the capacity of Malawian 
people to have food for subsistence. FAO estimated that, between 2002 and 2003, 
around 3 million people suffered the food shortages and in 2005 Malawi's situation 
worsened and it faced more than 4 million people or 34 percent of the population was 
without adequate food supplies.     
Infrastructure is another point that weakens agricultural production and the poverty 
reduction. With high costs, it landlocked country, which may improve the rural 
environment in two ways; building rural roads in remote areas to facilitate the domestic 
trade and the biggest modal project that will link Shire-Zambezi waterway with Sena 
Corridor: this project will connect the entire country with Nacala port in Mozambique.      
The strategy led Malawi to increase roads density from 8,61 kilometers of road per 100 
square kilometers of land area in 1990 to around 13,88 kilometers of road in 2005. On 
the other hand, rail lines density decreased at the same time from 0,66 kilometers of rail 
line density in 1990 to approximately 0,59 kilometers of rail line density per 100 square 
kilometers of land area in 2005 (World Bank data) 
Malawi government estimated that transportation costs account around 55 percent of the 
total transaction costs in Malawi trades. Doing Business 2010 confirm that Malawi has 
the same problem of almost all landlocked countries in Africa: the high costs and 
complicated bureaucratic system which prevents carrying out international trade.  
A container cost is USD 1713,00 and takes 41 days for export process and 51 days for 
the import process. The costs to import is higher than for the export process; it takes 
around USD 2570,00 to arrive in Nacala port from Mozambique (Doing Business 
2010).  
Although the importation costs are 50 percent higher than exportation costs, this does 
not prevents the negative historic balance on international trade. Malawi's exports are 
essentially primary goods, and the country imported mainly fuel and secondary 
products.  
                                                          
11
 See Matchaya 2008 
60 
 
Nowadays the major export partners are: South Africa (43%), EU 27 (12,9%), Zambia 
(8%) and India (7%). The main import partners are EU 27 (28,2%), South Africa 
(8,5%), Zimbabwe (8,4%) and Russia (7,3%) (EUROSTAT data). 
Despite the fact that Malawi has historically a negative international balance trade, with 
EU 27, Malawi has a positive balance; it exported USD 230 million and imported USD 
129 million. Naturally, 83 percent of export goods share was tobacco, and 47 percent of 
importations corresponded to chemical products and 24 percent was machinery 
(EUROSTAT data). Malawi’s main problem is in “fuel account” with South Africa. 
Even though tobacco is the main exported goods and play a crucial role in the balance 
of account of Malawi, the maize crops is without doubts an indispensable source for 
food and the percentile of area planted decreased from 56 percent in 1990 to 45 percent 
in 2005 (chart 4.9), but maize continue support around 67 percent of all calories in the 
Malawian diet between 1990 – 2005 (FAOstat). 
Chart 4.9: Malawi main crops 
 
Source: FAOstat 
After 1994, Malawi GDP share had a drastic change, the democratic government cut its 
economic participation and, as a main consequence, the services portion of GDP grew 
up very fast. However, many SOEs or State Companies closed the doors and Malawi 
did not have a very strong deindustrialization process (chart 4.10). 
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Chart 4.10: Malawi percentile of GDP share 
 
Source; The World Bank data  
 
4.4 Mozambique 
Almost African countries won the independence, because after the Second World War 
Europeans nations were weakened and this created possibilities for African colonies to 
fight for freedom, Except for Portuguese colonies, Portugal had been neutral during 
World War II and the “Estado Novo” or Portuguese dictatorship drove the country and 
all the colonies with “the sweet iron hand” until April 1974. 
Mozambique became independent from Portugal on June 25, 1975. The Front for the 
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) made the first government with a strong 
influence from the Soviet Union, FRELIMO established a one-party and the Socialist 
State. After a few years the civil war exploded, and it lasted 16 years starting in 1977 
and finishing 1992. 
Formed in 1975 the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), was the main 
objector to Mozambique’s government. RENAMO intensified the fights in 1990, 
supported by U.S. forces, South Africa and the newly independence country, 
Zimbabwe, thus in November 1990 FRELIMO government adopted a new constitution 
that guaranteed multiparty state and periodic elections. 
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In October 1992, the cease-fire agreement was signed in Rome between opponents and 
in 1994 Mozambique had the first free elections: the FRELIMO party won the election 
and after one year Mozambique joined the Commonwealth of Nations, hence the ex-
Portuguese colonial is the only member of Commonwealth of Nations, that never been 
part of the British Empire.  
By mid-1995, around 5.7 million refugees returned to their homes, over 1.7 million 
refugees who had sought asylum in neighboring countries had returned to Mozambique 
and the internally displaced completed this number (Mozambique Government report 
2010).  
Mozambique has 799.380 square kilometers and 10 provinces, the country have fought 
very successfully against the extreme rural poverty, this was reduced from 83,9 percent 
in 1990 to 47,9 percent in 2005 (World Bank data). Then again, extreme rural poverty 
trend changed after 1995 and poverty reduction was accelerated between 1995 and 
2002, unfortunately after 2002, rural poverty reductions come back of the first year’s 
rhythm of 1990s. 
The income GDP per capita following poverty reduction lasted until 2002, after that we 
saw a dichotomy of the data. Until 1995 both indexes remained relatively stable, after 
this year the rural poverty reduction and income GDP per capita statistics improved 
considerably,  the income GDP per capita fluctuated between 2000 – 2002, but rural 
poverty reduction kept its good performance. After that income GDP per capita 
restarted growing well, on the other hand, rural poverty reduction slowed the 
accomplishment. 
1995 was a significant also for the agricultural gross per capita production index (API), 
it grew 22 points in a year, but that was the unique sprint, while between 1996 and 2005 
API remained stable. This climb of the API level helped the agricultural trade balance 
of Mozambique that reduced the deficit during the three successive years (chart 4.11). 
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Chart 4.11: Mozambique macroeconomic environment 
 
Source: Agricultural trade balance and gross per capita produciton index by FAOstat and rural poverty line and GDP per capita by 
The World Bank data. 
To explain the low performance of the agricultural sector, we should be aware of 
Mozambique particularity, the northern and central provinces have a fine agro-
ecological conditions and good potential to develop agro-business, on the other hand 
southern provinces have a very poorer soil and scarce rainfall, in addition are subject to 
recurrent droughts and floods. 
Furthermore, the majority of the farms in Mozambique have produced goods for 
subsistence or the regional market. Typically a farm has on average 1,3 hectares, has no 
deed of property and never had access to credit market. (IFAD 2004). 
On the other hand, 83 percent of the employees who earn a salary and 70 percent of 
urban population are in the south region, and in addition Mozambique has ones of the 
worst transports systems in SSA. According IFAD (2004), to carry agricultural goods 
for more than 50 kilometers, it takes more than a week and the average cost of 
transporting is bigger than the product value. 
As a consequence only one quarter of the arable land was cultivated in 2004 (IFAD 
2004), the south of the country imported food from South Africa and Europe. And the 
central and north regions have a slow development and have carried out the “informal” 
trades with Malawi and Zambia (Abdula and Tschirley 2007). 
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Not only the agriculture sector suffered with Mozambique's mismatch, all the domestic 
credit to private sector shrunk between 1990 and 2005 in percentile of GDP from 17,58 
to 11,84. But again the IFAD estimated that rural sector suffered more and in 2004 got 
around 3,5 percent of the credit from the private sector. Although Mozambique in this 
period did not has big problems with macroeconomics numbers, because the foreign 
direct investment net was on average 3,51 percent of the GDP between 1990 and 2005, 
it overtook by an average of 40 percent the budget government deficit (World Bank 
data). 
In spite of the access to finance, in Mozambique there were bigger problems for 
entrepreneurs there, according to the EnterpriseSurveys (2007) to have access to finance 
in Mozambique is 40 percent more difficult than SSA averagely. On the other hand, 
corruption of public officials is around 20 percent lower than SSA average, hence the 
contraction of credit private sector has other starting point, probable owing to 
regulation, taxes or the bureaucratic system.      
Apparently the bureaucratic system affected also the gross school enrollment ratio at the 
primary level, which increased only by 0,10 percent between 1990 and 1998, from 
62.89 percent in 1990 to 63.80 percent in 1998, but the index changed the trend and 
soared significantly, between 1998 and 2005 from 63.80 percent to 101.10 percent rose 
on average 5,44 percent per year. 
The life expectancy at birth followed the inverse movement of education level and 
improved regularly, between 1990 – 1998 it rose from 43.34 years to 47.17 years. After 
1998 the life expectancy level remained stable and in 2005 it was 47,61 years (World 
Bank data). Although the mortality rate per thousand births improved sharply from 
155.2 children 1990 to 109.1 in 2005, this happened because HIV/AIDS pandemic 
dramatically affected all the health system (UN data). 
Official numbers of people who died because of AIDS in Mozambique, sky-rocketed, in 
1990 the number was 2.200 people per year but in 2005 it was 71.000 people, and the 
UN estimated that around 1.400.000 of people were living with HIV, that means 11.5 
percent of population, so this phenomenon produced around 670.000 orphans in that 
period.       
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Also we can say that the infrastructure situation in Mozambique seems a nightmare, 
notwithstanding a good geographic position, with 4.571 kilometers of coastline on 
Indian Ocean and three countries that must use it infrastructure to access international 
market – Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe – the road and rail lines densities persist in the 
same density. 
Road density in 1990 was 3,36, and arrived to 3,78 in 2005 while rail lines density had 
the same numbers during these sixteen years; 0,38 kilometers per 100 square kilometers 
of land area. For the farmers in Mozambique worse than density numbers is the 
government strategy that has invested in the so called “corridors”. 
The corridors always have latitudinal position toward the east – west linkages, they 
leave the north arable land and south consumers without linkage, furthermore, the 
conditions of the main road, which has longitudinal direction and connects north – south 
areas, are in fair or poor conditions, depending on part of road (Dominguez-Torres and 
Briceño-Garmendia 2011).   
Currently, the Mozambique exports have with main partners the Netherlands (47%), 
South Africa (20,8%) Portugal (5%) and China (3%). The main goods exported are 
unwrought aluminum, electrical energy and unmanufactured tobacco. On the other hand 
Mozambique imported mainly; motor vehicles, petroleum and commodities foods to 
South Africa (43%) Portugal (3,7%) India (2,8%) U.S.  (2,6%) in 2005 (CIA data). 
EU 27 is the major partner and represented 43,6 percent of the Mozambique 
international trades, exporting USD 858,6 million and importing USD 1.136,5 million. 
The EU 27 had a negative balance exporting mainly machinery and importing basically 
aluminum. However, Mozambique's international trade was historically negative in 
2005 (Eurostat).          
We observed which this phenomenon, the problem of trade balance, can does resolve 
with a higher integration within Mozambique regions, using the agricultural potentials, 
and improvement of the environment business. 
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The Mozambique environment business has positives and negatives points: unlike most 
SSA countries, Mozambique does not have problems with the electricity supply, 
apparently corruptions levels and tax rates are lower than SSA average. In contrast, 
entrepreneurs in Mozambique have to deal with problems like access to finance, a huge 
informal sector and highs transport costs; all these items have higher levels than SSA 
average. 
Despite all negative events, the agricultural business continued to grow constantly, 
harvest areas leapt from 3.564 thousands hectares in 1990, to 4.429 thousands hectares 
in 2005. Unfortunately the majority's area is mostly using subsistence or “food crops” as 
maize and cassava, while traditional crops like sorghum have been replaced by cash 
crops like cotton (chart 4.12). 
Chart 4.12: Mozambique main crops        
 
Source: FAOstat 
 
The percentile of GDP share in Mozambique had changed after the democratic period 
and industry value had been increasing. Here we can see other example that did not 
follow the classic hypothesis (Lipton and Ravallion 1993, Roemer and Gugerty 1997, 
Delgado, et al 1998), despite Mozambique has unused arable land, the agriculture in 
Mozambique is underdevelopment and the country has problems with supply foods, 
although the urban areas and local industry have been stocked by food imported (chart 
4.13). 
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Chart 4.13: Mozambique percentile of GDP share      
 
Source; The World Bank data  
 
4.5 Rwanda 
Rwanda’s colonial age had a confused history, after I World War, the European 
convention of Brussels transferred the “Ruanda-Urundi territory” to Belgium. The 
Belgian government used the Tutsi (14% of population) power to control the region, the 
Hutu (85% of population) and Pygmies (1% of population)  – other ethnicities – are 
subject to the forced labour. 
In July 1962, Ruanda-Urundi become independent and each region opted to go their 
separate ways. Thus was born Rwanda, the first president Gregoire Kayibanda (Hutu) 
ratified a new constitution and the Tutsi, who were dissatisfied, invaded Rwanda from 
Eastern Congo – ex Belgian Colonia –; in retaliation the Hutu government massacred 12 
thousands Tutsis and in 1969 The military dictatorship of Juvénal Habyarimana started. 
Habyarimana remained in power for twenty-one years, on 1 October 1990 Rwanda 
Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Congo and installed the Tutsi government 
between 1990 – 1993. During this period, unfortunately, around 300 thousand Hutus 
were killed. In April 1994 a civil war started, and killed 800 thousand people, the 
majority of which were Tutsis, this was the saddest and shameful chapter of 1990s 
because both sides of fighters were sponsored by “developed countries” (Article 19, 
1996).     
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Nowadays Rwanda has 26.338 square kilometers and five provinces with the capital 
Kigali, the rural poverty line in 1990 was estimated 51,7 percent (World Bank 1994) 
and the official numbers reached 64,2 percent of rural population in 2005 (World Bank 
data). 
The income GDP per capita in 1990 was USD 361.43 and plummeted to USD 135.89 in 
1994 for obvious reasons and attained USD 287,04 in 2005. The agricultural gross per 
capita production index (API) followed the same tendency slumped in 1994, after that it 
started to recover, influencing the agricultural trade balance, which had the worst result 
in 1994 and leveled off in 2005 (chart 4.14). 
Chart 4.14: Rwanda macroeconomic environment  
  
Source: Agricultural trade balance and gross per capita produciton index by FAOstat and rural poverty line and GDP per capita by 
The World Bank data.    
The rural environment in Rwanda suffered the strongest distortion between 1990 and 
1994, during RPF governments, many Hutus left their properties and, in 1994 Hutus 
revolutions provoked a new wave of displacement, hence with the end of civil war 
Rwanda had two homeless groups. This situation created tensions, so, in 1997 the 
government, concerned with a possible second ethnic war, implemented a great land 
redistribution and housing relocation program. 
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This program called the “villagization policy” or “imidugudu policy”, depending on 
ethnicity, contributed to the re-settlement of refugee and reduced the land related 
tensions among two ethnicities; moreover, through the public services, it helped 
households to create clusters that could enhance agricultural productivity.    
After eight years, the tensions between Hutus and Tutsis decreased and is was possible 
to see many positive signs coming to rural areas; the arable land grew from 869 
thousand hectares in 1994, to 1.714 thousand hectares in 2005, on the other hand the 
average size of farms decreased from one hectare in 1994 to 0.8 hectare. In 2005, 43 
percent of farms had 0.5 or less hectare.       
Rwanda’s government fought the micro's farms phenomenon, in 2000 it did another 
land reform, that increased arable land indeed in Rwanda, and finally in 2004 it adopted 
one of the most modern land policies in SSA, that banned the prerogative of men land 
ownership according to which the land rights were inherited from father to son 
excluding the female heirs, thus Rwanda government “ensure that equal rights and 
security of tenure are guaranteed for all land users without discrimination whatsoever” 
(Uwayezu and Mugiraneza 2011). 
Despite the rural population density, that is main causer of micro’s farm phenomenon in 
Rwanda, the density persisted and was very high – 645.05 people per one square 
kilometer of arable land – in 2005. The principal problem of this is that, even though the 
land tenure policy in Rwanda is very simple and avant-garde for the SSA parameters, it 
has a technical problem. 
The guidelines of land reform in Rwanda guaranteed certificate of ownership for all 
Rwandese the so called “security of tenure”, but put limits of size for farm and 
residential plots in rural areas. “The minimum limit of land tenure will be 1 ha when the 
maximum limit will be 50 ha in rural area for agricultural production. Residential plots 
should no exceed 6 ares.”  
Thereby, with this setup, around 60 percent of rural properties were in a kind of limbo 
and could not get the title of farms, because they were smaller than 1 hectare and could 
not be residential because are bigger than 0,06  hectare. Consequently, these farmers 
had the same problem which almost all SSA farmers, they cannot access credit market. 
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Even though the macroeconomics environment in Rwanda was not the most friendly 
between 1990 – 2005 the government expenditures averaged 2 percent over than 
revenues and current account deficit was averagely 6 percent of the GDP. After 1994 
Rwanda was being maintained by a large inflow of international finance aid, around 9 
percent of GDP (World Bank data). 
Naturally this scenario affected all domestic credit market, that improved in those 
sixteen years, the domestic credit to private sector in percentile of GDP was, in 1990, 
6,92 percent and rose to 11,20 in 2005 (World Bank data). Although the agricultural 
credit market practically did not exist in Rwanda, farmers there were helped by 
international aid, IFAD estimated that, in 2005 USD 180 million were invested on 
agricultural projects or around 7 percent of the GDP.  
Assessing the efficacy of international aid is always very difficult, in general African 
countries create the needs for aid, that does not mean that the African people do not 
need help, but most of African governments should be more transparent (Ndulu 2008). 
Hence we assumed that the best way to develop agricultural sector was creating tools to 
access a credit market. 
While the agricultural credit market is not going well, the education system shows a 
good performance, of course the civil war time produced a lack of information, but 
considering the data that we have, the figures are good; in Rwanda the gross enrolment 
ration of primary schooling rose from 75,62 percent in 1990 to 133,81 percent in 2005. 
Indicators of the health system are very complicated to account for; only one example 
demonstrates all horror that happened in this country: between 1990 and 1994 despite a 
very high fertility rate, an average of 6 births per woman, the Rwanda population 
shrunk more than 7 percent. Nobody can assess or blame the health system for this 
picture.  
Anyway, the mortality rate of infants per thousand live births improved from 102,9 
children in 1990 to 85,4 in 2005. At the same time life expectancy at birth had a terrible 
level of 32,68 years in 1990 and improved to 48,32 in 2005 (World Bank data). The 
only data didn’t progress was HIV/AIDS, around 3 percent of adult population was 
infected in 2005 and in 1990 the same percentile of population had been infected (UN 
data). 
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A peculiarity is that the rural areas and the urban areas had the same level of HIV/AIDS 
in 1990, but in 2005 the adults infected in rural areas were 2,2 percent of adult 
population, on the other hand 7,6% of adult urban population was infected (UNAIDS 
data). However this data has no information about social mobility, thus it is impossible 
to know whether the rural population has had different behaviors from urban population 
or rural population migrated looking for better health infrastructures in the cities. 
Rwanda, as almost all countries in SSA, has a great gap between urban and rural 
infrastructure, the level of water and energy supplies are very different. The national 
level for water supply in 1990 was 69 percent of residences and fell to 65 percent in 
2005, the rural areas maintained the same level (62 percent) and urban areas worsened 
the numbers from 93 percent in 1990 to 76 percent in 2005 (IMIS). 
On the other hand energy supply has a very different trend: 80 percent of residences 
have energy supply in urban areas e only 5 percent of rural residences have energy 
supply in 2005. (IMIS). What we know is that the most important tool for farmers to 
overtake the poverty line is the road and in Rwanda there was a slight improvement 
from 49,84 kilometers of road per 100 square  kilometers of land area in 1990 to 53,00 
kilometers in 2005 (World Bank). 
Nowadays Rwanda’s major trading partners for its goods are: Kenya (30,1%), China 
(13,5%) the Democratic Republic of Congo (12%) and Malaysia (8,8%), among the 
goods exported coffee represented 56 percent of revenues, tea 27 percent and ores like 
gold, tin and wolframite together represented 17 percent (CIA data). 
On the other hand Rwanda imported mainly petroleum (11%), machinery and 
equipment (10,3%) and foodstuffs (8,3); the goods came from Kenya (18,1%), Uganda 
(16,4%), UAE (8,8%) and the United Republic of Tanzania (5,8%). The EU 27 
represented 16,8 percent of Rwandan trades and was the second major partner (Euro 
stat).  
Rwanda trade balance had a historical deficit, only in 2005 it was USD 177 million, 
added to the Government fiscal balance that was 5,6 percent of GDP it created a current 
account balance of -18,1 percent with respect to GDP. It was helped with FDI and 
international financial aid. 
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The FDI and international financial aid probably will remain and increase just because 
the Rwanda government has worked very hard to transform the country and turn over 
the page – recent history – and has apparently been successful. 
Doing Business ranked Rwanda’s 2008/09 reforms in the first place of the top 10 
reformers in 2008/09. “For the first time since Doing Business started tracking reforms, 
a Sub-Saharan African economy, Rwanda, led the world in reforms. Rwanda has 
steadily reformed its commercial laws and institutions since 2001. In the past year it 
introduced a new company law that simplified business start-up and strengthened 
minority shareholder protections. Entrepreneurs can now start a business in two 
procedures and three days. Rwanda has also enacted new laws in order to improve 
regulations to ease access to credit” 
Regardless of all reforms, the agricultural environment has not responded yet, the 
majority of farmers have produced for subsistence only and failed to overtake the 
poverty line, perhaps the bad infrastructures, ethnic division and geographic position are 
the reasons that have forbidden the development, seeing that many other indexes are 
positive, like education level and environmental business.  
The main crops in Rwanda are plantains, beans and sorghum (chart 4.15).      
The mobility of GDP share suffered two disruptions between 1993/1994 and after the 
reforms in 1998. Although all the “Western Institutions” say that Rwanda’s reforms are 
positive, industry is decreasing, the agricultural sector has remained stable and run 
toward a dangerous path, with micro-farms and low productivity; finally, the services 
sector growth happened by importation and the financial sector has  been driven by 
government deficit (chart 4.16). 
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Chart 4.15: Rwanda main crops      
 
Source: FAOstat 
Chart 4.16: Rwanda percentile of GDP share 
 
Source; The World Bank data  
 
4.6 Uganda 
Uganda's independence happened in 1962, the ex-British colony became independent 
led by Milton Obote, the first prime minister, and the so called “Uganda’s tribal 
kingdoms”. After five years Obote changed the constitution and abolished all traditional 
kingdoms and made himself president with great powers; as a consequence another state 
coup occurred in 1971. 
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The new dictator, Idi Amin, remained for nine years and this time was marked by 
economic decline, for three main reasons: Amin's ordered all Asians people who were 
not Ugandan citizens must to leave the country – around 60 thousand people –. There 
were many human rights violations, the UN estimated that 100 thousand Ugandans had 
been murdered. Currently Uganda's government says that 300 thousand people were 
killed. Finally, in 1978, Ugandan Army invaded the U. R. of Tanzania's territory 
looking for exile. 
As a response, the U. R. of Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979, the army was helped by 
anti-Amin forces within Uganda, but after Amin fell between 1980 and 1986, Uganda 
had five presidents and a very hostile civil environment. However, the last president 
Yoweri Museveni brought stability and improved human rights protection, in 1993 civil 
war was over and the country made the new constitution which restored the traditional 
kings 
Now Uganda's territory has 236,04 thousand square kilometers with a complicated 
political map, the country is divided in four regions; Central – capital –, Eastern, 
Western and Northern. But there are more than one hundred autonomous districts, and, 
besides, Uganda has six traditional kingdoms that enjoy degrees of cultural autonomy.   
It happened because in 1995 the constitution reestablished autonomy for each traditional 
ethnic group. Even though apparently there was political confusion, Uganda’s fight 
against extreme poverty worked well, the rural poverty decreased from 65 percent in 
1990 to 34,2 percent in 2005. And the income GDP per capita rose from USD 242,76 in 
1990 to USD 313,59 in 2005, of course we cannot forget that the civil war provoked the 
fall of GDP per capita among 1991 and 1994.   
At the same time the agricultural gross per capita production index (API) had an inverse 
trend with respect to income per capita, it decreased from 112,28 points in 1990 to 
99,89 points in 2005. It is important to explain the low performance of the agricultural 
trade balance (chart 4.17). 
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Chart 4.17: Uganda macroeconomic environment      
 
Source: Agricultural trade balance and gross per capita produciton index by FAOstat and rural poverty line and GDP per capita by 
The World Bank data. 
Despite API's low performances, the rural environment in Uganda has positives 
features; first of all Uganda had good land and water resources, secondly the farmers 
use good agricultural methods to enhance the productivity like "coffee-banana 
techniques", and the Ugandan land tenure system has practically been resolved since 
1995 and there has not been the title land problem.  
The 1995 Constitution recognized the four tenure systems existing before, hence in 
accordance with local governance, the Ugandan government wrote: 
• All Ugandan citizens owning land under customary tenure may acquire certificates of 
ownership in a manner prescribed by Government; 
• Land under customary tenure may be converted into freehold ownership by 
registration; 
• any lease which was granted to a Ugandan citizen out of public land may be converted 
into freehold in accordance with law made by Parliament; and, 
• Lawful or bona fide occupants of Mailo land, freehold or leasehold land shall enjoy 
security of occupancy of the land. 
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After it, one part of agriculture was modernized and some agricultural commodities as 
coffee, tea, tobacco and cotton gained importance. Even though the rural population 
density rose from 315,25 people per one square kilometer of arable land in 1990 to 
465,03 people in 2005 (World Bank data), the national average of farm size remained 
2,2 hectares (FAO data); the non-agricultural sector also improved and jobs and welfare 
were created. 
This improvement was not only in the agricultural sector, Uganda’s new path meant 
progress for all the macroeconomic system. In 1990 the domestic credit to the private 
sector did not exist, the FDI had negative inflows, the domestic market was very close 
and the merchandise trade represented only 10 percent of GDP; the Government budget 
account was surreal.  
With very hard work, Uganda “made a miracle”, since in 2005 the domestic credit to the 
private sector was 8,63 percent of  GDP, while the FDI represented 4,11 percent of 
GDP, Uganda’s economic modernizing and merchandise trades accounted for more than 
31 percent of the GDP and the Government account was negative 1 percent compared to 
the GDP.       
This “miracle” was possible with the convergence of two factors, first the political 
desire to change the social-economic environment, second because Uganda had most of 
the population in rural areas (89%) and with clear and fair rules and good natural 
resources as land and water the agricultural sector spread the welfare. 
It affected the education index: the gross school enrollment ratio at the primary level 
leapt from 69,51 percent in 1990 to 123,22 percent in 2005. Also the situation of the 
health system improved, and two important indexes, life expectancy and mortality rate, 
also regained. Life expectancy at birth improved from 47,35 years in 1990 to 50,12 in 
2005 and the mortality rate per one thousand live births fell from 105,8 to 74,7 in the 
same period (World Bank).  
Also for HIV/AIDS, that is an endemic SSA problem, Uganda had good numbers: the 
adults infected represented 10,2 percent of the population in 1990 and declined to 6,4 
percent of the adult population in 2005 (UN). 
Almost all the infrastructure system improved its numbers, the national level of water 
supply rose from 43 percent of household in 1990 to 64,5 percent in 2005.  
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There naturally exists a gap between rural and urban areas, in 1990 it was 50 percent, in 
other words for each house with water access in rural areas Uganda had 2 in urban 
areas. However in 2005 this gap was reduced to 30 percent (AMCOW 2010). 
The roads density per one hundred square kilometers of land area had grown from 7,77 
kilometers in 1990 to 29,35 kilometers in 2005. On the other hand, the rail lines density 
decreased from 0,51 kilometers per one hundred square kilometers of land area to 0,10 
kilometers in 2005, therefore it influenced the government decision to intensify the road 
transportation and give up the rail lines "of colonial model". 
However Uganda has a bigger problem, the electricity supply: even though it rose by 
350 percent between 1990 – 2005, it covered only 9 percent of Ugandan households in 
2005, furthermore its supply was concentrated in the central area – the capital – cities in 
the others regions depended on generators and rural areas simply did not have electricity 
because 90 percent of the country’s population was not connected to the national 
network. 
Fortunately, as we know, the electricity supply did not influence the start-up and the 
development of the basic agriculture as the road's influence. Electricity supply will be 
important if Ugandan farmers become exporters of fresh fruits and vegetables, but if 
they wish this to come true they should overtake food safety barriers first. 
Nowadays the main goods exported by Uganda are; coffee, tea, fish and fish products 
and cotton These goods go to Sudan (14,3%), Kenya (9,5%), Switzerland (9%) and 
Rwanda (7,9%). Uganda's imports are petroleum, capital equipment, vehicles and 
medicines. The goods come mainly from UAE (11,4%), Kenya (11,3%), India (10,4%) 
and China (8,1%) (CIA data). 
With a trade balance deficit of USD 1.178 million in 2005, Uganda has with his major 
trade partners, the EU 27, the biggest gap between export and import. It represented 
21,3 percent of the whole Ugandan trade and this trade contributed for 40 percent of the 
deficit. They have basically imported food and fish (78,3%) and have exported mineral 
fuels (28,8%) and machinery (26%) (Euro stat). 
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Environmental business in Uganda is very a friendly, the rules are simple, the labour 
market is dynamic and public offices have one of the highest corruption levels in SSA 
(Doing Business data), but the energy supply problem practically prevented industrial 
development. Meanwhile, the agricultural sector made a sprint after 1995 but couldn’t 
continue to run at the same speed to transform into an advanced agriculture, because the 
flow of urbanization couldn’t happen in a country where the cities do not have 
electricity supply.  
Ugandan agriculture is being modernized by the private sector, which means that 
marginal areas are not used with the same goals. Agricultural commodities need the 
good corridors to access the global market, thus in remotes areas there were no 
investments, and there the farmers continued to live on subsistence agriculture, and the 
majority of arable land was used for plantains (FAO data) (chart 4.18) 
Chart 4.18: Uganda main crops  
 
Source: FAOstat 
 
Despite the modern profile since 1995, the Ugandan government had new challenges: 
the GDP share trend altered, it flexed to stabilization, thus this landlocked country 
should do the next step to continue fighting against poverty. Either spreading welfare 
with subsidies programs, or make investments that help the industrial sector 
development (chart 4.19). 
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Chart 4.19: Uganda percentile of GDP share 
 
Source; The World Bank data  
 
4.7 The United Republic of Tanzania  
The U. R. of Tanzania was born in 1964 with the fusion of two ex-British colonies. 
Tanganyika that had becomes independent in 1961 with Julius Nyerere as prime 
minister, and Zanzibar, which had become independent in 1963 with the Sultan 
Abdullah Bin Khalifah. After one year the Zanzibar sovereign suffered a coup, the so 
called “Zanzibar revolution”, it overthrew the Abdullah dynasty and the new leader, 
Abeid Karume, in a couple of days, murdered 5 thousands Arab people and 15 
thousands Asian people.     
In April 1964 Tanganyika joined Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania, the 
name Tanzania is a portmanteau of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Nyerere, the main leader 
after unity, also called “baba wa taifa” – father of the nation – stopped the slayings; he 
remained on power until 1985 when he retired. 
Nyerere introduced the socialist state in 1967 with Arusha Declaration, but he respected 
the regional differences, thus the country had “only one political ideal but had two 
parties” the TANU in Tanganyika region and the ASP in Zanzibar region. They merged 
in 1977 as CCM, the so called Revolutionary Party. 
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The U. R. of Tanzania achieved good results in education and social-stability between 
1967 – 1985, practically all the children were at school and there were civil conflicts 
like in most SSA countries, but the economic policies failed, probably because “the 
non-alignment countries” as China and USSR had stopped to send financial aid. 
Nyerere left voluntarily the power, but remained in the party, and possibly helped the 
changes there. The new president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, made a new democratic 
constitution in 1992 with a multiparty, but it had one condition: the party would only be 
registered if they were active in both regions – Tanganyika and Zanzibar – and if they 
were not identified with religious, regional, tribal or racial groups.    
All rational concerns to prevent civil conflicts didn’t save the U. R. of Tanzania. During 
the 1990s the ethnic conflicts outside Tanzanian frontiers – Rwanda and Burundi – 
created a very great strain. In 1994, during only 24 hours, 250 thousand Rwandan 
refugees arrived in Tanzania; furthermore in the course of 1990s a heavy burden was 
placed on an already impoverished U. R. of Tanzania: 650 thousand refugees arrived 
there, 550 thousand from Rwanda and 100 thousand from Burundi (UN data). 
Nowadays, the U. R. of Tanzania has 945,1 thousand square kilometers and 26 
provinces and a very low performance against extreme poverty. The extreme poverty in 
rural areas decreased from 41,35 percent in 1990 to 37,74 percent in 2005. Of course 
the “refugees period” hindered Tanzanian development, but the income GDP per capita 
did not suffer the same fate: it was USD 167,30 in 1990, it started to rose considerably 
after 1994 and rocketed to USD 362,54 in 2005. 
The agricultural gross per capita production index (API), instead, followed the poverty 
line lead, and had a low performance improving from 92,22 points in 1990 to 100,34 
point in 2005. The disparity between API and income GDP per capita probably 
contributed to shrink the agricultural trade balance in Tanzania (chart 4.20) 
Unlike Uganda, where the new constitution (1995) changed the entire rural 
environment, cutting the entire bureaucratic barrier to get a land title very easily. The U. 
R. of Tanzania's new constitution (1992), did affect many changes. 
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Chart 4.20: The United Republic of Tanzania macroeconomic environment. 
 
Source: Agricultural trade balance and gross per capita produciton index by FAOstat and rural poverty line and GDP per capita by 
The World Bank data. 
The national land policy was enacted in 1995; amended in 1997, the law became 
operational in 2001, but three main laws were enacted only in 2007 – the land use plan, 
the town and country planning and the registration board act –. In 2008 one more 
followed, the unit titles law and finally in 2009 the mortgage financing act law. 
Thereby, after 17 years, Tanzania had a land tenure system much closer than in western 
countries. However the agricultural sector changed at the same speed of the laws.  
That does not mean a bad performance, just a performance below the real potential. 
Macroeconomic numbers changed greatly after 1992, the government of Tanzania 
started the programs of privatization and fiscal consolidation. It reduced the supply of 
credit to the public sector and the percentile of domestic credit to the private sector 
decreased from 13,90 percent of GDP in 1990 to 10,18 percent in 2005. 
Whether macro economy should first stabilize and after grow, the gross school 
enrollment ratio at the primary level (PRI) should be like in the past. PRI that was on 
average, in 1980s, higher than 90 percent, reached 69,40 percent in 1990 and continued 
stable until 2000 with 68,25 percent; after 2000 they started to improve and stood at 
105,35 percent in 2005 (World Bank data). 
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On the other hand almost all the health system numbers were positive: life expectancy 
at birth increased from 50,39 years 1990 to 53,34 years in 2005. The mortality rate per 
one thousand live births had a very good performance, improving from 95,2 children in 
1990 to 65 children in 2005 (World Bank data). Only HIV/AIDS number's worsened 
and won the status of pandemic: in 1990 around 4,8 percent of adult population was 
infected and in 2005 around 6,2 percent had the disease (UN data). 
Infrastructure data showed a dichotomy between, the modern Tanzania's path, and the 
country's logistics, that followed the deterioration route. If Tanzania had relatively good 
numbers in infrastructure in the 1980s, after the privatization program the access to 
water and electricity power decreased and the mesh logistics – roads and rail lines – had 
no new investments to build new projects or maintenance of existing roads and rail 
lines. 
As a consequence all the numbers fell: 55 percent of households had water supply in 
1990 (46% in rural areas and 94% in urban areas), while 54 percent had it in 2005 (45% 
rural areas, 83% in urban areas). The electric power supply decreased from 15 percent 
in 1990 (rural areas 4,3%, urban areas 29%) to 13,9 percent of household in 2005 (2% 
urban areas, 19% urban areas). 
The mesh logistics that is the most important tool to integrate a country and reduce the 
poverty also performed badly. The road density shrunk from 9,32 kilometers of road per 
one hundred square kilometers of land area in 1990 to 3,34 kilometers in 2005. The rail 
lines density had the same trend, declining from 0,47 kilometers in 1990 to 0,27 
kilometers of line per one hundred square kilometers of land area. 
Currently the main international trade partners for Tanzania’s export goods are: India 
(8,1%), Japan (6,5%), China (6,3%) and UAE (4,9%). Tanzania export share is 
composted basically of Fish and fish products (10,2), tobacco and tobacco products 
(8,1%), gold (8%) and coffee (7,3%). At the same time Tanzania imports mainly 
machinery (12,6%), Mineral fuels (12%), electrical and electronic equipment (10%) and 
vehicles (9,4%); theses goods come from China (14,4%), India (9%), South Africa 
(7,7%) and Kenya (6,9%). 
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EU 27 have had a modest participation in Tanzanian trades, ranking third, while all 
trades goods contributed 13,2 percent and had a surplus of USD 403 million in 2005. At 
the same time the Tanzania international trades historically had a negative result: in 
2005 it was USD 1.6 billion, but with “friendly environment business” the FDI had 
sustained trade deficits and the government current accounts, that in 2005 was negative, 
was 3,8 percent of the GDP (World Bank data). 
The “friendly environment business” means good laws that protect investment and 
enforce contracts existing in Tanzania, but the U. R of Tanzania had a very difficult 
labour market (Doing Business data). Maybe Tanzania was not ready yet to do business 
with intensive labour-force. To start up, an Agro business in non-developed countries 
usually needs cheap and intensive labour force to develop well. On the other hand the 
mining business only needs to protect the investment. 
Among the main crops maize is the best representative of the Tanzanian agricultural 
modernization process. In 1990 Tanzania kept the maize market close and was utilizing 
25,8 percent of arable land and was exporting 57 thousand tones; when the market 
opened in 1998, this area started to decrease very fast until 2001, then it began to grow 
and in 2005 27,91 percent of arable land was used and 98,9 tonnes were exported, and 
in the same year Tanzania imported 44,5 tonnes of maize (FAOstat). 
In other words, the market became more flexible and dynamic, this transformation 
didn’t happen only in the maize market, but also in the tobacco market, where 
exportations in tonnes rose more than 500 percent from 7,06 thousand tonnes in 1990 to 
42,3 thousand tonnes in 2005, just to give an example (FAOstat) (chart 4.21) 
The politicians of the United Republic of Tanzania have made slow changes, but a 
constant changing of the rules reflected on percentile of GDP share too. Between 1990 
and 2005 we can see that, at the beginning of the 1990s, the opening of the goods 
market provoked a kind of deindustrialization; in 1998 the agricultural market was 
opened, and then the services and industry sectors became stronger (chart 4.22). 
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Chart 4.21: The United Republic of Tanzania main crops           
 
Source: FAOstat 
Chart 4.22: The United Republic of Tanzania percentile of GDP share 
  
Source; The World Bank data             
 
4.8 Zambia  
In 1961 Northern Rhodesia integrated a federation, the Commonwealth of Nations with 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi), the federation was dissolved 
in 1963, thus the independence process of the ex-British colony was concluded and in 
1964 the country changed its name to Zambia. 
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The first Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda changed Zambia’s economic policy, 
nationalized great mineral companies, started a plan to be self-sufficient through the 
import of substitute goods, and also changed civil rights, he abolished racist laws for 
black or white people. The economic shift displeased the western countries, mainly the 
U.K. government and the last change, the abolition of racist laws, irritated indeed 
Southern Rhodesia, after 1967 so called Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and South-West Africa 
(Namibia), both neighboring racist governments supported by South Africa.  
Zambia is a landlocked country, without oil and the economy was heavily dependent on 
the copper industry. In 1965 Zambia stopped importing goods from Zimbabwe while 
Zimbabwe retaliated by stopping the supplies of petroleum that was transported through 
its territory. Isolated Zambia was using guerrillas fought in Zimbabwe to receive petrol. 
Finally it received the Chinese loan and in 1968 an oil pipeline was built in Tanzania – 
Zambia, while a railway was built in 1974. 
Kaunda declared another new constitution in 1973, it had socialist ideals and imposed a 
one-party state. Kaunda’s authoritarian rules suffered a strong blow in 1975, the price of 
copper plummeted and the oil price soared, thus between 1975 and 1990 Zambia’s 
economy dropped by around 30 percent. 
To complicate the situation more, in the late 1970s Mozambique and Angola had 
attained independence from Portugal with a terrible civil war and Zimbabwe began the 
fight in 1979. As a consequence, the main port used by Zambia was not working 
anymore – Beira in Mozambique – and the Benguela rail line which extended for 
western – Angola – was closed, damaging Zambia’s international trade. Furthermore 
Zambia supported the Zimbabwe guerrillas, that had an external headquarters in Lusaka 
– Zambia capital –, with food and weapons and this increased the financial deficit of 
Zambia even more. 
In 1991 Kaunda’s government ended, luckily it finished with multiparty elections and a 
new democratic constitution. Zambia lived a rare situation in African countries, a 
pacific transition from autocratic government to democratic government.  
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Presently Zambia has 752.614 square kilometers and nine provinces. Extreme poverty 
in rural areas between 1990 and 2005 was high, endemic and constant. In 1990 poverty 
represented 83 percent of all rural population, with the end of the communist 
government it reached 92,2 percent of the population and in 2005 it represented 76,8 
percent of the rural population.        
The income GDP per capita followed the poverty index, which fell between 1990 and 
1999 from USD 415,70 to USD 306,98 per capita; in 2000 it started to rise and in 2005 
it was USD 609,69 per capita (World Bank data). The agricultural gross per capita 
production index (API) grew merely 1.26 points in sixteen years, from 98,88 points in 
1990 to 100,14 points in 2005.In the same period the agricultural trade balance showed 
a dependence on the outside, the balance was positive on three occasions only (FAO 
stat) (chart 4.23). 
Chart 4.23: Zambia macroeconomic environment  
 
Source: Agricultural trade balance and gross per capita produciton index by FAOstat and rural poverty line and GDP per capita by 
The World Bank data. 
 
Even though Zambia is an agricultural country with more than 65 percent of the 
popupation living in rural areas in 2005 (FAO stat), the situation in the countryside was 
worsening for two important issues after 1990. 
 
 
87 
 
Firstly, the hipper-inflation in the last years of Kaunda’s government and after it, the 
inflation affected mainly the people that did not have access to the bank system; the 
number of Zambia's account in 2005 represented only 3,8 percent of the population but 
this data included accounts of firms and some people were allowed to have more than 
one account. Furthermore, only 0,02 percent of rural population had a Bank account 
(Martinez 2006). 
Secondly, Zambia’s macroeconomic policies focused on copper mining in the colony 
era, after indepedence on “white elites” and nowadays history is repeatng itself again 
with the “black elites”. The privatization of the rail line program is an example: the rail 
line company stopped with agricultural subsidies of transport and the main goal of the 
new company was to improve the efficiencies for the mining companies, but 60% of the 
population that was concentrated along the rail was without services. As a result many 
rural areas were isolated and the agricultural goods production declined. 
While Zambia's privatization program intensified poverty in some areas, this helped the 
macroeconomics numbers. Zambia GDP averagely rose by 0.16 percent between 1990 
and 1998 and after 7 years of privatization program GDP started to rise with good 
numbers, about 4,26 percent between 1999 and 2005. The inflation in 2004 was below 
20 percent per year, for the first time since 1984 (World Bank data). 
Anyway, this improvement of macroeconomic data did not follow the whole private 
sector, the domestic credit to private sector  fell from 8,87 percent of GDP in 1990 to 
7,22 percent in 2005 (World Bank). 
The communist government left a bad heritage as hyperinflation, but alos positive 
elements, like the education system. In 1990 Zambia had 96,59 percent of the gross 
school enrollment ratio at primary level (PRI), which was one of the best performances 
among SSA countries; this level fell continuously until 2001, when it represented 83,78 
percent, then it began to rise and in 2005 it reached 118,73 percent PRI.     
The health system in Zambia had a contrast: it had a relatively good infrastructure, a 
good interconnection for medicinal supplies, a good training system to staff,. On the 
other hand, the budget per capita had been shrinking. Consequently, the life expectancy 
at birth fell from 47,48 years in 1990 to 44,38 years in 2005. However, the mortality 
rate per one thousand live births improved from 109,20 babies in 1990 to 83,5 children 
in 2005 (UN). 
88 
 
Two factors had a close relationship with life expectancy: between 1992 and 2002 the 
government did not have the money to buy basic medicines and in this period the supply 
depended on international aid; secondly the HIV/AIDS diseases had always had high 
infection levels. 12,7 percent of the adult population was infected in 1990 and this 
number rose to 14 percent in 2005 (UN). 
If the health system in 1990 was well, the infrastructure was not bad too. Even though 
the electricity grid supply had been built to support cooper mining, around 19 percent of 
population had access to the electricity supply in 1990, the water access had the same 
level, 20 percent of the population had it. Unfortunately this level remained the same in 
2005. 
Another datum that persisted was the rail line density: in 1990 Zambia had 0,16 
kilometers of rail line per one hundred square kilometers of land area and in 2005 the 
same numbers. On the other hand, road density improved sharply and rose from 4,69 
kilometers of road per one hundred square kilometers of land area in 1990 to 8,87 in 
2005 (World Bank). 
The aim of Zambia’s government was Zambia’s integration and trades along the roads. 
Currently, Zambia’s major partners to goods exporting are; Switzerland (51,7%), China 
(20,3%), South Africa (9,2%) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (4,6%). Zambia 
exports mainly: copper/cobalt (64%), electricity (8,9%),tobacco (7,6%) and 
cotton(4,3%) (CIA data). 
On the other hand Zambia imports principally: Machinery(26,3%), Petroleum(16,1%), 
chemical products(8,4%) and Fertilizer(3,9%) from South Africa (35%), Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (23,5%), Kuwait (8,9%) and China (5,6%) (CIA data).   
Thanks to copper, Zambia historically had a surplus in international trade, but not with 
EU 27; in 2005 Zambia had a deficit of USD 143.3 million. The main Zambian exports 
were copper (50%) and tobacco and cotton (24,2%) and the country imported basically 
machinery (54%) and chemical products (18%). The EU 27 represented 6,3 percent of 
Zambia’s trade and occupied the 5 position in importance (Eurostat). 
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The Zambia environment business is built around around copper mining or agricultural 
business. Despite respectable rules and a pacific social environment, Zambia should 
affront a paradigm. The land reform started in 1991 and implemented in 1995 is simple 
and modern, and it allows title of land for all Zambians, including women, but this title 
could be withdrawn in the interest of the country. 
In other words, if this this place has mineral resources. Thus farmers feel safer to invest 
when they are away from mining activities, but as they are more distant from the mines, 
farmers are more distant from the domestic consumer market and the good 
infrastructures. The more fragile the infrastructure the more difficult the access to the 
international market. 
The main crops in percentile of arable land are maize, cassava and cotton seeds. 
However, between 1990 and 2005. the profile of crops has changed, maize crops shrunk 
32 percent in the use of arable land but at the same time the yield increased by 25 
percent. The improvement of productivity happened also in other cash-crops as 
sugarcane (21%), cotton  seeds(59%) and tobacco (80%) (FAOstat)(chart 4.24) 
With the end of communism in Zambia, the services market grew more than the average 
GDP and won market share. The agricultural sector grew well after land reforms and 
even though the percentile of market share started to decrease in 1999, it was not a bad 
news, but a collateral effect of modernizing the sector (chart 4.25) 
Chart 4.24: Zambia main crops 
 
Source: FAOstat 
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Chart 4.25: Zambia percentile of GDP share 
 
Source; The World Bank data  
 
4.9 Zimbabwe 
Ex-British colony, the so called Southern Rhodesia followed a different way to 
independence. With the end of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963 that 
included Northern Rhodesia – Zambia – and Nyasaland – Malawi –, Southern Rhodesia 
declared independence in 1965 with “the white- minority” very different from most of 
the former African colonies, that won the independence with fighting with the “black-
majority”. 
Perhaps influenced by South African history, the first Prime Minister Ian Smith started 
in 1965 a “white government”, the United Kingdom declared the independence illegal 
and banned all trades with Rhodesia. After one year the United Nations imposed 
sanctions on Rhodesia. In 1969 Smith declared a new racist constitution and on 2 March 
1970 created the Republic of Rhodesia. 
In 1970s the world was divided between US and USSR blocks or capitalists and 
communists, the Zimbabwe northern neighboring countries had turned communist – 
Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique (1975) – and the southern neighboring countries 
were capitalist and with a close relationship with the U.K., hence Smith’s government 
was pressed by guerrillas in the north and by armies and a heavy diplomacy in the 
south. 
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After ten years, in 1979 the elections took place and were described by the Rhodesian 
government as non-racial and democratic, but the main parties/guerillas – Zimbabwe 
African Nation Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) – did 
not participate because the new rules were perceived as retaining “strong white minority 
privilege”. However Great Britain recognized the country’s independence in 1980 and 
Rhodesia’s name was changed to Zimbabwe. 
Robert Mugabe won the elections, and rose to power, he was associated with ZANU’s 
party and merged ZANU with ZAPU party in 1987; finally in 1988 he created a one-
party-state. In this period Mugabe started the systemic attacks against everyone that had 
a different point of view, thus in 1988 Zimbabwe's commenced a dictatorship. And 
again, Zimbabwe was contra-flowed; at the close of 1990 almost all of the neighboring 
countries were looking for political stability and to open their economies. 
After 7 years of dictatorship and with strong international pressure, in 1995 the country 
had new elections and Mugabe won once more. The economy of Zimbabwe collapsed 
in 1998, and Mugabe’s government worsened the economic situation when, in 1999, he 
engaged in DR. Congo’s civil war. To calm down Zimbabwe’s population, in 2002 
Mugabe ordered all white commercial farmers to leave their land without compensation 
because that land had been taken under British colonization.  
The chaos exploded in rural areas, squatters seized hundreds of white-owned farms in 
an ongoing and violent campaign to reclaim what they said was stolen by settlers. 
During 2002 the State of disaster was declared due to the worst food shortage of history; 
at the same time about 3 thousand farmers left their land. The protests widespread 
around the country lacked everything. The government responded violently with arrests, 
beatings and murders.  
The confiscation policy of “white-farms” was affected by several years of droughts as 
well as a serious lack in inputs as fertilizer, consequently the economic system fell 
together with the decline of agricultural exports. As a result a severe hard-currency 
shortage led the country to hyperinflation and chronic shortages of fuel and basic 
consumer goods. 
In 2005 Zimbabwe government created the “Urban clean-up programme”; this program 
consisted in wiping out all shanty dwelling in the cities. The UN estimated that around 
700 thousand people were missing because of this program. 
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Zimbabwe has 8 provinces and 390.757 square kilometers, Zimbabweans saw the level 
of extreme poverty in rural areas soar from the estimated 20 percent in 1990 to 71 
percent in 2005, the income GDP per capita slumped dramatically from USD 839,66 in 
1990 to USD 447,56 in 2005.     
The agricultural gross per capita production index (API) fell too from 120.59 points in 
1990, to 93.11 points in 2005. Here we should say that while the growth of population 
trend in 1980s had been maintained, the API had fallen more. The Zimbabwe 
population decreased despite rate birth was very high . And the agricultural trade 
balance made a rally based on the number of consumers and their purchasing power 
(chart 4.26)  
Chart 4.26: Zimbabwe macroeconomic environment  
 
Source: Agricultural trade balance and gross per capita produciton index by FAOstat and rural poverty line and GDP per capita by 
The World Bank data. 
The rural environment was not perfect, before 1990 one-third of Zimbabwe’s arable 
land was owned by 4 thousand farmers, versus a rural population of 7.5 million of 
people. Although the rural business was running better than the majority of SSA 
countries, there were formal jobs and the linkages between agricultural business and 
non-agricultural business in rural areas happened as well. 
Zimbabwe had a similar profile as Latin America, a great concentration of income and 
large land holdings and with good yield. After the reforms the majority of Zimbabweans 
did not win their land and the largest farms, nationalized, lost the productivity.    
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The decline of agricultural production affected the macroeconomic numbers in 
Zimbabwe, because in 1990, among the main revenue of export goods, it had cotton 
(12%), tobacco (22%) textiles and clothing products (39%). All these sectors had had 
great losses, mainly textiles and clothing: in 1990 around USD 900 million were 
exported and less than USD 300 million in 2005. 
Textiles sector lost international market for two important factors: first, the lack of raw 
material to work, second the inflation. Inflation history in Zimbabwe showed bizarre 
numbers: it rocketed from 17 percent per year in 1990 to 585,84 percent per year in 
2005 (World Bank data), of course this work used only this time series – from 1990 to 
2005 – but only for curiosity in 2008 Zimbabwe’s inflation was estimated by UN in 
79.6 billion percent per year or the equivalent of daily inflation rate, 98 percent.  
With this scenario the domestic credit to the private sector fell too, from 23,03 percent 
of GDP in 1990 to 16,27 percent in 2005. Obviously, monetary policies are not a point 
of strength in Zimbabwe between 1990 – 2005. They had many monetary expansion 
policies, for example in 2002 the credit to the private sector was 104,46 percent of 
GDP.      
The country had bad performances, but also good numbers: the educational level is one 
of the gross school enrollment ratios at primary level; historically they had one of the 
best performances of SSA countries: in 1990 it was 100,59 percent and the last data that 
exist was 1997, and it represented 103,15 percent of children in aged school enrollment 
(UN). Even though after 1997 specific numbers in Zimbabwe are lacking, the UN 
considered that the country had continued with the same trend, and in 2005, according 
to UNESCO, Zimbabwe had 92 percent of adult literacy.  
While the economic crises did not affect the educational system, the health system 
suffered indeed. The life expectancy at birth dropped from 60,52 years in 1990 to 43,86 
years in 2005. At the same time mortality rate rose from 52,1 per one thousand live 
births to 60,2 babies per one thousand live births (World Bank). 
Doubtless HIV/AIDS is the worst health problem in Zimbabwe, the rate of adult 
infected in 1990 was 10.1 percent, this percentile grew continuously and in 1997 it 
reached 26,5 percent of adult population, then after a peak it started decrease and in 
2005 it stood at 18,4 percent (UN). 
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Two infrastructure data have the same dichotomy of movements like education and 
health, the water and electricity supply. Between 1990 and 2005 the access to electricity 
improved from 20 percent of population in 1990 – 70% in urban areas and 10% rural 
areas – to 41,5 percent in 2005 – 86% in urban areas and 31 percent in rural areas – 
(UN). 
At the same time access to water deteriorated from 74 percent in 1990 – 95% in urban 
areas and 65% in rural areas – to 46 percent in 2005 – 60% in urban areas and 40% in 
rural areas –. Another index that decreased was rail lines density from 0,70 kilometers 
of the line per one hundred square kilometers of land area in 1990 to 0,66 kilometers in 
2005. 
However the most interesting data was the dynamic of the road density, Zimbabwe had 
in 1990, 23,08 kilometers of road per one hundred square kilometers of land area, this 
number got worse and in the election year, in 1995, Zimbabwe had only 4,72 kilometers 
of road per one hundred square kilometers of land area; in other words, just roads which 
have been policed were drivable, after that the level improved and in 2005 it reached 
24,89 kilometers of road per one hundred square kilometers of land area (World Bank).   
All these changes also transformed Zimbabwe international trade: if in 1990 the 
textile’s products was the main export goods (39%), in 2005 the export market share of 
goods was ores, slag, and ash (23,8%), nickel (20,5%), tobacco (14,3%), iron and steel 
(12,9%) and cotton (5,9%). The main partners to export merchandises were South 
Africa (32,1%), China (9,7%), Botswana (8,5%) and Zambia (3,7%). 
Zimbabwe imported mainly, fuels (14,8%), cereals (14,5%), machinery (12,3%) and 
vehicles (10,9%), the goods in 2005 came from South Africa (56,6%), China (8,5%), 
Botswana (3,4%) and Zambia (3,2%), and  (CIA data). 
The EU 27 had a surplus with Zimbabwe’s trade in 2005, which represented around 
10,5 percent of all Zimbabwe trades, however 2005 was a terrible year for the economy 
of Zimbabwe, and all these numbers have problems of “interpretation”, just two 
examples could help understand the scenario. 
The borders of the country were controlled by ethnic groups, which helped its groups to 
trade with the same ethnicity that lived outside the country; thus this numbers did not 
exist in official data. On the other hand, the official data referred to the official USD 
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exchange, but in 2005 the percentage premium of Zimbabwe’s "USD black market" was 
500 percent (Makochekanwa 2007).  
Although Zimbabwe had turned into another country from the point of view economy, 
between 1990 and 2005, the main crops remained relatively stable, maize and millet 
were used like food crops and cotton was the main crop for state’s farms. And the same 
stability can be seen in the percentile of GDP share (charts 4.27 and 4.28). 
Chart 4.27: Zimbabwe main crops    
 
Source: FAOstat 
Chart 4.28: Zimbabwe percentile of GDP share 
 
Source; The World Bank data  
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5. A COMPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS: THE POVERTY TRAP IN GHANA 
 
This chapter describes the regional economy of Ghana. The Agrisystem Ph.D. program 
contemplated the experience abroad, and during my experience at The International 
Cocoa Organization (ICCO) in London, I had the opportunity to investigate deeply the 
international cocoa market and, among main cocoa producers there are some African 
countries, whereof Ghana has more details about the its rural economy.  
Then, with a more detailed database, it was possible to write a especial chapter about 
the regional economy as type of crop, their paybacks, and we can observe the 
confirmation of the “poverty trap” theory as Lipton (1977), Ravallion and Chen (2005) 
and Fan, Hazell and Thorat (1998). 
The geographic position or few natural resources, which offer low potential for 
agriculture, are the main hindrances to develop agriculture and reduce the poverty these 
areas are suffering from the so called “poverty traps”(Lipton, 1977, Ravallion and Chen, 
2007 and Fan, Hazell and Thorat, 1998).  
When a region has the poverty traps, it cannot develop at the same speed as the rest of 
the country: geographic position or shortage of natural resource reduce the development 
capacity, and also interfere negatively in the socio-economic environment and as a 
consequence, rural poverty reduction has not happened. 
Despite the best performance of the rural poverty reduction among the nine countries, 
Ghana showed a regional discrepancy of data and confirmed that there exists the 
poverty trap.  
Between 1990 – 2005 some regions as, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern, Volta 
and Western, showed very well data about rural poverty reduction. But in two others 
regions, Upper East and Upper West rural poverty increased in this period (chart 5.1). 
Adding Northern region we have three regions that had the worst performance in 
poverty reduction in Ghana. They are those with larger distances from the sea – 
geographic position –, and with different ecological zones from the rest of the country, 
they belong to Guinea and Sudan Savannahs – few natural resources –. Albeit these 
situations are not means a poverty trap scenario, showed strong indicia.     
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Chart 5.1: The Ghana regional rural poverty 
 Source GLSS 3, 4, and 5 
Usually, to fight against the poverty trap cause by geographic position, a country should 
improved the infrastructure. But in Ghana the north regions have faced as the worse 
infrastructure level of the country. Amoatey (2007) showed the inequality of 
distribution and also showed the difference in the quality of road and the close 
relationship between poverty and bad road conditions. Following this reasoning we 
decided to add the road network density, which might improve the link between people 
and goods, reduce the costs and improve quality of life (chart 5.2). 
 
Chart 5.2: Ghana poverty and roads conditions and density  
 
Source:  Ministry of Road and transport (MRT, 2002) by Amoatey (2007) pg 7 and road density by World Bank data 
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Roads are the main link between regions and have the strong impact to reduce poverty. 
Better roads enable access to markets, created jobs and reduce the cost of goods. Ghana 
proved it with a regional situation that created a kind of map, where roads reflect the 
socio economic environment; the capital Accra, has political power and had great 
density of road, the main exporting regions, like Western, Eastern and Ashanti have the 
road in the best conditions to facilitate the production and poor regions have the worst 
conditions and the less density of road.   
Furthermore, also the natural resources, demonstrated an imbalance among the 
provinces, as we said, and produced dissimilar wealth among they; the three main 
export goods of Ghana come from the regions with good performance in rural poverty 
reduction.  
Ghana suffering of high commodities dependence (chart 5.3), in other words it has a 
low diversification of exports goods; cocoa beans, gold and timber have had a 
significant numbers, they represented around 60 percent of Ghana export revenues 
throughout these sixteen years (Ghana stat).  
Chart 5.3: Ghana export revenues 
 
Source IMF data 
Between these goods, cocoa has more volatility in the market share, because the 
monopsonistic government position is very strong, but Ghana’s frontiers system is not. 
It lead a great flux of smuggling sometimes positive sometimes negative, with the 
neighbours, Cote d’Ivories and Togo. ICCO estimated that between crop years 1999 and 
2002 Ghana had a negative smuggling flux and positive one after that.         
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However, Ghana’s scenario between 1990 and 2005 showed strong evidences that north 
regions did not can to develop at the same speed as the rest of the country, the 
literatures sustain that it is the first token of poverty trap phenomenon, but we kept the 
research looking for more evidences. 
 
5.1 The differences in regional agriculture    
The seven main crops in Ghana occupied more than 73 percent of the arable land in 
2005. Cocoa beans represented 28.43 percent of the area, and its area grew 16 percent, 
between 1990 – 2005. Cocoa crops were following by maize and cassava with around 
11.5 of the area each. Nevertheless the crop which grew the most was groundnut; with 
an increase the 38 percent in its area, and oil palm had great performance growing by 11 
percent in its area (chart 5.4). 
Similarly, Ghana increased its agriculture area around 123 percent from 2.92 million 
hectares to 6.49 million ha. Which means that, to increase the market share of percentile 
arable land; cocoa beans, groundnuts and oil palm, increased their area even more (chart 
5.5). 
Ghana had and has a “stock land” that has been used differently for each type of crop; 
cocoa beans, oil palm fruit and groundnuts seemingly were on the road to extensive 
agriculture and the others ones intensive agriculture.  
Among the seven main crops, three increased significantly the production by increasing 
their agricultural areas but with a productivity near to zero or negative – cocoa 
groundnuts and oil palm fruit –. On the other hand the yield of the sorghum increased 
more than 3.5 percent per year, followed very closely by cassava and yams crops, the 
maize crops had a productivity growth of 31 percent during the sixteen years.  
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Chart 5.4: Ghana main crops  
 
Source: FAOstat 
Chart 5.5: Ghana arable land 
 
Source: FAOstat 
Many developing countries have been increasing the agricultural output using more 
arable land instead of more efficient land. The farmers in developing countries usually 
have: difficulty to get credit, high interest cost, and local technologic has a low level.  
At the same time costs of lands, local labour and social concerns about ecologic 
problems were also minimal. With this scenario, most of the farmers deal with food and 
feed demand demanding the use of more and more land. 
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Frequently the farmers, in low-developing countries, do not use intensive agricultural 
techniques, because the government, in these countries, has raised taxes on the 
agricultural output. Anderson (2009) showed that developing countries needed the 
agricultural taxes to manage the domestic budget, but his reduced the competitiveness 
of its own agriculture for the global market. 
The Ghana agricultural scenarios show that among the seven main crops, three 
increased significantly the production by increasing their agricultural areas but with a 
productivity near to zero or negative. These are cash-crops. The first one is cocoa, 
which has had a huge importance in Ghana export revenues: the country was the second 
largest exporter of cocoa in the world between 1990 – 2005 Ghana governments had a 
monopsonistic position in cocoa market.      
The others two cash-crops in Ghana, groundnuts and oil palm, have as its main market 
the energetic market as biodiesel and both crops have “government attendance”, but 
these markets are much more free than the cocoa market. They have sellers and buyers 
at regional and national level everywhere, the government is present in the distribution 
sector and export taxes. 
On the other hand the food-crops in Ghana are following the intensive agricultural path, 
the yield of the sorghum increased more than 3.5 percent per year, followed very 
closely by cassava and yams crops, the maize crops had a productivity growth of 31 
percent during the sixteen years (chart 5.6). 
The agricultural productivity growth means that the farm producers, in a region or 
country, can manage the available resources and increased the output, using the same 
amount of land. However agricultural productivity growth is not constant in time 
because exogenous factors as weather influence the results. 
The apparently dichotomy between extensive agriculture and intensive agriculture 
decisions is explained by Ghana’s agriculture policies.  
The Ghanaian government authorized and promoted new cash-crops in forest areas, at 
the same time they started to give assistance to farmers’ food crops with the training and 
commercialization of goods.     
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Howsoever, we did not judge the best path to the agricultural policies of Ghana as 
extensive or intensive. Likewise we did not assess if it is good or bad to use forest area 
to plant cocoa or oil palm tree, neither did we estimate the possible ecologic impact or 
CO2 balance. 
Our analysis aims to help the farmers overtake the poverty line assessing all agricultural 
environments as: agro-ecologic zone, infrastructure and market size. We wanted to 
show "what and how" each crop, among the main ones, had the best financial results 
and which one is the optimal output. 
 
Chart 5.6: Ghana yield crops   
 
Source: FAOstat 
Hence, we picked up the data to reinforce the poverty trap thesis, in other words, if the 
farmers of a region to use all available sources as natural resources, agricultural 
techniques, work forces and financial sources and yet not out of poverty. It is another 
signal of poverty trap. 
However we noted that the Ghanaian government program that authorized and 
promoted new cash-crops in forest areas produced the lost 25 percent of its forest cover, 
between 1990 – 2005. Ghana forests covered in 2005 around 23 percent of its areas or 
5566 thousand hectares; of these, only 8 percent or 395 thousand hectares is classified 
as primary forest.  
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Deforestation in Ghana has happened for three reasons: the exploitation of timber for 
commercial purposes – timber is the third exportations goods in Ghana –, the expansion 
of agriculture in forest areas and “fire wood” the majority of Ghanaian people depends 
on the forest for cooking and creating energy.  
Returning to the main focus, through the GLSSs data was possible check the profile of 
the farmers and their socio mobility, that we will showed in the next paragraph.  
 
5.2 Implications on rural poverty reduction  
 
The World Bank did a work that showed the cocoa farmers had the best performance in 
poverty reduction between GLSS 3 and 4. Following the same methodology, by 
Canagarajah and Pörtner (2003), we did GLSS 5 and we confirmed this trend.  
Obvious, one farm has more than one type of crop, but this methodology consider the 
main crop of the property and its aims i.e. in Ghana 2005/06 among the maize farmers 
86.19 percent of the production was consumed and 2,4 was sold, sorghum crops had 
74,84 percent of the production was consumed and 15,33 percent traded, so both 
harvests were so called food-crops.  
On the other hand, in the same period the 75.22 percent of groundnut production was 
sold, while 15,33 percent was consumed, more than 90 percent of the palm oil crops 
was traded, thus they were cash-crops, and so forth. (GLSS 5)   
Thanks to the additional data of GLSS 5 and the results of Canagarajah and Pörtner 
(2003) we observed that the three groups maintained the same trend between 1998 and 
2005 (chart 5.7). 
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Chart 5.7: Ghana extreme poverty by crops  
 
Source: 1990 and 1998 Canagarajah and Pörtner (2003) and 2005 GLSS 5 calculated by author 
The cocoa farmers had great performances between 1990 and 2005, the poverty line fell 
around 65 percent in each of seven years. Also the cash crops farmers had a good 
performance, they reduced it by around 26,5 percent in seven years. But the food crops 
farmers reduced the rural poverty line only by 11,5 percent in the same period. 
The numbers are well-defined, but the most interesting results are not obvious at first 
sight, the amount of cocoa farmers grew from around 280 thousand farmers in 1990, to 
720 thousand farmers in 2005. The cocoa farmers increased around 139 percent in 
sixteen years, at the same time, the cash crops farmers rose around 60 percent, the food 
crops enlarged around 20 percent and the entire rural population grew 16, 6 percent. 
In other words, cocoa crops were the main driver to reduce the rural poverty in Ghana 
for many reasons. First of all, as we saw and will show in the next paragraphs, the 
efficiency of cocoa crops – main cash crop – is better than maize crops – main food 
crops –. 
Secondly in Ghana the majority of farms have a small size that reduces the possibilities 
to introduce new tools as tractors to reduce the costs, without these instruments it is 
difficult for maize crops to improve the yield. Finally, the food trade between north and 
south regions is practically nonexistent this surely inhibits investment in the north areas, 
consequently in the food crops. 
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We goal was to calculate the efficiency of the tree groups and find out the reasons of 
this scenario, but we did not find literature or data to support this research, thus this job 
at regional level and by crops we used the small time series – 2001 to 2004 –, only two 
crops – cocoa and maize – and we needed to accept some assumptions about some 
factors to calculate the cost function. 
To calculate the efficiency of cocoa and maize crops we obtained, from TFP of the 
theoretical framework, the cost function. To decompose the efficiency we followed the 
Farell (1957) and Bauer (1990) methodology and all databases are in appendix III.  
E(Q,w,x,t) = C(Q,w,t) /C = w’xE(Q,w,t)/w’x     where 0<E(q,w,x,t) ≤1, C(Q,w,t) 
E is measure of efficiency economics  
C is the observed total cost  
Q is a vector of output quantities  
w is a vector of input prices and  
t is a time index  
x
E
 and x are the cost minimizing and the observed input vectors. 
The improvement of costs crops is necessary to enhance the competitiveness, raise 
profits and spread the welfare in the rural environment. In academics works, business 
plans of agro-business and also governments, the performance is usually measured 
through the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth.  
TFP is the difference between the growth of out-put and the growth of a combination of 
all factor inputs, usually labour and capital. The TFP reflects the contribution to output 
as a result of the more efficient use of resources or the adoption of new technologic. 
Many empirical studies proved the positive effect in local economy when the TFP grow. 
(Block and Timmer 1994, Alston, Pardey and Smith 1999 and FAO 2006). 
But as we said, to do this job at regional level and by crops we faced, once again, the 
usual problem of the shortage of information and we should use the small time series – 
2001 to 2004 – and we needed to accept some assumptions about some factors, such as: 
For the input costs, as fertilizer prices and labour forces, we used the data base of the 
Ministry of Food & Agriculture Republic of Ghana (MoFa), Although we had many 
suspicions that information could be asymmetric.  
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For example the fertilizer prices, – NPK bag of 50 kilograms – were falling in current 
USD and the consumption was also declining up to 2001, after which prices rocketed 
and the consumption also. The insecticides that used urea derivatives had the same trend 
(table 5.1). 
The fertilizer NPK 15/15/15 represented 82 percent of all fertilizer used in this period 
according to IFPRI/IFDC (2009), and the insecticides with urea derivatives represented 
61 percent of all the insecticides consumed in Ghana between 2001 and 2005 
(FAOstat).    
Another important point is the exchanges rate, to change Cedi (CHS) to Dollar (USD) 
data of the Bank of Ghana were used, thus the black market rate was ignored. To be 
coherent in this analysis, together with alleged black markets of fertilizers and currency, 
we did not considered land prices, because we considered impossible putting the “real 
price” of rural land in Ghana. Despite the respectable land tenure system, the Ghana 
land markets are very stable and cheap in official data, but it is very dynamic in the real 
economy (Awanyo 2009). 
Table 5.1: Ghana fertilizer prices and consumption 
Prices & consumption bags 50 kg 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Fertilizer NPK 15/15/15 CHS 500,00 800,00 8000,00 9000,00 20000,00 35500,00 
Fertilizer NPK 15/15/15 USD 0,07 0,10 0,92 1,00 2,22 3,86 
Consumption kg/ha 2,66 2,71 4,68 8,11 5,06 12,73 
Insecticides Urea derivative CHS 1000,00 1700,00 16850,00 18940,00 42000,00 74500,00 
Insecticides Urea derivative USD 0,14 0,21 1,94 2,10 4,66 8,10 
Consumption  kg/ha 0,01 0,19 0,00 0,20 0,41 1,77 
Source; Ministry of Food & Agriculture Republic of Ghana  
We are sure that to explain the parallels markets of fertilizer, currency and land, we 
need more one chapter, hence we assumed that possible distortions caused by black 
markets in the rural environment have had the horizontal effects for all crops, so this 
reduces distortions effects toward the main goal, check the efficiency between the two 
crops. 
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Another main factor that has strong influence on the agriculture output is the rainfall. In 
this specific period, between 2001 and 2004, precipitation had regular shape at national 
and regional level, according to Ghana’s Meteorological Agency (table 5.2). Hence the 
productivity was influenced more by agriculture techniques than the weather. 
Table 5.2: Ghana rainfall by regions  
Region /rainfall mm 
2001 2002 2003 2004 
Average in 
last 10 years 
Average in last 
30 years 
WESTERN 1235 1720 1467 1248 1471 1558 
CENTRAL 1156 1305 1178 949 1242 1252 
Greater Accra 773 899 908 484 790 788 
EASTERN 1150 1583 1054 1174 1284 1340 
VOLTA 1027 1263 1245 1215 1183 1180 
ASHANTI 1136 1637 1326 1098 1343 1345 
BRONG AHAFO 1170 1311 1325 1362 1280 1244 
NORTHERN 880 1100 1420 1178 1204 1155 
UPPER WEST 936 898 1117 613 937 912 
UPPER EAST 968 1059 1189 607 947 1022 
TOTAL  10431 12775 12229 9928 11680 11796 
Source; Ghana’s Meteorological Agency 
After skipping the dilemmas of fertilizer, labour, exchange currency, and weather, we 
picked up data of consumed fertilizer and labour force to maize crops by MoFa data, 
and the data of cocoa crops by the Ghana Cocoa Farmers Survey reports 2001/02 and 
2003/04. For the cost of wages we used the IFPRI report (Ngeleza et al 2011), that 
basically affirmed that the national minimal wage is respected in the cocoa and maize 
belts and is not used in other areas (table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3: Ghana wages by regions  
  Daily wage    Contract Cost per acre 
Belt  CHS Minimum CHS Maximum CHS 
Moderate cocoa  5 40 40 
High cocoa  5 40 40 
High maize 5 25 30 
Volta valley 3 25 30 
Cereals  2 25 30 
High onion  2 20 25 
Source Ngeleza et al 2011 
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To calculate the output of maize crops we used the wholesale price by FAOstat data, 
and the farm gate price estimated by MoFa, they analyzed the maize crops and asserted 
that the farm gate price in Ghana is around 24,12 percent of wholesale prices. At the 
same time, for cocoa farm gate prices we used the Ghana Cocoa Board data 
(COCOBOD).       
Finally, as to the sizes of regional farms and the yield of maize and the sizes of regional 
farms and yield of cocoa, we used the same sources, MoFa and COCOBOD 
respectively. All these data were calculated by hectare in nominal USD, thus with this 
methodology we found out the economics efficiency by hectare and region. 
As we said, even though the farms in Ghana had small areas, usually the farmers 
planted more than one single crops in own land, the GLSS 5 showed that this depended 
on ecological zones; the farmers behaviors changed, but they always had more than 2 
crops per farm, independently of the farm size (table 5.4). Hence, the results represented 
the partial financial scores of one farm. 
 
Table 5.4: Ghana farm size and ecological zone 
Farm size/ecological zones Coastal Forest Savanna Average 
< 0,5 ha  2,7 2,8 2,5 2,7 
0,5 - 1 ha 3,2 3,3 2,4 3,0 
1 - 2 ha  3,9 3,7 2,7 3,4 
2 - 3  ha 4,1 4,0 3,3 3,7 
3 - 4 ha  4,3 4,5 3,9 4,3 
4 - 5 ha  4,3 4,3 3,8 4,1 
> 5 ha  4,1 5,0 5,3 5,0 
Average  3,5 3,8 3,5 3,7 
Source; GLSS 5 
We analyzed the economics efficiency by region between two crops – Cocoa and Maize 
– but it is indispensable to highlight that some regions had their score affected or altered 
because they had a part of their territories in one ecological zone and another part in 
other. Consequently, there were at the same time two or more crops belt as Upper East – 
Onion and Cereal belts – Brong Ahafo – Cocoa and Maize belt – Volta – Cocoa and 
Rice belts – and Easter – Cocoa and Maize belts (Figure 5.1). 
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However the frontier between cocoa, maize and rice belts always are at the end of the 
forest; on the other hand, the frontier in Upper East between the Guinea and Sudan 
savannah is less visible, almost all literatures and the official government data divided 
the Forest and Savanna regions on the edge between Brong Ahafo and Northern, but the 
Upper East often appears like “savanna”. Hence this region probable had their results 
more modified.        
Despite the same limitation our research shows the following important results; between 
2001 and 2004 the maize and cocoa crops had one improvement of the farm gate price 
around 11 percent for maize and 16 percent of cocoa. The productivity per hectare grew 
round 19 percent of cocoa crops and fell around -15 percent of maize crops (table 5.5). 
 
Figure 5.1: Ghana ecological zone and main crops 
 
Source; main crops by Ngeleza page 7 and ecological zone by MOFA   
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Table 5.5: National average yield of cocoa and maize crops 
 Yield and prices 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Maize yield (ton/ha) 0,78564 0,73101 0,67111 0,67882 
Maize prices (USD/ton) 134,15 108,41 110,41 151,19 
Cocoa yield (ton/ha) 0,29539 0,28499 0,33123 0,36849 
Cocoa prices (USD/ton) 533,26 848,75 796,56 639,78 
Source; MoFa data and COCOBOD data calculated by author 
The inputs of maize crops remained stable between 2001 and 2004, the use of fertilizer, 
(one bag of 50 kilograms per hectare), insecticides (0.32 bags of 50 kilograms per 
hectare) and labour force (4,7 worked per hectare).  
On the other hand, cocoa crops increased the use of fertilizer from 0.45 bag per hectare 
in 2001 to 5.14 bags per hectare in 2004, also the use of insecticides grew from 0.14 bag 
per hectare to 0.94 bag per hectare at the same period. But the most significant 
movement was the work force that dropped from 5.02 people per hectare in 2001, to 
1.69 employees per hectare in 2004.  
According to the average of national numbers only it would be easy to say the North 
regions are poor because producing maize and the South regions are better because they 
have planted cocoa. However, when we bring out the regional level, the efficiency of 
maize crops in the North is moderately better than in the South, because north farmers 
pay less than 60 percent of national minimal wage for their worked. So we went into 
more detail (tables 5.6 and 5.7). 
Table 5.6: Profitability from cost-effectiveness to maize crops 
 Region/year 2001 2002 2003 2004 Median 
WESTERN 10,3% -24,9% -35,3% -26,5% -19,1% 
CENTRAL 17,9% -52,1% -65,3% -42,5% -35,5% 
EASTERN 12,4% -36,3% -44,1% -38,1% -26,6% 
VOLTA 0,4% -28,2% -32,1% -23,0% -20,7% 
ASHANTI 7,5% -33,7% -44,2% -34,6% -26,2% 
BRONG AHAFO 25,8% -12,6% -24,9% -12,7% -6,1% 
NORTHERN 493,8% 354,7% 272,2% 252,4% 343,3% 
UPPER WEST 184,8% 60,8% 45,3% 80,0% 92,7% 
UPPER EAST 54,7% -1,0% -19,9% 20,1% 13,5% 
National 50,6% -3,7% -18,1% -4,6% 6,1% 
Source; MoFa data calculated by author 
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Table 5.7: Profitability from cost-effectiveness to cocoa crops 
Region/ year 2001 2002 2003 2004 Median 
WESTERN 58,45% 120,63% 425,48% 275,87% 220,11% 
ASHANTI 60,24% 123,13% 411,12% 265,60% 215,02% 
BRONG AHAFO 55,74% 116,87% 399,14% 257,03% 207,19% 
CENTRAL 10,94% 47,85% 202,26% 234,38% 123,86% 
EASTERN 10,94% 47,85% 202,26% 234,38% 123,86% 
VOLTA 797,37% 1264,48% 759,46% 974,00% 948,83% 
National 49,09% 100,29% 358,20% 264,61% 193,05% 
Source; COCOBOD data calculated by author 
 
The best efficiency in maize crops was achieved for Northern, Upper West and Upper 
East regions. For the same reason the high performance of the Volta region was in 
cocoa crops. As to the low price of the workforce, the north region paid in rural areas 
around 40 percent of the national minimal wage and in Volta the wage pay was around 
60 percent of the minimal wage.   
We followed the goal that understand the gears helping poverty reduction, we divided 
the suppose efficiency surplus for the numbers of worked per hectare by crops. Because 
almost all farmers in Ghana use intensive labour force and usually this workforce comes 
from their families. Hence we attained the income per capita per crops/hectare and 
compared it with the minimal national wage (tables 5.8 and 5.9). 
Table 5.8: Revenue per employee based on the % of the minimum wage in maize crops  
Region / year 2001 2002 2003 2004 Median 
WESTERN 102,43% 94,10% 91,59% 93,68% 95,45% 
CENTRAL 104,23% 87,68% 84,46% 89,89% 91,57% 
EASTERN 102,92% 91,40% 89,50% 90,93% 93,69% 
VOLTA 60,03% 57,67% 57,34% 58,09% 58,28% 
ASHANTI 101,76% 92,04% 89,49% 91,76% 93,76% 
BRONG AHAFO 108,47% 95,84% 91,73% 95,77% 97,95% 
NORTHERN 88,78% 75,06% 67,37% 65,34% 74,14% 
UPPER WEST 58,25% 46,00% 44,55% 48,02% 49,21% 
UPPER EAST 43,14% 39,94% 38,84% 41,16% 40,77% 
Source; MoFa data and Ngeleza et al 2011, calculated by author 
112 
 
Table 5.9: Revenue per employee based on the % of the minimum wage in cocoa crops 
Region / year  2001 2002 2003 2004 Median 
WESTERN 111,64% 107,68% 385,00% 238,19% 210,63% 
ASHANTI 111,98% 124,50% 375,38% 276,37% 222,06% 
BRONG AHAFO 111,09% 123,25% 367,35% 270,67% 218,09% 
CENTRAL 102,18% 109,52% 235,48% 255,63% 175,70% 
EASTERN 102,18% 109,52% 235,48% 255,63% 175,70% 
VOLTA 70,13% 77,48% 219,11% 239,27% 151,50% 
Source; COCOBOD data and Ngeleza et al 2011, calculated by author 
The best performance in maize crops happened in Brong Ahafo the so called “Ghana 
maize belt” where the average pay is around 97 percent of minimal wage. Meanwhile, 
in cocoa crops, Volta region that had the best efficiency, but also offered the worse per 
capita payment and the Ashanti region had the best score (tables 5.10 and 5.11).    
These results point out other reasons; if we look for the other point of view, it seems 
clear that cocoa belt must stop to plant maize crops and intensify cocoa crops, this path 
can be supported by the supply of cereal belt, which could intensify the maize crops or 
sadly by importation, in one classical argument proved by Ricardo in the 19th century.  
Again, it is not worth harvesting maize in the forest. Every time that one hectare of 
maize is planted in Ashanti region the farmer loses around 88 percent of national 
minimal wage per capita. Comparing the maize crops with cocoa crops income, we 
wondered.    
Table 5.10: The income of maize crops in USD per hectare  
Region / year  2001 2002 2003 2004 Median 
WESTERN 9,04 -25,74 -43,11 -38,11 -24,48 
CENTRAL 15,74 -53,76 -79,64 -61,02 -44,67 
EASTERN 10,88 -37,50 -53,83 -54,76 -33,80 
VOLTA 0,35 -30,14 -40,46 -34,17 -26,11 
ASHANTI 6,55 -34,73 -53,87 -49,71 -32,94 
BRONG AHAFO 16,24 -9,36 -21,86 -13,17 -7,04 
NORTHERN 166,18 140,43 128,76 140,42 143,95 
UPPER WEST 62,19 24,06 21,43 44,48 38,04 
UPPER EAST 31,60 -0,70 -16,02 19,05 8,48 
National  35,42 -3,05 -17,62 -5,22 2,38 
Source; MoFa data calculated by author 
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Table 5.11 The income of cocoa crops in USD per hectare 
Region / year  2001 2002 2003 2004 median 
WESTERN 61,75 145,68 236,70 178,38 155,63 
ASHANTI 63,64 148,69 228,71 171,73 153,19 
BRONG AHAFO 58,90 141,14 222,04 166,19 147,07 
CENTRAL 11,56 57,79 112,52 151,54 83,35 
EASTERN 11,56 57,79 112,52 151,54 83,35 
VOLTA 11,56 57,79 112,52 151,54 83,35 
National  51,86 121,12 199,27 171,09 135,84 
Source; COCOBOD data calculated by author 
Whether the agricultural policy changes and forest areas stopped to plant maize, will it 
help the rural poverty reduction in the north regions? And then break the cycle of 
poverty trap.  
To answer this question, we should highlight that the efficiency of the maize crops is 
microeconomic, thus we can see how the maize agro-business in the north regions could 
response on the new policy. On the other hand, changing the minimal wage, 
improvement of the interregional trades and the policies of birth rate that can reduced 
the rural poverty, are the macroeconomic policies.    
As we saw, the minimal wage is respected only in the south areas, the minimal wage in 
Ghana represented an income little more than USD 1.25 (PPP) a day, in others words 
when somebody has a job, and he can overtake the poverty line there. But in Volta 
valley, Northern, Upper West and Upper East, who has one job cannot do it, the rural 
salary in Volta is around 40 percent less than minimal wage and in the other regions the 
wage is around 60 percent lower. 
However, the need to enlarge the supply of maize could press the farmers that will have 
more necessity of labour force, it could will help the wage level in the north, only, if the 
demographic profile change your trend, then start to reduce the amount of family 
members.  
Again, historically, the farmers in Ghana used intensive labour force and usually this 
workforce come from their families, so we hypothesized that crops which use fewer 
workers led the family to have a smaller amount of children and vice-verse (table 5.12).   
To check this assumption we used the Coase methodology (1937, 1960) we showed up 
the problem of social cost in Ghana.    
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Coase explained, with one simple example, the herd of input and output, that in this 
case the farmer make choices to achieve the best performance, Coase proposed to use an 
arithmetical example; the annual cost of fencing the farmer’s property was USD 9, the 
price of the crop was USD 1 per ton (table 5.13). 
 
Table 5.12: Ghana crops and family size 
Regions Main Crops Family size 
WESTERN cocoa 4,7 
CENTRAL cocoa 4,4 
EASTERN cocoa 4,6 
VOLTA rice/cocoa 4,7 
ASHANTI cocoa 5,3 
BRONG AHAFO cocoa/maize 5,3 
NORTHERN maize/sorghum 7,4 
UPPER WEST maize/sorghum 6,4 
UPPER EAST maize/onion 7,2 
Source; GLSS 5 data calculated by author 
Table 5.13: Coase example 
Number in 
herd  
cost pay  for 
fencing  
Crop loss per 
additional steer ton 
Annual crop 
loss ton 
Total of 
cost  
Cost for 
herd 
1 9 1 1 11 11 
2 18 2 3 23 11,5 
3 27 3 6 36 12 
4 36 4 10 50 12,5 
Source; Coase 1960 pg 4 
 
Thus the herd increasing depend on the price of output and the cost of input, in others 
words while the meat price grows enough to support the input prices, the farmers will 
continue to enlarge their farm. Otherwise they will decrease the supply until it reaches 
the optimization of input prices. 
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As we saw, the maize farms in the north regions had the highest efficiency for theses 
crops in Ghana, but it is obvious that their efficiency was supported by the low inputs, 
that produce one kind of “stagnation disease”. Without new possibilities to trade their 
goods the farmers do not investing and the yield continue very low. 
The farmers in Northern Ghana have great supply of labour, and we suspect that without 
policy intervention the wage will not increase up to  Southern levels; the ecological 
zone prevents to plant cocoa or oil palm trees, the low infrastructure avoids 
improvement of trades goods like maize, and finally as we saw in Ghana’s paragraph – 
4.2 – public investments as education, water and electricity supplies, are smaller than in 
south areas, thus we concluded that the north regions of Ghana are in the so called 
“poverty trap” .  
Therefore, the expectation is that the increase of the agriculture techniques and the 
improvement of yield can improve the income per capita per hectare in maize crops and 
help to change this setting .Then we bet in this new scenario and we simulated this 
hypothesis. 
To do this exercise, we assumed that labour and cost correlation used in Ngeleza et al 
(2011) are correct, so improving the agricultural system in the cereal belt from 
traditional crops, that use only labour force with the use of labour and mechanization 
techniques will reduce the labour cost in 34,7 percent, because will improve the labour 
efficiency. 
In a similar way we assume that changing agricultural techniques from traditional input 
in maize crops – 1 bag of 50 kilograms per hectare – to the so called “median input” 
fertilizer – 3 bags of 50 kilograms per hectare – they can increase the output goods in 
around 100 percent in SSA (FAO 2009). 
But we did not change the “regional wage” because the demographic window does not 
allow it. So we faced the possible modification in this hypothetical scenario* (tables 
5.14, 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17).  
The next tables were calculated using the same methodology to decompose the 
efficiency. We followed the Farell (1957) and Bauer (1990) methodology and all 
databases are in appendix III, but the work force costs we changed following the 
Ngeleza et al (2011) data. 
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E(Q,w,x,t) = C(Q,w,t) /C = w’xE(Q,w,t)/w’x     where 0<E(q,w,x,t) ≤1, C(Q,w,t) 
E is measure of efficiency economics  
C is the observed total cost  
Q is a vector of output quantities  
w is a vector of input prices and  
t is a time index  
xE and x are the cost minimizing and the observed input vectors. 
Table 5.14: Profitability from cost-effectiveness to maize crops  
Region/ year 2001 2002 2003 2004 median 
NORTHERN 493,8% 354,7% 272,2% 252,4% 343,3% 
UPPER WEST 184,8% 60,8% 45,3% 80,0% 92,7% 
UPPER EAST 54,7% -1,0% -19,9% 20,1% 13,5% 
Source; MoFa data calculated by author 
 
Table 5.15: New* profitability from cost-effectiveness to maize crops 
Region / year 2001 2002 2003 2004 median 
NORTHERN 1705,10% 1280,87% 652,82% 594,69% 1058,37% 
UPPER WEST 765,83% 387,95% 315,94% 417,69% 471,85% 
UPPER EAST 371,72% 201,50% 135,75% 254,32% 240,82% 
Source; MoFa data and Ngeleza et at 2001 calculated by author 
Table 5.16: Revenue per employee based on the % of the minimum wage 
Region / year  2001 2002 2003 2004 median 
NORTHERN 88,78% 75,06% 67,37% 65,34% 74,14% 
UPPER WEST 58,25% 46,00% 44,55% 48,02% 49,21% 
UPPER EAST 43,14% 39,94% 38,84% 41,16% 40,77% 
Source; MoFa data calculated by author 
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Table 5.17: New* revenue per employee based on the % of the minimum wage 
Region / year  2001 2002 2003 2004 median 
NORTHERN 147,42% 119,97% 82,45% 78,10% 106,99% 
UPPER WEST 86,36% 61,85% 58,78% 65,74% 68,18% 
UPPER EAST 52,01% 45,61% 43,36% 48,00% 47,25% 
Source; MoFa data and Ngeleza et al 2011calculated by author 
The more interesting results, , shows that the growth of productivity may increase the 
efficiency but not resolve the low per capita revenues issue, stressing more the problem. 
Agricultural growth without others policies does not lead to poverty reduction.  
Perhaps we were conservatives about yield growth in the our hypothesis*, as we know 
the Guinea savannah, offers to Ghanaian farmers a very similar agricultural 
environment to the Brazilian “cerrado” as rainfall, soil and temperature, but, the farmers 
using very different inputs as agricultural techniques and seeds. 
However, it is clear that north region can increase the productivity, also the maize crop 
in north areas is efficient, but with our results it does not mean that the rural poverty 
line will decrease in cereal areas, as for cocoa or others cash crops in Ghana (Table 
5.18). 
Table 5.18: Ghana and Brazil yields      
Ghana low technique 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Northern yield (ton/ha) 1,490 1,661 1,127 0,889 
Upper West yield (ton/ha) 0,714 0,587 0,622 0,662 
Upper East yield (ton/ha) 0,666 0,620 0,585 0,754 
Fertilizer used kg/ha 50 50 50 50 
Ghana median technique* 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Northern yield (ton/ha) 2,979 3,321 2,253 1,777 
Upper West yield (ton/ha) 1,429 1,174 1,245 1,324 
Upper East yield (ton/ha) 1,333 1,241 1,170 1,507 
Fertilizer used kg/ha 150 150 150 150 
Brazil  2001 2002 2003 2004 
Mato Grosso yield (ton/ha) 3,396 2,978 3,671 3,450 
Mato grosso do Sul yield (ton/ha) 3,984 2,796 4,331 3,818 
Goias yield (ton/ha) 4,503 4,549 4,873 4,983 
Fertilizer used kg/ha 151 163 158 189 
Source; MoFa data, Ngeleza et al 2011 and CONAB calculated by author 
118 
 
6. METHODOLOGY OF THE ECONOMTRIC MODEL   
 
In this chapter we described the previous evidence about rural poverty reduction in 
SSA, our proposed a model and explained the methodology step by step of all 
agricultural environment and their links and finally we showed the results.   
 
6.1 Previous evidence for SSA countries 
Based on previuos work, our assumption is that the poverty reduction at rural areas of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, namely in low-income countries that have no significant reserves 
of mineral resources, should happen through agricultural development.    
A country that has huge mineral resources as petroleum, gas, gold, diamond, etc. 
usually does not have problems to make international trade with these commodities, 
since this normally improves the country current balance and provides a comfortable 
macroeconomic environment.  
However, mineral activities have a low impact on poverty reduction in developing 
countries. It is more profitable and manageable; hence a country that has huge mineral 
resources can reduce poverty level very fast. Nevertheless, this hypothetical country 
should not follow our reasoning, because it could use others tools. 
On the other hand, agricultural growth always led an agricultural country to the 
development, but the elasticity of the result achieved by each one was different, because 
the labor force growth, GDP growth and poverty reduction all depend on inner factors. 
However is truly striking that in a country that has relevant arable land and most of 
population working in agriculture, it has a better performance as far as the previous 
three items
12 
are concerned (table 6.1), the so called “agricultural linkages”. Small 
countries with a scarce quantity of arable land as Singapore, Hong Kong and Monaco 
are out of this rule, since the services sector led to their development. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 See Block ana Timer 1994, Mellor 1999 and 2001, Lipton and Ravallion 1993 and Quibria 2002  
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Table 6.1: SSA agricultural growth and GDP growth   
Agriculture 
growth    
GDP 
growth 
Country       Authors  
1% 0.92% 14 M. Roemer and M. K. Gugerty 1997   
1% 2.75% Burkina 
Faso 
C. Delgado J Hopkins and V A Kelly 
1998 
1% 1.96% Niger  
1% 1.97% Senegal  
1% 2.48% Zambia 
1% 1.45% Kenya  S Block and C P Timmer 1994 
Source by author  
All modern literature considers the linkages as part of the main tools to reduce poverty 
in rural areas around the world.  
We selected here fourteen examples of research made by western institutions and 
universities, which focused on developing countries localized in Latin America, Africa 
and Asia within a time series from 1960 to 2000s. 
Some authors created models to explain this phenomenon, others supplied academic 
explanations with empirical results about agricultural growth and poverty reduction. 
However all of them call attention to positive or negative effects that each inner factor 
could cause in an agricultural environment. In our model we substantially agree on the 
most popular ideas cited by these authors. The only exception is the inequality reduction 
issue. 
Inequality reduction occurs as a consequence of various policies, and not as a result of 
the growth of the agriculture sector. At the beginning, agricultural growth in SSA meant 
increase of inequality, as illustrated by Bigsten (1984) in Kenya, Collier, Radwan and 
Wangwe (1986) in The U. R. of Tanzania, by Bigesten, Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1995) and 
Roemer and Gugerty (1997) in Uganda. 
With the following two graphs, we are trying to summarise an immense quantities of 
ideas, referring to different situations, hence when one author talk about civil violence, 
other one in civil war or good democratic governments. We synthesized in the term 
“political stability” (PS), and so on (chart 6.1 and 6.2). 
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Chart 6.1: Authors with models       
 
Source; author 
Chart 6.2: Authors without models 
 
Source; author 
Even though we agree with the authors about the main tools that help the poverty 
reduction in rural areas, these instruments do not have the same performances in SSA – 
9 as in the rest of the world. We added NPKL elements and we did previous test with 
fixed-effects and pooled OLS econometric models, and unfortunately was confirmed the 
researcher concern that agricultural linkages are not working in SSA. See results in the 
following paragraphs and variable list and abbreviations in the appendix 1. (block 1, 2, 
4, and 4) 
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The idea, here, is to reproduce the metothodoly used by previous authors but using other 
data and different countries (Anderson 2009, Lipton and Ravallion 1995, Quibria 2002, 
Ravallion and Jalan 1998, Deininger and Okidi 2002 and Thirtle Lin and Piesse 2002) 
since we have applied these models to  the SSA – 9. 
First of all we have found a the negative relationship between HC e poverty reduction 
like previous author, World Bank 1998 and Easterly et al 2001. 
In this part of the research we have used panel data since this methodology is the most 
useful  given our data contraint, and since  previous authors did the same; so we only 
tried to replicate the same approach using different data.  
 
Table 6.2: Model test one using fixed-effects 
Model Test 1 : Fixed-effects, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: RPL 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value   
PR -118.163 0.436484 -27.072 0.00774 *** 
PS -0.254944 0.200577 -12.711 0.20607   
HCPRI 0.223263 0.0601518 37.117 0.00031 *** 
NPKL -0.0332673 0.0429618 -0.7743 0.44019   
DCPS 0.0665262 0.0825942 0.8055 0.42208   
AVA 0.208835 0.124598 16.761 0.09622 * 
GDPPC -0.0537526 0.0102871 -52.253 <0.00001 *** 
API -0.0688431 0.0693613 -0.9925 0.32286   
INFR -0.293035 0.153225 -19.124 0.05811 * 
RPDAL 0.0359981 0.0245772 14.647 0.14551   
R-squared  0.861056 
Adjusted R-squared  0.841049 
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Table 6.3: Model test two using pooled OLS   
 
Model test 2: Pooled OLS, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: RPL 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value   
HCPRI 0.173258 0.0628876 27.550 0.00669 *** 
PS 0.600301 0.298125 20.136 0.04607 ** 
PR -379.662 0.448878 -84.580 <0.00001 *** 
NPKL 0.223887 0.0465766 48.069 <0.00001 *** 
DCPS 0.132324 0.107436 12.317 0.22025   
AVA -0.151522 0.153342 -0.9881 0.32488   
GDPPC -0.0341378 0.01122 -30.426 0.00283 *** 
API 0.142735 0.0742017 19.236 0.05654 * 
RPDAL 0.0451603 0.017203 26.251 0.00968 *** 
INFR 0.105129 0.143628 0.7319 0.46549   
 
Classics spill-overs have inverse relation that traditional effects, for example when 
human capital (HC) or domestic credit to private sector (DCPS) increase the rural 
poverty line grows also. 
 
6.2 Towards a new model   
Building up a model that answer how the agricultural gears in SSA – 9 were moving 
between 1990 and 2005, as well as assessing how the agricultural growth can reduce 
rural poverty, was very challenging. As we know, in the last 50 years the agricultural 
environment in SSA showed inability to build the linkages between farms and non-
farming business in rural areas. 
In the age of pre-colonial civilization between 1500 and 1799, among the four biggest 
areas or continents, SSA was the only area that did not have a food chain based on a 
type of crops. In the Americas had with based the maize. The Incas, Mayans and Aztecs 
developed your societies around the maize crops, the Mexican tortilla come from the 
Aztecs culture. 
European and Mediterranean areas chose wheat as food base and the East Asia had 
chosen rice, Adam Smith wrote (The Wealth of Nations 1776), that China was more 
developed and had a bigger population than Europe because they had chosen rice 
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instead of wheat as food base, as rice crops was possible to have two harvests per year 
while wheat did not. All these crops are, nowadays, so called commodities. 
Clark (1961) showed that, in Africa, only Mediterranean areas and the Nile zone had 
agriculture in 1300; after that, the agricultural techniques were spread well in Horn area 
– Ethiopia – but in west, central, east and south SSA areas the majority of people were 
living on hunting, fishing and extractives techniques mainly with roots and vegetables. 
In 2005 the roots crops as taro, yams, sweet potatoes and cassava, were used around 35 
million hectares in SSA and the second type of crops was the maize with around 27 
million hectares.  
This agricultural rapport with so called non-tradable goods surely affects one 
agricultural country’s development. De Melo and Robinson (1989) showed that 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) has a mismatch of results in SSA for many 
reasons, but, among the main problems, they indicated the following: domestically 
produced and imported goods are imperfect substitutes, domestically produced goods 
sold on the domestic market are imperfect substitutes for good sold on the export 
market. 
Also they pointed out that aggregate production is virtually fixed and there is a balance 
of trade constraint, mainly for politics acts. Hence, it is transparent that there is not 
stimulus for farmers to increase productivity with non-tradable goods; furthermore, 
political implications have locked the so called "agricultural linkages". 
Agricultural linkages are the economic relations between farmers and non-farmers 
businesses in rural areas, basically they are the services sectors such as the supply of 
manpower and sale of goods. 
This happens because SSA countries have some asymmetric markets, and these do not 
allow development to follow like free market, again the SSA – 9 agriculture 
environments are suffering from non-tradable goods and cultural phenomena. So the 
traditional model cannot explain this picture, so, to resolve this conundrum, we were 
looking for a model that gives details about agriculture mechanisms and indicates a 
solution.  
It is widespread accepted and relativity easy to list these factors; in this research we 
suggested that agricultural development should start from the farmer and all factors that 
he can manage were called “dependent factors” or “endogenous factors” they are: 
124 
 
education level so called human capital (HC), maintenance of the arable land and the 
efficiency of the crops. 
The “independent” or “exogenous” factors, which have strong relation with endogenous 
factors, are: Political stability, land tenure system, macroeconomic policies, 
infrastructure and rural population density. Thus, a country which has an optimal 
combination between endogenous and exogenous factors reduced the poverty with a 
higher efficiency than others which have a shortage of such good combination. 
 Hence, we built a model that considers economic facts and also human behavior. It is 
clear that all the elements influence each other, so to understand this impact we used a 
system of recursive rather than simultaneous equations; a recursive model is a special 
case of an equation system where the endogenous variables are determined one at a time 
in sequence (Ducan and Berry 2010, Brito and Pearl 2002 and 2006, Chisholm 1990, 
Cooper 1972, Fox 2012, Kline 1970 and 2004, Liu 2004, Pearl 2012, Richardson 2008, 
Strotz and Wold 1960, Tenehaus 2009, Westland 2010). 
In others words, the left-hand side of the equation for the first endogenous variable 
includes no endogenous variables, only exogenous variables; the second endogenous 
variable includes exogenous variables and the first endogenous variable, the third 
endogenous variable includes exogenous variable the second endogenous variable, and 
so on, block by block. But the last endogenous variable influence the first block (figure 
6.1). 
First block; the land property right (PR) and political stability (PS) influence human 
capital at primary school (HCPRI). 
Second block; the HCPRI, the percentile of agricultural value added of GDP (AVA), 
GDP per capita income (GDPPC) and the percentage of domestic credit to the private 
sector of GDP (DCPS) influence the soil loss of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium 
elements (NPKL).  
Third block; the NPKL, the rural population density by arable land (RPDAL) and the 
infrastructure index (INFR) influence the Agricultural gross per capita production index 
(API) 
Fourth block, the API, RPDAL and PR influence the rural poverty line (RPL), similarly 
RPL and PR influenced the PS in first block doing a feedback loop. 
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Figure 6.1: Econometric model proposal  
 
6.3 The first block: Assessing human capital (HC)  
We assumed that HC is narrowly influenced by political stability and land tenure 
system.  
The relationship between educational and economic system is very strong, in the 
economy the educational and cultural qualities obtained will transform economical 
values. World Bank (1998) proved it in empirical work about the world education and 
socioeconomic development, from 1960 to 1996. However this relationship is not 
working well in SSA countries. The GDP per capita of SSA had a negative growth -6.5 
and the percentile of primary enrollment grew 87 percent among 1960 – 1996. 
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On the other hand, the GDP per capita of the world grew 36 percent and the percentile 
of primary enrollment 19 percent. The world had a positive correlation and the SSA a 
negative correlation (figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.2: World Bank; education growth and GDP growth 
 
Source World Bank (1998) World Development Indicator 
Easterly et al (2001) show the other discouraging data, the growth in educational capital 
and economic growth, in East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, between 1960 – 1985. East 
Asia grew 1,48 percent of GDP per capita per 1 percent of educational capital growth 
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and SSA increased only 0,11 percent of GDP per capita per 1 percent of education 
capital growth between 1960 and 1985 in Easterly research (chart 6.3). 
 
Chart 6.3: Average of annual growth during 1960 – 85    
 
Source: Pritchett (1996), adapted from Easterly et al (2001). 
Using the same methodology with World Bank data we found that East Asia showed a 
growth of 1,89 percent of income GDP per capita per only 1 percent of  primary 
enrollment in the world. 
First of all, African countries have a short independence history, except for Ethiopia, 
which has been free since the biblical time and Liberia from 1847; all another countries 
won the independence after second war: the first one was Egypt in 1951 and last one 
was Eritrea in 1993.  
Around half of SSA countries achieved independence in the period 1960 – 1970, thus 
talking about GDP growth during an “independence war” is just gossip. In this period 
countries had a great social and political instability. Furthermore the macroeconomic 
condition drained down all economic sectors and depletes an entire country. 
Unfortunately, the period between 1970 and 1995 was not peaceful, Ndulu (2008), 
demonstrated that there were 25 civil wars in SSA. These wars happened for different 
reasons and had distinct durations, between 1 and 25 years.   
Thereby, we not agree that SSA has a different rapport between HC and development; 
of course, the relationship between education and development is not as simple as it 
appears to be, but it exists, education is considered as a social instrument for developing 
human resources and for human capital formation. People having reasonable literacy 
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and numeracy skills tend to produce more farm crops, have limited number of children 
and enjoy a relatively better quality of life as compared with uneducated families. 
Although this is partly a season, why SSA countries had a different behaviour from the 
rest of the world in the past, we assumption that social and political instability were the 
roots of the problem throughout the years after independence. These countries lost HC 
with horrendous genocides or with successive migrations.  
Psacharopoulos (1994), showed how difficult "HC stocks" mensuration, in a country, 
because people who improve their education level have more propensity to immigrate 
whether a country does not offer a well-off environment.  
So it is, people invest in your education if they believe in a future, and when the 
formative path finishes they expect a good socio-economic environment to enjoy this 
investment. If the country has strong socio or political instability, people will invest less 
in education or will go away. In both cases the country loses the HC.   
However, after 1990s this situation has been changing. In SSA countries, conflicts have 
decreased and the positive bond between education level, economic growth and per 
capita GDP income has been established. Moreover the education level has improved 
much faster after 1990 than in the past. 
Our database measured years of school attainment, but we did not consider the quality 
of education, this research measured the local level of HC stocks. Albeit, each education 
system is only a continuation of family education and has the tendency to preserve the 
local values and the local culture. We would be important, in future works, to 
acknowledge the role of education quality. 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) confirmed that the improvement of the education 
level has benefices and great returns to investment, mainly in low and very low income 
countries. This return occurs at a social level and with the so called “private returns” 
one’s own reward is better than social returns (charts 6.4 and 6.5). 
Our sample has a per capita income lower than USD 1000, and it fits the very low 
income countries category. Thus, the social returns to investment in education represent 
2,2 percent of investment per year in higher level, 2,24 percent in secondary level and 
4,26 percent at primary level. 
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Chart 6.4: Education social returns      
 
Source Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) 
Chart 6.5: Education private returns 
 
Source Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) 
The private returns are better than social returns. The own income growth is around 5,2 
percent of investment per year in higher level, 2,85 percent in secondary level and 5,2 
percent in primary level.      
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The rural environment has numerous problems to improve education level, typically 
rural areas have poor infrastructure, low government investments and logistical situation 
that forces pupils to move across the large distances to reach the nearest school. 
However, if the agricultural areas have more problems to improve the education level, 
farmers have great benefices in agriculture output per year of primary school. Many 
authors researched many countries in SSA and all countries had a positive relation 
between education level and agricultural production (table 6.4). 
Table 6.4: Education and agricultural output   
Area and Study % increased in agricultural 
output for 4 years of primary 
schooling 
Kenya (Bigsten 1984) 20 
U. R. Tanzania (Collier, Radwan and Wangwe 1986) 19 
Uganda (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1995) 12 
Uganda (Appleton and Balihuta 1996) 7 
Zimbabwe (Owens and  Hoddinott 1999)  2 
Ethiopia (Weir 1999) 20 
Source; by author  
Consequently the HC, in rural areas, is led by farmer behaviours, because in a short or 
medium term it is unimaginably to see SSA governments make huge educational 
investments in rural areas. The agenda of SSA governments should include rebalancing 
the current account of country, improve macroeconomics data and enhancing urban 
infrastructure to avoid the chaos like in Lagos (Nigeria), Kinshasa (Congo Democratic 
Republic) or Khartoum (Sudan) cities. 
The Economist on line (October 2012) showed that this chaos has happened in many 
SSA countries, they started the urbanization process but saw the slums increasing and 
the GDP income did not grow between 1985 and 2010. The lack of urban infrastructure 
created a type of “urbanization trap” in SSA countries; on the other hand, Asian 
countries that had done investments, solved this problem (figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.3: Urbanization and income     
 
Source; The economist on line 
If African countries do urban investments, they will surpass the “urbanization trap” like 
Asian countries and will attract new international investments. However, the education 
scenario in rural areas will be caused by the same problem, an inadequate infrastructure, 
so, to improve HC, farmers must go toward an education level improvement.   
As we saw in the past and as have happened nowadays, farmers behaviours are moving 
by the theory of behaviourism (Skinner, Maslow). The behaviourist theories by Skinner 
say that people respond to their environment – people encounters a stimulus and this 
stimulus has an effect – but they also operate on the environment to produce certain 
consequences. Hence they contribute to a kind of “feedback loop” which influence a 
larger system that impacts itself. 
Maslow made one schema, the so called “the Hierarchy of Needs”; according to this 
theory, people, in the two first steps, need to feel safe and secure in a world with basic 
needs like, food and water in the first step, and to feel secure to make the next step. 
After it people begin to seek out friendships and education. 
So, to overcome the “paradigm of stability”, SSA governments should give SSA 
farmers the most important stimulus, that should make them feel safe and secure. 
Thereunto they should improve political stability and give the right to have a land or 
land tenure.  
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Political stability database in SSA 9 was taken from Center for Systemic 
Peace/Integrated Network for Social Conflict Research. This center created a task force 
that represents several of the US leading research institutions as Arizona State, 
Columbia, George Mason, Harvard, Maryland, Minnesota, Stanford and Texas 
universities. 
It has a panel with the “political regime” characteristics and transitions among 1800 and 
2010, cross-national, time series and polity-case formats in all independent countries 
with a total population greater than 500.000 people
13
. 
Land Tenure database in SSA 9, it was taken from International Property Rights Index 
(IPRI). It was built by World Bank Doing Business and World Economic Forum 
database. We picked up variables of “Physical Property Rights14”, the protection of 
physical property rights and registering property that have a relation with property 
rights, because there does not exist a specific land tenure index in western institution. 
As a result, this index could not be perfect, but we analysed that is the best option to 
rank property rights in SSA – 9.    
Our endogenous factor is HC, usually education can aggregate average income levels 
for all population, but normally the inequality grew the first time and was subsequently 
reduced, at the second moment, showing the mechanism of the original Kuznets curve 
(1955), which depicts the inequality dynamics along with growth by an inverted U-
shaped, show up. 
However, equality and poverty differ from each other, although inequality grows with 
improved education levels, all these population quintile groups are benefited. Empirical 
works brought up that the top one increased in terms of sources accumulation and 
productivity, while the last one grew thanks to new opportunities of occupation and 
labour (Barro and Lee 1993).  
 
 
                                                          
13
 See methodology on the site  http://www.systemicpeace.org/ 
14
 See methodology on the site http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/data 
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Our proposal was to find out tools, or so called “inner factors”, that take people from 
rural areas away from extreme poverty conditions. Albeit all education levels compose 
the so called HC, for our sample we used only primary school level for three clear 
motivations. 
Firstly, many authors endorse the idea that the fourth years of primary schooling 
increase farmer incomes more than seven years of secondary schooling and high 
education has the same percentile of income increase as primary school. Also if SSA 
farmers’ income rises more than 21 per cent the majority of them will leave the poverty 
line. 
Secondly, we used Barro and Lee methodology, which need data about adult population 
which have primary education 15 years earlier than the first year of time series, to 
calculate all levels of HC. Our first year is 1990, thus we need 1975 data, but many 
countries of the sample did not have data in this period, because in these years we had 
the “stability paradigm”. 
Finally, the gross enrolment ratio of the secondary and tertiary level in SSA represented, 
in 2005, 31 and 5 per cent respectively, and the percentile of all the population on 
secondary and tertiary level was around 11 and 0.9 per cent (World Bank). So the 
impact of the removal of these people did not change much overall data because are 
small dimension were small and usually these people worked in the city or had 
immigrated. 
The gross enrolment ration relates to the total number of students at a given level the 
population of the age group that, according to national regulation or custom, would be 
enrolled at that level. 
The data set on educational attainment was supplied by UNESCO database and we used 
Barro and Lee
15
 methodology, but we considered only HC stocks by primary school or 
HCPRI.  
HCPRI≡ H1t/Lt 
H1t= H1t-5*(1-§t)+L18t*(1-PRIt-5)                                         (1) 
§t≈ (L18t+Lt-5-Lt)/Lt-5                                                                             (2) 
H1t≡H1t/Lt=[1-(L18t/Lt]*H1t-5+(L18t/Lt)*(1-PRIt-5)                             (3) 
                                                          
15
 See Barro and Lee 1993 International Comparisons of Educational Attainment  
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Where: HCPRI be result the quantity of H1 people that has primary school dived by L 
quantity of adult people or labour age (more than 18 years old).   
 H1t-5 be the number of people within this adult population who have primary school 
 L18 be the population aged between 12 and 17 years old 
PRI be the enrolment in primary school divided by total population aged between 6 – 11 
years old 
§t be the proportion of people aged 18 and over in year t-5 who did not survive to year t 
 Table 6.5: First block using fixed-effects 
Step 1: Fixed-effects, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: HCPRI 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
 PS 0.846789 0.302591 27.985 0.00590 *** 
PR 180.248 0.530459 33.980 0.00090 *** 
R-squared 0.663631 
Adjusted R-squared 0.638340 
 
Table 6.6: First block using random-effects 
Step 1: Random-effects (GLS), using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: HCPRI 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value   
PS 0.862188 0.297191 29.011 0.00432 *** 
PR 176.206 0.519291 33.932 0.00090 *** 
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6.4 The second block: assessing soil quality   
We assumed that the NPKL is narrowly influenced by HCPRI, the agriculture value 
added (% of GDP), GDP per capita income, human capital and Domestic credit to 
private sector (% of GDP).  
To start up, agriculture needs basic conditions: soil, water and human intervention, but, 
to develop, it needs the improvement deriving from the use of the main natural assets; 
the soil should offer more productivity through good management practices and water 
supply, if necessary, should be regulated by irrigations or drainages. 
The so called “agricultural revolution” had the flash point around 10.000 BC in Middle 
Eastern Sumerian regions – between Iran and the coast of the Mediterranean –; this 
revolution changed human history: before mankind was of small mobile groups of 
hunters/fishermen; after it, our society was turned into sedentary societies based in 
villages and this modified radically all the natural environment. The techniques of 
domestication of plants were widespread around the world and the optimized during the 
"bronze age", that allowed new techniques to make new tools. 
All it happened because the natural resources had been available, and man knew how to 
manage these resources. Nowadays the increasing population has pressured and 
increased demands for foods; moreover, they have threatened agricultural systems with 
land occupation. Between 1960 and 1990 the growth of productivity helped western 
countries to resolve this problem. But now the rising purchasing power of the so called 
“emerging markets” has changed the scenario. 
Latin America, South and Southeast Asian have put millions of people in the consumer 
market every year. These people, who lived in extreme poverty before, can now eat 
every day, have immigrated to cities, also demanding another consumer goods like 
houses, thus putting in check the arable land around the cities. Perhaps for the first time 
in the history the sustainable management of the land sources is more import than the 
supply of land for development.        
The cities were born from small villages that had been built in the best soils for 
agriculture, while the marginal lands, usually with low performances in agriculture, now 
are the majority of places where the farmers can found stock of land and increase the 
quantity of arable land.  
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However these areas need more inputs to maintain the productivity and the quality; only 
with these cares the marginal lands be useful in the present and perennial.  
Nevertheless, all inputs have costs and, consequently, this increases the food prices or 
reduces the farmer’s profit; also the capability of farmers of doing investments depends 
on the economic environment, in other words European’s farmers have more 
opportunities than African’s farmers in this case. Eurostat show that the farmers of EU’s 
27 had an average consumption of 76 kilograms of nutrients per hectare in 2005, on the 
other hand FAO demonstrated that African’s farmers had a consumption average 12 
kilograms per hectare. 
We have to add that, among SSA countries, there exist differences of economic 
environment, thus the low income countries have a smaller consumption of inputs than 
the others African countries with a median income. Our sample, the SSA’s – 9 farmers, 
have averagely consumed a third of the average SSA countries, with a mean of a modest 
4 kilograms per hectare in 2005 (FAOstat). 
Of course, low levels of inputs affect straight the crops yield, but, more importantly, 
they jeopardize the future agriculture of these regions, because they create a vicious 
circle. The yield gap reduces farmer’s profit, hence the following year he will have 
fewer financial resources to invest and the lack of soil nutrient balance will lead to a 
deterioration of soil quality, thus reducing productivity, increased erosion processes and 
provoking a reduction of the arable land. 
Thereby, knowing the amount of inputs needed is the milestone of the process. 
Thereunto it is fundamental to identify the quality of the soil to measure the 
investments. Ones of the first classifications of the African soil was made by Peterson 
(1987), who created one index. This index put on the table the quality and costs of lands 
around the world and compared it with the US soils and prices.  
Even though it was useful, the index did not provide a thorough picture of the 
agricultural situation: soil quality is dynamic and it is continuously changing, because 
the weather and agronomic activities have been influencing it all the time. In 1990 
Smaling and Stoorvogel developed the "nutrient-budget" and "nutrient-balance" models, 
that to rely on a series of assumptions in order to deal with the complex nutrient 
systems.   
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Basically the models or the so called “black box” account for the foremost 
macronutrients, nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and potassium (K) of the soil 
16
 . With five 
major inputs process of nutrients – IN 1 to 5 – and five principal outputs processes of 
nutrients – OUT 1 to 5 – were identified below (figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4: NPK “black box” 
 
Smaling and Stoorvogel (1990) pg 17 
Despite the Smaling and Stoorvogel methodology is widespread accepted (Cobo et al 
2010, Henao and Baanante 2006, Bindraban et al 2000, Pieri et al 1995 and FAO 2003), 
the principal criticism is about the soil data base. As pivotal phase they used the "Land 
Use Systems" (LUS) and the "Land Use Type" (LUT) data base (FAO 1976). These 
data bases are more homogeneous and consequently we can use the same forms to 
calculation the nutrient balance, but they created problems when they were used for 
small land (micro level), because they are general data. 
Many institutions have been trying to resolve this problem: the Canadian government 
has the Canadian Soil Quality guidelines that do not only calculate NPK, but also do the 
calculations of soil contaminations and are very precisions for Canadian area, these 
tools are available online www.ccme.ca . 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has two softwares with two 
methodologies that can be used to identify soil quality in US: The CQESTR model and 
RUSLE model. 
                                                          
16
 See Smaling and Stoorvogel 1990 
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The CQESTR's model was applied on Brazil’s tropical soils in 2009, but without good 
results. The model’s simulations in general underestimated soil organic carbon (SOC), 
they made mistakes when they did the conversion from native forest to croplands. The 
SOC showed a mismatch with the empirical results, thus is needed to evaluate the 
CQESTR model’s performance in tropical soils (Leite et al 2009).      
The RUSLE's model was applied in the south west of India in partnership with the 
University of Cambridge. Both institutions made RUSLE2, this upgrade allowed the 
software to be more useful in tropical areas. Pal and Al-Tabbaa (2009) confirmed that 
they had picked up good results and the software can be an alternative to local 
equations. 
However, this research was looking for macro levels or national data, moreover we did 
not wish to develop a new software, hence we assumptions that the Smaling and 
Stoorvogel methodology is the best model to understand which path the SSA – 9 areas 
are following. 
We believe the soil nutrient balance is the result, of the stress that the men cause to the 
rural environment; these outcomes can be good or bad. The use of fertilizers in the EU 
27 produces a good yield and pollutes the environment, while, without fertilizers in SSA 
– 9, they have a terrible productivity and the arable lands have risk to shrink. 
In this case excess or loss the NPK in the soil is the consequence of the acts of farmers. 
In this step we looked at farmers’ behaviors and the society that they live in. To 
comprehend a society, all economists first of all look for macroeconomics data: with 
these data it is possible to do forecasts about the economic paths of the country. 
Here, fatefully, we confronted with the same problem; when you talk about African 
countries, there is a lack or mismatch of information about, for instance, inflation, 
employment and public investment. All these facts are “drivers” of social and economic 
movability. 
To resolve this problem, we were picked up economics mobility to make up the lack of 
information, in others words, the agriculture value added in percentile of GDP (AVA). 
We considered that SSA’s – 9 economy should follow the same trend of developed and 
emerging countries. As agriculture develops, it creates potentials for all country 
develops. Thus, the services and industrial sectors can gain space in their GDP and the 
percentile of agriculture value should decrease. 
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The rural areas in SSA – 9 historically have been losing NPK (NPKL), so the both facts, 
the agricultural development and NPKL, must have the inverse relation. While the NPK 
is negative agribusiness cannot develop well, and, as result economic movability cannot 
happen. On the other hand the percentile move of GDP means that macroeconomics 
data are improving and will influence farmer’s deeds that will reduce NPKL. 
Another fact that shows an inverse relation is the GDP per capita income (GDPPC); this 
is not a surprises for three reasons: Firstly, all SSA – 9 countries have a low per capita 
income, and the farmers use elementary agricultural techniques, like intensive labour 
forces; moreover they have poor infrastructure, that create difficulties to carry out 
national or international trades, hence they depend the local market. Therefore the rise 
of income does not mean that the consumer market is improving: Usually in low income 
countries the consumer market is enlarged by demographic expansion. 
Secondly, in SSA – 9, the farmer behaviour does not  follow the western logic, some 
indigenous attitudes lead to an inverse relation between income and productivity, 
Dormon et al. (2004) showed that the “high cost of hired labour” associate with good 
cocoa price resulted in low productivity, because with this scenario the farmers 
preferred to use their families than hire labour to do cocoa harvesting, but they 
harvested only the necessary to pay the bills, they did cover all the cocoa fruits seasons. 
The last issue, which is less complex and easier to deal with is the “dualism” economic 
theory, that does not work for SSA – 9; when the cost of labour force rises, farmers 
should invest in technology to use less workforce and rise the yield, but the farmer’s 
investment to increase productivity are very few or do not exist in SSA – 9. 
We believe that low income countries have the same dilemma as median income 
countries; structural problems do not allow median income countries to turn into 
developed countries, the so called “middle income trap”. The low income countries 
paradigms are mainly education level (HC) and credit systems.  
With more education farmers can perform better analyses of the market and find out 
solutions and opportunities, however without credit systems, many opportunities will be 
lost and the agricultural sector will have a low potential growth. 
Whether AVA and per capita income have an inverse relation with NPKL, the HCPRI 
and domestic credit to private sector (DCPS) have a positive relation. The education 
level used in this step is the same methodology as the previous step.    
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We selected DCPS data from World Bank data bases, but unfortunately in these 
countries the rural credit does not have the same performances as the domestic credit to 
private sector in general. Frequently the agriculture credit represents a third of the 
performances. In others words, when the DCPS reaches 10 percent of GDP, the rural 
credit attains around 3 percent of agricultural GDP. 
However we were not sure whether to use this percentage, because, despite the extreme 
relevance of the issue, only IFAD reports have scarce data about rural credit, and using 
their information only we cannot build a time series data about rural credit. As a result, 
we maintained the reason about credit system but used the domestic credit of all the 
private sector, the so called DCPS (World Bank data). 
As to the agricultural value added in percentile of GDP (AVA), and GDP per capita 
income (GDPPC) we used the World Bank data base, while for the human capital (HC) 
we used the UNESCO data base.    
Finally, for the NPKL data was used the Smaling and Stoorvogel (1990) data for 1983 
and 2000, Henao and Baanante (2006) for 1995 and 2002 data. With "Smaling and 
Stoorvogel methodology" and FAOstat data, we created the NPKL 2009. So we did a 
trend of NPKL among 1990 and 2005 in SSA – 9 through a median. 
Table 6.7: Second block using fixed-effects 
Step 2: Fixed-effects, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: NPKL 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value   
AVA -0.797613 0.215273 -37.051 0.00031 *** 
GDPPC -0.0384806 0.020262 -18.992 0.05974 * 
HCPRI 0.176736 0.0969932 18.222 0.07071 * 
DCPS 0.257647 0.172765 14.913 0.13828   
R-squared  0.874346 
Adjusted R-squared  0.862835 
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Table 6.8: Second block using random-effects  
Step 2: Random-effects (GLS), using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: NPKL 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value   
AVA -0.891581 0.219317 -40.653 0.00008 *** 
GDPPC -0.0283659 0.020019 -14.170 0.15873   
HCPRI 0.152849 0.0990776 15.427 0.12517   
DCPS 0.261412 0.174767 14.958 0.13698   
 
6.5 The third block: assessing agricultural productivity   
We assumed that the agricultural productivity (API) is narrowly influenced by NPKL, 
rural population density by arable land (RPDAL), roads density and rail lines density 
(INFR).  
Farms were the first firms in the history of humankind, man managed inputs as soil, 
water and knowledge and they obtained output like foods and feeds. This fact changed 
behaviours and it was possible to build the civilization that we know. Producing foods 
for the whole village meant autonomy and chances the progress. 
Thereby ensuring a minimal amount food for everybody, despite the demographic 
growth, was the main goal of each village, region or kingdom. The consumption per 
capita of calories in the first years of new human civilizations are inaccurate, historians 
talk of an intake between one thousand and 1500 caloric per day. But after industrial 
revolution the consumption per capita grew in Europe and decreased in Asia and 
remained stable others regions until 1900.    
Currently we can see that each region in the world has different approach about calorie 
consumption, because each region has a different degree of development and the 
agricultural sector has a different weight and function in their economies. Nowadays 
these regions are divided by international institutions into: developed countries, Latin 
America, south and central Asia, East and south East Asia, Middle East and North 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Consumption of caloric in SSA countries rose by 7,2 percent between 1990 and 2005 
and they had an average consumption of 2100 calories per capita in 2005, but the SSA 
agricultural gross per capita production index (API) fell by 8,72 percent from 1990 to 
2005 and increased the gap between consumption and production in SSA. In others 
words SSA was more dependences the food importation in 2005 than in 1990. 
Moreover, the SSA – 9 has a similar trend of average consumption of daily calories, 
which rose from 1974 caloric per day in 1990 to 2137 caloric in 2005, on the other hand 
SSA – 9 API grew only by 3,95 percent, even though they had a performance which 
was a little better than SSA  (FAOstat). 
Differently of SSA, other regions in the world showed growth of the API indexes or it 
remained stable. In developed countries the index grew by 3 per cent – despite the EU 
27 fell by 12% –, Latin America increased by 7,1 percent, south Asia was only 0,05 
percent positive, middle east and north Africa surge by 27.23 percent and east and south 
east Asia the API rocketed by 32,59 percent, between 1990 and 2005. 
In this research we are looking for evidences that agriculture can reduce rural poverty as 
well as what tools are more efficient to optimizes this relations. For this, the third step is 
crucial to check the agriculture firms prospective within SSA – 9 contexts, i.e. what the 
capability of farmers are to increase productivity inside low income countries. 
As everybody knows productivity does not means profit; to bring up the return of 
investment we should do the cost function and to kwon of constant returns to scale and 
efficiency performing a TFP analysis is more appropriated, therefore farmers can find 
out the breakeven point for their investment.  
Thereunto we need information that does not exist, so, despite our caution when 
choosing the sample, some information about SSA countries had to be based on 
assumption. We hypothesized that, when yield growth of corps occurs, that reduces 
costs and farmers will have more profit, then they will reduce their level of poverty. 
Many other authors did the same reasoning, when the agricultural sector grows in low 
income countries reduces the poverty (Timmer 2005), (Lipton and Ravallion 1993), 
(Mellor 2001 and 1999), (Quibria 2002), (Roemer and Gugerty 1997), (Janvry and 
Sadoulet 2009), (Anderson 2009), (Headey et al 2010) and (Thirtle 2003). However, 
poverty reduction depends in part on the environment and the economy’s poverty 
profile. 
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In others words, we can classify the “poverty profile” in urban and rural areas and sub-
classify it in poverty – PPP 2005, income of USD 2.25 daily – and extreme poverty – 
PPP 2005, income of USD 1.25 per day –. So to be more exact each group must be 
calculated apart, because the needs of each one are according to the profile. This 
research puts its emphasis on the economic problem of extreme poverty in rural areas. 
The environment in rural areas certainly helped or hindered the agricultural growth and 
poverty reduction; among many factors we can synthesize the agro-ecological zoning 
(AEZ), that included weather, soil, crops choose and management skills. Among the 
many output that AEZ has, NPKL data is the main measurable result. We added the 
rural population density of arable land and the infrastructure to complete the rural areas 
scenario. 
The rural population density is one of the key factors, because agriculture’s powerful 
poverty reducing effect in rural areas come substantially through the links between 
farmers and non-farm activities (Mellor 2001), hence poor countries with poor 
infrastructure and high rural density can have better linkages in regional level, which 
means that high population density is better than low population density to develop non-
farm activities.  
According to Mellor, the agricultural growth effect has two rounds: the first one mainly 
benefits farmers and in many cases it can concentrate the income, in spite of this 
collateral effect; the second round happens next, as the non-farming rural business, 
besides contributing to increase the rural population density, has welfare effects for all 
rural societies and poverty reduction is three time larger than during the first round.   
Roemer and Gugerty (1997) emphasized the effect of rural density with some important 
research, supported by empirical results they said that large rural economies based on 
small scale farming, as in African and Asian countries, showed the different results in 
poverty reduction, because the countries with a high rural population density responded 
better than countries with a low rural population density.  
In their opinion, the East Asian countries had a comparative advantage, to reduce the 
rural poverty, because, although their land is poorer than Africa's soil, the Asians had 
abundant labour force to supply services and goods for emerging agribusiness. 
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Headey et al (2010) put on the table not only the density of population but also the 
infrastructure system, they compared Latin American, Asian and African agricultural 
countries. Firstly, they confirmed that rural population density facilitated the startup of 
agriculture and accelerated the development of a rural non-farming economy, but these 
benefices turning into a problem when the countries had poor infrastructure. 
Between 1960 and 2000, Nepal, India, Indonesia and Thailand had different 
performances in the rural poverty reduction and non-farm economy development, even 
though all countries had high rural population density. The rural infrastructures in Nepal 
and India stopped the rural development, while Indonesia and Thailand, which have 
better infrastructure than both previous countries, presented the good numbers.  
To follow similar reasoning of the majority of authors, the first step was to determine 
what how exactly gauged the rural population density. Asian countries used practically 
all marginal lands to agriculture (Quibria 2002), albeit marginal land had a worsen yield 
than Asian countries on average.  
On the other hand, African countries have exploited around a third of their agriculture 
area (FAO 2001); practically, only good quality soils were being used and the so called 
marginal land were not used. Furthermore, in our sample, we have countries like 
Mozambique and Zambia that have almost a third of their areas truly unsustainable for 
agriculture. 
Consequently, we assumed that, if there were areas where it was possible to develop 
agriculture form the point of view of natural resources, and still it was not done, that 
was because infrastructure or the socio-economic environment did not allow to do it. 
Thereby these lands cannot contribute to API; on the other hand, the sites having so 
called “arable land” or were agricultural activities are possible are the only ones that can 
be part of the model.  
Hence, we used the so called “rural population density of arable land” index (RPDAL) 
from the FAO data base. The RPDAL index was calculated, took all rural population 
and divided it by arable land used on base year    
Identifying exactly the best combination between RPDAL and needs of infrastructure to 
support the agriculture development is a crucial point, but, once more, the absence of 
accurate data bases prevented us from doing a deeper analysis.  
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In an ordinary least squares test (OLS) only Zambia and Zimbabwe have a positive 
correlation between RPDAL and API implying that their infrastructure can support the 
rural population and their goods, nevertheless we know that, as the data superficial, we 
cannot to have  deep results.  
However, SSA – 9 has a narrow relation between API and RPDAL, as suggested by  
literature, but with negative effects, we therefore affirm, that despite the SSA’s 
demographic windows, that it will has until 2050, their agriculture won’t develop 
without investments in infrastructure. The most important investments, would be 
logistic system as roads, rail lines and ports.  
Notwithstanding their importance, between 1990 and 2005 international institutions 
practically did not assess the ports performances of SSA – 9. It is well known that ports 
are the most important tools to access international market and can helped the 
agricultural countries with a small domestic market to develop. 
However without the ports data, we sought for road and rail line data: the best free data 
base is the World Bank data base, but these data are at national level and we know that 
it would be better if we had the rural road density and the agricultural merchandises 
transported by railroad. 
Unfortunately, the road investments in SSA – 9 were done mainly in urban areas like 
Ghana: moreover, rail companies usually transported mineral resources and not 
agricultural goods, as in Zambia and Mozambique cases. Anyhow we used, as 
infrastructure data base, only road density and rail line density (World Bank data). 
Table 6.9: Third block using fixed-effects 
Step 3: Fixed-effects, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: API 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value   
NPKL -0.11172 0.0569351 -19.622 0.05184 * 
RPDAL -0.0955184 0.0275439 -34.679 0.00071 *** 
INFR 0.227076 0.212495 10.686 0.28719   
R-squared  0.513679 
Adjusted R-squared  0.473152 
 
 
 
 
146 
 
Table 6.10: Third block using random-effects  
Step 3: Random-effects (GLS), using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: API 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value   
NPKL -0.119292 0.0517227 -23.064 0.02256 ** 
RPDAL -0.0692854 0.0220525 -31.418 0.00205 *** 
INFR 0.389327 0.182615 21.320 0.03476 ** 
 
6.6 The fourth block: assessing the rural poverty  
We assumed that the Rural Poverty Line (RPL) is narrowly influenced by API, RPDAL 
and land tenure system (PR). 
Some institutions exist to fight against poverty, some sociologists like to give 
explanations about privation and the rural people hate of misery. In rural areas, misery 
or extreme poverty means that people are being deprived of eating despite having 
contact with the field, all the time. It is terribly, sad seeing you and your family suffer in 
the present and without future. 
To get rid of misery, rural populations always have responded quickly for all stimuli. 
Classic and modern literatures
17
 have indicated as main factors, RPDAL, PR and API. 
In the last step of the model we agree with the authors, but we highlighted that these 
exogenous elements, that influenced the reduction of rural poverty, affect and are 
affected by others “inner factors” and creating a feedback-loop.   
Therefore, for SSA – 9 and probable for most of low-income agricultural countries, a 
higher RPDAL optimizes poverty reduction when API grows and PR improves, 
similarly the growth or reduction of API is affected by the mix of factors that can be 
positive or negative such as: RPDAL, local infrastructure and agro-ecological zoning 
(AEZ) in this model represented by the NPKL outputs. 
                                                          
17
 (Lipton 1977), (Lipton and Ravallion 1993), (Roemer and Gugerty 1997), (Delgado et al 1998), (Mellor 
1999 and 2001), (FAO 2001), (Quibria 2002), (Thirtle et al 2003), (World Bank 2004), (Timmer 2005), 
(Janvry and Sadoulet 2009), (Anderson 2009), (Larsen et al 2009), (Headey et al 2010) and (IFAD 2011). 
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NPKL was the outcome of the combination the natural resources as AEZ, the socio-
economic environment by macroeconomic index and the intellectual capacity of farmers 
descripted in this thesis as human capacity (HC). In its turn HC has narrow linkages 
with PR and political stability. 
In others words, the right of property or land tenure showed as pivot the process, but is 
not the essence. Poverty reduction happened in rural areas without PR, because in the 
core of this process is the fight against hunger of rural people. 
Aided by techniques inherited from the local culture to manage the AEZ, “saved” by 
lack of infrastructure that prevents the entry of agricultural goods and forgotten by 
rulers when the soil does not have mineral resources, the farmers have been trying to 
improve their life conditions. 
But, we suggested that this circle is not sufficient to assure the rural poverty reduction; 
the governments of SSA – 9 should improve, first of all, land tenure system. That 
change would touch the rural population, the farmers would change their behaviour and 
the poverty reduction process would be more efficient.  
 
Table 6.11: Fourth block using fixed-effects 
Step 4: Fixed-effects, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: RPL 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value   
API -0.136445 0.0752567 -18.131 0.07209 * 
PR -130.882 0.350597 -37.331 0.00028 *** 
RPDAL -0.019211 0.0257769 -0.7453 0.45743   
R-squared  0.801489 
Adjusted R-squared  0.784947 
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Table 6.12: Fourth block using random-effects 
Model 4: Random-effects (GLS), using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: RPL 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value   
API -0.0866034 0.0695377 -12.454 0.21506   
PR -157.825 0.318587 -49.539 <0.00001 *** 
RPDAL 0.00606864 0.0184908 0.3282 0.74325   
 
 
6.7 Results of the complete econometric Model 
As we said, we built a model that considers economic facts and also human behavior. It 
is clear that all the elements influence each other, so to understand this impact we used a 
system of recursive rather than simultaneous equations, a recursive model is a special 
case of an equation system where the endogenous variables are determined one at a time 
in sequence. 
In others words, the left-hand side of the equation for the first endogenous variable 
includes no endogenous variables, only exogenous variables, the second endogenous 
variable includes exogenous variables and the first endogenous variable, the third 
endogenous variable includes exogenous variable the second endogenous variable, and 
so on, block by block. But the last endogenous variable influence the first block. 
One the most popular systems to create recursive and non-recursive models is the 
Structural Equation Models (SEM), because it allow to develop both confirmatory and 
exploratory modeling, meaning they are suited to both theory testing and theory 
development. Other attractive of SEM models is their simple causal interpretation that 
consents to identify direct and indirect effects.  
The different between recursive and simultaneous models is that one simultaneous 
regression uses the independent elements as Xs and dependents variable Ys and one 
equation explain the variance of Y such as: Yi = β 0 + β 1 X1i + β 2 X2i + β 3 X3i + εi 
On the other hand SEM model also used unidirectional causal effects but they do it 
block by block, so they can evaluate the weight of each block as: 
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Yi = β 0 + β 1 Y2i + β 2 X1i + εi 
Y2i = Ø 0 + Ø1 X1i + Ø 2 X2i + Ø 3 X3i + ε1i 
X3i = C 0 + C 2 X2i + C 3 Yi + ε2i 
For example; in a simple agriculture environment with supply and demand function: 
Rainfall might affect the supply of agricultural goods but it not directly affect the 
demand for then. Similarly per capita income might affect demand but not directly 
affect supply. However rainfall has an indirect influence on demand and per capita 
income also influences supply indirectly. 
   
 
 
 
The SEM have been implicit in almost all of causal modeling. It was built by the Sewell 
Wright (1921) one geneticist and it was followed by many authors as Simon (1953) 
Blalock (1964), Duncan (1975), Pearl (2000) and Kline 2005. The SEM model started 
to be used for models of health / disease, but nowadays it is also used to model 
behaviour, economic systems and diseases. 
In SEM, the qualitative causal assumptions are represented by the missing variables in 
each equation, as well as vanishing covariance among some error terms. These 
assumptions were tested in our research and to confirm our thesis. 
We used SEM by Stata software, again with follow assumptions;  
First block; the land property right (PR) and political stability (PS) influence human 
capital at primary school (HCPRI). 
Second block; the HCPRI, the percentile of agricultural value added of GDP (AVA), 
GDP per capita income (GDPPC) and the percentage of domestic credit to the private 
sector of GDP (DCPS) influence the soil loss of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium 
elements (NPKL).  
Third block; the NPKL, the rural population density by arable land (RPDAL) and the 
infrastructure index (INFR) influence the Agricultural gross per capita production index 
(API) 
Fourth block, the API, RPDAL and PR influence the rural poverty line (RPL), similarly 
RPL and PR influenced the PS in first block doing a feedback loop. 
rainfall supply demand per capita 
$  i$ $ 
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Figure 6.5: Results of the econometric model   
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The estimated results the following; the first block the improvement in of 1 point of PR 
and PS meant the improvement of HCPRI in 0.91 and 1.1 point respectively. This 
confirmed the classics school of human behaviours. As much as I feel safe and secure 
today, I will invest more for my future (Skinner and Maslow). 
The second block showed that the loss of soil nutrient NPKL changed, when HCPRI, 
AVA and DCPS increase by one point in the following order -0,52, -2,9 and -0,68. With 
simple reasons we arrived in these conclusions: with the better education level, farmers 
acquired more knowledge to manage natural resources and to use new techniques, 
consequently the soil quality improved. 
The decrease of agriculture value added in percentile of GDP (AVA) means that 
agriculture was following well and pulled out all national GDP, hence the others sectors 
of the country grew also, so the AVA index decreased. As a result, agriculture was 
doing well in the time it needed take care of soil quality. Finally when the Domestic 
Credit to the private sector (DCPS) grows, it produces more possibilities to 
entrepreneurs, who can invest in fertilizers and improve soil quality. 
However, the most interesting factor is that, when GDP per capita income (GDPPC) 
grows by one point the NPKL increases loss in 0.02 points. Literature points out that the 
“high cost of hired labour” in SSA induced farmers to hire less work force (Dormon et 
al 2004).  
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Even though it is not clear why this trend occurred, in this specific subject deeper 
research on the elasticity of supply and demand should be carried out. In others words, 
it should be investigated how much the earnings should increase to push the domestic 
demand and offset the worth paid to keep the soil quality. 
The third block showed that, when NPKL and INFR progressed by one point meant 
0,02 and 0,57 point of API enhancement correspondingly. On the other hand when 
RPDAL increase by one point API declined by 0,04 point.  
In this step we should be open minded to understand the nuances of this tripod that was 
supporting API. First of all NPKL is the collateral effect of the mixes between human 
intervention and the local natural resources. As we knew it can be positive, negative or 
equal to the NPK balances, i.e. if the farmers use fertilizer in excess this produces a 
positive NPK and causes pollution in the environment like many developed countries 
and nowadays some Asian countries.  
If we get the equal balance of NPK, we will arrive the so called “sustainable 
agriculture”. That means we will produce the max of goods possible without 
contaminating the soil and to ensure the future for the next generation.  
On the other hand, what we have seen in SSA – 9 and practically in all SSA countries in 
the last 20 years, is the NPKL phenomenon. The negative balance of NPK does not 
mean the slump the API like a cutting axe. NPKL is slowly weakening the foundations 
of current production and reducing the changes of future sustainability form an 
economic and social point of view. As a skin cancer that does not kill itself, but kills 
because of its side effects. 
Infrastructure instead of NPKL has strong and quick effects: good roads and rail lines 
are the main link between regions and have a significant impact to reduce the costs and 
improve the trade of goods; it certainty can help farmers to leap from subsistence 
agriculture to cash crops trades (Amoatey 2007).  
Furthermore, building infrastructure in marginal areas creates jobs and spreads welfare 
immediately. In our research we picked up only roads and rail lines data, but this maybe 
also true for energy and water supplies, health and telecommunication systems, and so 
on. 
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We called RPDAL the last foot of the tripod; when RPDAL is low the domestic 
agricultural development is less provable because it does not produce the linkages 
(Mellor 2001 and Roemer and Gugerty 1997). On the other hand a high RPDAL 
without adequate infrastructure blocks the agricultural development and it could be 
interpreted as a problem (Headey et al 2010).        
Our data confirm the strong relation between RPDAL and API, but also demonstrate 
that now in SSA – 9 this relation is negative. The increase of rural population stress the 
NPK balance because the food demand continue to grow, but the infrastructure that can 
reduce this pressure is very poor to support the rural population growth. 
Empirical results in Asia countries among 1960 and 2000 indicated that when 
infrastructure improved the high RPDAL converted into positive effect for API.  
The fourth block; the rural poverty line (RPL) decrease very well when PR increase. 
The correlation amounting to more than one point of PR resulted in less 3.1 points of 
RPL, but the other two main factors had to inverse relationship. When RPDAL and API 
increased one point, the RPL also increased 0,01 and 0,14 point respectively. 
With a title of land the farmers have more security to work and produce more, can 
access to credit system and improve their business or yet they can sell their lands and go 
to the cities. In all these cases the index of RPL will fall. 
The negative effect that RPDAL has on RPL was expected; some countries of SSA – 9 
have low infrastructure as we saw from the previous block. Furthermore the lack of land 
tenure system and the high birth rate produced the “micro-land” phenomenon or trap. 
The farms were divided between heirs but as was impossible to sell their land, the 
successors become ever more people to be supported by less land.        
But API has a negative effect on RPL called our attention; this is the most import point 
in this research, in SSA – 9, when the API grew by one point, RPL increased by 0.14. In 
others words the agricultural growth increased the rural poverty. 
By a thorough analysis for each country of the sample, we saw one dichotomy of 
results; countries with low agricultural develop and good performance in poverty 
reduction as Uganda, or countries enjoying the improvement of API but with the rural 
poverty growing as Malawi. 
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It is because between 1990 and 2005 the prices of agriculture remained stable, thus the 
internal policies as land tenure, rural credit and infrastructure proved the main actors to 
optimize the agricultural results toward the rural poverty reduction. 
Finally in the feedback loop, PS level has inverse relationship with RPL in 0,11 point 
and positive linkage the PR in 1,2 points. 
Table 6.13: SSA – 9 model robust test 
Robust test           
HCPRI coef. std. erro Z P>(Z)   
PS 1,09072 0,38693 2,82 0,005 *** 
PR 0,91072 0,38103 2,39 0,017 *** 
NPKL coef. std. erro Z P>(Z)   
HCPRI -0,5178 0,11978 -4,32 0,000 *** 
AVA -2,8931 0,31366 -9,22 0,000 *** 
GDPPC 0,02492 0,02286 1,09 0,276   
DCPS -0,6822 0,18117 -3,77 0,000 *** 
API coef. std. erro Z P>(Z)   
NPKL -0,0222 0,03661 -0,61 0,544   
RPDAL -0,0481 0,01543 -3,12 0,002 *** 
INFR 0,56907 0,13741 4,14 0,000 *** 
RPL  coef. std. erro Z P>(Z)   
API -0,0222 0,03661 -0,61 0,544   
PR -3,0816 0,45845 -6,72 0,000 *** 
RPDAL 0,01142 0,00695 1,64 0,100 * 
PS coef. std. erro Z P>(Z)   
RPL  0,11155 0,02232 5 0,000 *** 
PR 1,15632 0,11872 9,74 0,000 *** 
 
Table 6.14: SSA – 9 model R-square observed 
observed      R-squared         mc       mc2 
HCPRI 0,13704 0,37019 0,13704 
PS 0,33169 0,57593 0,33169 
RPL 0,30648 0,55361 0,30648 
NPKL 0,55047 0,74193 0,55047 
API 0,13503 0,36746 0,13503 
overall   0,8066     
 
mc  = correlation between depvar and its prediction 
mc2 = mc^2 is the Bentler-Raykov squared multiple correlation coefficient 
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7. MAIN RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
All this work had as goal assessing the role of agricultural productivity and the socio-
economic environment to in rural poverty reduction in SSA – 9. Thus find out the 
efficient tools for their domestic societies to help the rural population overtake the 
poverty line meant also reducing food security problems, with more food supply and 
with more income for farmers and non-farmers in rural areas. 
However the lack of data in many areas, we forced estimates some data and assume 
several conditions, future research can help sharpen the model and also the estimates 
such as the FAO (October 2012) that brought up for the first time the Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) food price index by country (chart 7.1). 
Anderson (2009) hypothesized that, where the cost of living is higher the poverty line 
must be higher than USD 1,25, similarly it should be lower than USD 1,25 where the 
cost of living is better, not only by country but for each region, mainly differentiating 
urban and rural areas.   
The definition the extreme rural poverty refers to those people who would still not be 
able to eat the minimum amount of nutrition necessary for their daily life, if they to use 
their entire budget to buy food. And the World Bank fixed the poverty line in USD 1,25 
a day PPP, but current report of FAO showed that each country has different food 
prices, consequently each country should be dissimilar poverty line. 
Again is was worthwhile to make all considerations, and to try improve the assessment 
methodology, but we judged it would be prudent to play with mature methodology and 
with the available data during our research, and we contributed to the subject for these 
reasons.   
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Chart 7.1: Food prices index and poverty line  
     
Source; food price index by FAO and poverty line by World Bank 
 
7.1 Main results for the nine SSA countries 
In this paragraph we examined the model for each single country; in other words we 
confronted the model results of SSA – 9 with results for each one of the nine countries 
separately, block by block. The next tables show the starting point levels – 1990 –, the 
data of last year – 2005 – and the average of these sixteen years. The complete database 
is in appendix III of chapter 6.   
This approach is important for two reasons; first, because these results support the idea 
that future research could possibly analize single countries with this model. 
Second, it has made possible to identify and measure the improvements and the main 
policy implications in every single For example: the results of the first block show that 
the improvement in of 1% point of PR and PS mean the improvement of HCPRI in 0.91 
and 1.1 point respectively. This confirmed the results of classical school of human 
behaviours: as soon as farmers start to feel safe and secure, they also begin to invest 
more for the future (Skinner and Maslow). 
However, PR index shows itself to be much more efficient than PS in a singular 
analysis; this means that  rural population believe more in the future and will invest 
more in education when they have land rights; only Rwandan population had different 
trend, but we supposed that the genocides of Rwanda explain this behaviors. 
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On the other hand, when the HCPRI and PR and PS indexes of one country are very 
low, and PR and or PS had a fast pickup, the HCPRI reacted very well as Malawi, 
Rwanda and Uganda that had had HCPRI levels below of the SSA – 9 average, and 
finished in 2005 with numbers higher than the cluster. 
 
Table 7.1: Relationship among PS and PR indexes and HCPRI.      
Country PS > HCPRI PR > HCPRI 
SSA - 9  1,1 0,91 
Burundi -0,17 8,1 
Ghana 0,32 1,8 
Malawi -18 44 
Mozambique 0,4 -0,4 
Rwanda 13 -0,0008 
Uganda -7 5 
Tanzania -3 2,6 
Zambia -0,0008 -0,6 
Zimbabwe 0,98 4 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
Table 7.2: Individual levels of HCPRI, PS and PR. 
 HCPRI level PS level PR level 
Country 1990 2005 average 1990 2005 average 1990 2005 average 
SSA - 9  54,3 64,9 56,6 3,56 10,44 6,58 4,05 7,40 5,44 
Burundi 30,5 41,7 41,4 3,00 9,00 5,94 4,32 4,56 4,55 
Ghana 58,8 63,5 60,6 3,00 12,00 7,50 8,29 10,03 8,97 
Malawi 43,4 115,1 84,7 1,00 16,00 7,63 1,00 8,61 4,40 
Mozambique 57,0 44,6 41,5 3,00 15,00 9,19 2,00 8,19 5,00 
Rwanda 43,2 84,8 57,9 3,00 6,00 3,56 3,00 5,27 3,86 
Uganda 46,7 76,3 51,0 3,00 6,00 4,69 1,83 8,62 5,17 
Tanzania 50,0 40,8 43,0 4,00 9,00 6,06 4,00 8,75 5,97 
Zambia 67,6 60,9 64,2 1,00 15,00 9,69 1,00 8,51 3,88 
Zimbabwe 94,0 56,2 65,3 11,00 6,00 4,94 11,00 4,06 7,18 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
With respect to the second block, the SSA – 9  model, shows that the loss of soil 
nutrient NPKL changed, when HCPRI, AVA and DCPS increase by one point in the 
following order: -0,52, -2,9 and -0,68. When we look to each country, it is possible to 
see different trends mainly in the NPKL, HCPRI and DCPS factors. 
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First of all, as we know NPKL is the collateral effect human intervention and the local 
natural resources, and NPKL indicate the sustainability of agriculture in the long term.  
The human intervention plays a role, but the start point of soil quality is also very 
important: thus country as Uganda, with a very good soil quality, has a comparative 
advantages. 
HCPRI (human capital) is a social instrument for developing countries, because people 
with better education tend to produce more farm crops and manage better the NPKL 
using good agricultural techniques; however the model analyzed only quantitative data 
and not qualitative levels of education, thus it could happened that two countries with 
the same numbers had really different levels of human capital. 
Furthermore the DCPS is essential tool; in other words it does matter if I have or not 
access to the credit system.  
 
Table 7.3: Relationship among HCPRI, AVA, GDPPC and NPKL. 
Country HCPRI> NPKL AVA> NPKL GDPPC>NPKL DCPS>NPKL 
SSA - 9  -0,52 -2,9 0,0025 -0,68 
Burundi -0,37 -1,6 -0,47 -0,12 
Ghana -0,0009 1 -0,0008 1,9 
Malawi 0,23 -1,5 0,35 2,7 
Mozambique -0,2 1,5 -0,0008 0,58 
Rwanda 2,3 -0,62 -0,0006 -6,6 
Uganda 0,23 -0,55 -0,0001 -1,6 
Tanzania 0,55 -0,3 0,11 0,19 
Zambia -1,6 -0,3 -0,0009 0,92 
Zimbabwe 0,0002 -0,15 0,0004 -0,0002 
Source: Calculated by author 
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Table 7.4: Individual levels of NPKL, HCPRI and AVA. 
 NPKL level  HCPRI level AVA level  
Country 1990 2005 average 1990 2005 average 1990 2005 average 
SSA - 9  -82,52 -66,61 -78,90 54,3 64,9 56,6 39,5 30,5 35,0 
Burundi -153,00 -83,40 -125,28 30,5 41,7 41,4 55,9 34,8 46,4 
Ghana -72,75 -63,60 70,35 58,8 63,5 60,6 45,1 40,9 41,7 
Malawi -118,80 -75,28 -115,08 43,4 115,1 84,7 45,0 32,6 36,9 
Mozambique -28,35 -54,20 -40,15 57,0 44,6 41,5 37,1 27,0 31,5 
Rwanda -134,48 -85,58 -131,13 43,2 84,8 57,9 32,5 38,4 39,4 
Uganda -82,16 -84,30 -82,51 46,7 76,3 51,0 56,6 26,7 39,9 
Tanzania -80,03 -65,04 -75,41 50,0 40,8 43,0 46,0 31,8 40,1 
Zambia -21,60 -31,02 -18,63 67,6 60,9 64,2 20,6 23,3 21,7 
Zimbabwe -51,50 -57,04 -51,53 94,0 56,2 65,3 16,5 19,2 17,3 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
Table 7.5: Individual levels of GDPPC and DCPS. 
 GDPPC level DCPS level  
Country 1990 2005 average 1990 2005 average 
SSA - 9  333,36 348,34 292,06 10,54 12,40 12,41 
Burundi 199,27 107,87 137,84 8,61 22,27 17,88 
Ghana 393,25 489,17 372,18 4,93 15,54 9,00 
Malawi 198,99 201,80 184,04 10,95 7,91 8,26 
Mozambique 181,88 315,75 208,90 17,59 11,84 13,03 
Rwanda 361,43 287,05 256,75 6,92 11,21 8,67 
Uganda 242,76 313,60 242,91 0,00 8,63 5,36 
Tanzania 167,31 362,54 246,94 13,90 10,18 7,71 
Zambia 415,71 609,69 387,33 8,88 7,72 7,02 
Zimbabwe 839,66 447,56 591,65 23,04 16,28 34,76 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
The third block shows that, when NPKL and INFR increase by one point, this implies a 
corresponding increase by 0,02 and 0,57 point of API . On the other hand when RPDAL 
increase by one point, API declines by 0,04 point.  
The negative balance of NPK does not mean the slump the API like a cutting axe. 
NPKL is slowly weakening the foundations of current production and reducing the 
changes of future sustainability form an economic and social point of view.  
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INFR has strong and quick effects on API: good roads and rail lines are the main link 
between regions and have a significant impact to reduce the costs and improve the trade 
of goods. Furthermore, building infrastructure in marginal areas creates jobs and 
spreads welfare immediately. 
On the other hand, RPDAL should be supported by INFR and influence directly the 
NPKL; RPDAL without adequate infrastructure the agricultural development could not 
happen.  
 
Table 7.6: Relationship among NPLK, INFR, RPDAL and API 
Country NPKL> API INFR> API RPDAL> API 
SSA - 9  -0,0002 0,57 -0,0004 
Burundi -0,41 -6,1 -0,39 
Ghana -1,3 3 -0,31 
Malawi -0,0004 6,4 -0,53 
Mozambique -0,81 -2,6 0,0001 
Rwanda 0,0005 -0,72 -7 
Uganda 0,43 -0,0007 -0,0005 
Tanzania 0,32 -16 -0,16 
Zambia -0,27 -1,1 0,0002 
Zimbabwe -3,6 -0,39 1,1 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
Table 7.7: Individual levels of API and NPKL. 
 API level  NPKL level  
Country 1990 2005 Average 1990 2005 average 
SSA - 9  96,25 97,10 96,44 -82,52 -66,61 -78,90 
Burundi 128,68 99,58 110,45 -153,00 -83,40 -125,28 
Ghana 55,15 99,97 86,20 -72,75 -63,60 70,35 
Malawi 71,13 85,57 87,19 -118,80 -75,28 -115,08 
Mozambique 91,80 94,60 93,07 -28,35 -54,20 -40,15 
Rwanda 95,54 100,70 95,51 -134,48 -85,58 -131,13 
Uganda 112,28 99,89 106,22 -82,16 -84,30 -82,51 
Tanzania 92,22 100,34 85,14 -80,03 -65,04 -75,41 
Zambia 98,88 100,14 92,85 -21,60 -31,02 -18,63 
Zimbabwe 120,59 93,11 111,39 -51,50 -57,04 -51,53 
Source: Calculated by author 
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Table 7.8: Individual levels of INFR and RPDAL 
 INFR level  RPDAL level  
Country 1990 2005 Average 1990 2005 average 
SSA - 9  19,70 23,73 20,51 376,16 408,54 391,10 
Burundi 52,03 44,28 50,58 572,40 705,84 617,84 
Ghana 16,39 24,56 17,82 352,57 285,99 309,65 
Malawi 9,28 14,50 13,49 371,34 376,41 373,35 
Mozambique 3,37 4,17 3,72 309,73 303,26 311,31 
Rwanda 49,84 53,00 51,13 768,66 645,09 698,20 
Uganda 8,29 29,46 11,75 315,25 465,03 393,77 
Tanzania 9,46 8,99 9,50 229,37 311,24 277,18 
Zambia 4,86 9,04 7,79 209,15 354,22 286,02 
Zimbabwe 23,79 25,57 18,85 257,00 229,79 252,65 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
The fourth block; the rural poverty line (RPL) decrease very well when PR increase. 
The correlation amounting to more than one point of PR resulted in less 3.1 points of 
RPL, but the other two main factors have a different relationship. When RPDAL and 
API increased one point, the RPL also increased 0,01 and 0,14 point respectively. 
With title quantity of land farmers have more security to work and produce more, can 
access to credit system and improve their business or yet they can sell their lands and go 
to the cities. In all these cases the index of RPL will fall. 
The negative effect that RPDAL has on RPL was expected; some countries of SSA – 9 
have low infrastructure as we saw from the previous block. Furthermore the lack of land 
tenure system and the high birth rate produced the “micro-land” phenomenon or trap.  
However, when the API grew by one point, RPL increased by 0.14. In others words the 
agricultural growth increased the rural poverty. 
By a thorough analysis for each country of the sample, we saw one dichotomy of 
results: there are countries with low agricultural development but good performance in 
poverty reduction as Uganda, or countries enjoying the improvement of API but with 
the rural poverty growing as Malawi. 
The role of domestic policies like the one about land tenure, rural credit and 
infrastructures followed different paths and provided different outputs. 
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Table 7.9: Relationship among API, RPDAL, PR and RPL 
Country API> RPL RPDAL>RPL PR>RPL 
SSA - 9  0,14 0,0001 -3,1 
Burundi -0,51 -0,00005 1,7 
Ghana -0,046 0,22 2.3 
Malawi 0,33 0,0009 -0,89 
Mozambique 0,0003 0,0008 -3,9 
Rwanda -0,19 -0,0003 2,4 
Uganda 0,34 -0,16 -0,31 
Tanzania 0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0005 
Zambia -0,0005 -0,0008 -1,3 
Zimbabwe 0,0006 -0,9 -3,1 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
Table 7.10: Individual levels of RPL and API 
 RPL level  API level  
Country 1990 2005 Average 1990 2005 average 
SSA - 9  53,43 53,06 57,73 96,25 97,10 96,44 
Burundi 36,20 70,68 75,92 128,68 99,58 110,45 
Ghana 48,00 20,87 37,09 55,15 99,97 86,20 
Malawi 51,70 54,14 59,24 71,13 85,57 87,19 
Mozambique 83,90 47,90 66,62 91,80 94,60 93,07 
Rwanda 51,70 64,20 61,89 95,54 100,70 95,51 
Uganda 65,00 34,20 48,25 112,28 99,89 106,22 
Tanzania 41,35 37,74 39,40 92,22 100,34 85,14 
Zambia 83,00 76,80 83,12 98,88 100,14 92,85 
Zimbabwe 20,00 71,00 48,03 120,59 93,11 111,39 
Source: Calculated by author 
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Table 7.11: Individual levels of RPDAL and PR 
 RPDAL level  PR level 
Country 1990 2005 average 1990 2005 average 
SSA - 9  376,16 408,54 391,10 4,05 7,40 5,44 
Burundi 572,40 705,84 617,84 4,32 4,56 4,55 
Ghana 352,57 285,99 309,65 8,29 10,03 8,97 
Malawi 371,34 376,41 373,35 1,00 8,61 4,40 
Mozambique 309,73 303,26 311,31 2,00 8,19 5,00 
Rwanda 768,66 645,09 698,20 3,00 5,27 3,86 
Uganda 315,25 465,03 393,77 1,83 8,62 5,17 
Tanzania 229,37 311,24 277,18 4,00 8,75 5,97 
Zambia 209,15 354,22 286,02 1,00 8,51 3,88 
Zimbabwe 257,00 229,79 252,65 11,00 4,06 7,18 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
7.2 Policy implication  
In this chapter we examined the main tools that had strong relation with poverty 
reduction; the PR index, DCPS, HCPRI and finally INFR. 
This debate about the weight of policies implication is very propitious because our 
timeline is between 1990 and 2005, in this period the international agricultural prices 
were relativity constant. So, excluding this very important element, price, we can 
analyzes what the low-income countries in SSA may do to develop their agriculture. 
Our sample was composted by nine agricultural countries, we used the serial times 
between 1990 and 2005; all of them have had low incomes during this time, that means 
less than USD 1000 per capita, but they had different performances about rural poverty 
reduction.  
The PR index has solid link with the rural poverty but also the robust linkage with PS. 
Albeit both indexes were made by two different institutions, they have similar 
parameters in SSA, so some comments are fit for both and it could be redundant to talk 
twice the same topics. 
Property right (PR) is the basic of all capitalism system, also in the agricultural business 
farmers do their best, accept risks when there could be reward in the future. Those 
efforts produce wealth and can spread welfare to all society. The SSA – 9 societies had 
different rules about PR and they produced different results between 1990 and 2005.     
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Basically we have three groups: the winners where the poverty fell significantly, like 
Ghana (-56%), Uganda (-47%) Mozambique (-43%), the losers where the poverty grew 
like Rwanda (+23%), Burundi (+93%) and Zimbabwe (+255%) and those which who 
remained more or less stable on the poverty line, like Zambia (-8%), Tanzania (-8%) 
and Malawi (+4%). 
The first highlight of the our research is about the starting point, 1990 and the deadline, 
2005, when the search began we realized that the rural poverty line has a strong link 
with PR, in other words all countries that had a PR index higher than the average of 
group (level 4 or more), also had the poverty line better than average (smaller than 50 
per cent). We made a PR index based on International Property Rights Index (IPRI) 
with a score from 1 to 15, and the rural poverty line used the World Bank data. 
In 1990 Zambia had the worst performance; around 83 per cent of the rural population 
was living below the poverty line and the Zambia’s PR index was 1; on the other hand 
the best performance was the Zimbabwe’s where the poverty line represented 20 per 
cent of rural population and PR index was 11. 
In 2005 Mozambique that likewise had in 1990 around 83 per cent of rural poverty had 
a PR index was 2. In 2005 it reached 47 per cent of the rural poverty line and PR index 
was 8.18; similarly, Ghana’s PR index, when the research started, was 8.28, and in 2005 
it had the best performance among the countries: the poverty line decreased by 56 per 
cent and Ghana had very similar figures to those of Zimbabwe in 1990, the rural 
poverty line was around 20 per cent and PR index was worth 10 points (chart 7.2). 
We should add that PR improvement has strong effects to reduce poverty when rural 
poverty level are highs like Mozambique, where  poverty fell from 83% to 47,9 %. 
Moreover PR increased from 2 to 8,18, but it is less influenced when the poverty level 
is better, as in the United Republic of Tanzania. There poverty decreased from 41,35% 
to 37,74 and the PR level grew from 4 to 8,75 points.  
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Chart 7.2: Three groups inner SSA – 9   
 
Source: calculated by author 
Thus we assumed that in one scenario without land tenure agriculture cannot develop 
the extreme poverty is prevalent in a rural setting, as in Mozambique in 1990 or 
Zimbabwe in 2005. However, if between losers and winners the PR influence is clear, in 
the so called “stable countries” it is not. 
In 1990 Zambia had a poverty line of 83 per cent and the PR index was 1, but in 2005 
PR was 8,5 points, thus similar to Mozambique  (8,18) and Uganda (8,62), but the rural 
poverty line did not fall well and remained in a percentile of 76,8. 
Even though PR had good improvement in Zambia, other important indexes as DCPS 
and HCPRI decreased their performances. DCPS fell by 12% from 8,8 per cent of GDP 
in 1990 to 7,72 per cent in 2005, HC fell around 10 percent from 67,50 percent to 66,88 
% in the same period. 
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Furthermore, the rail lines in the country, after privatization program, practically banned 
the transport of agricultural goods. Before that the state-owned railway had carried out 
the transportation of agricultural goods in marginal areas with a strong program of 
subsidies. 
Hence, it was obvious that PR is very important, but it cannot improve the rural 
environment alone. Other policies must exist to enhance the opportunities for the rural 
population; however, in our assessment PR is the pivot of the process for three reasons: 
Firstly the DCPS of GDP is very important to entrepreneurs; when they do not have 
access to the credit system farmers lose many opportunities to develop, but here we 
should express two basic concerns, the banking system cannot grant loans to the farmers 
who are deprived of the title land or another kind of guarantee. 
The other matter is that some governments, to solve the credit access problem without 
changing the PR, use state banks or other types of financial maneuver to expand the 
credit: in this way the country will usually have high inflation and liquidity problems, so 
at the end of this cycle poverty will probably increase. 
Secondly, if the access to credit was resolved, the human capital should have good 
levels, because the higher the level of education, the higher the probability to succeed in 
a venture for a farmer. However, in our models it is understandable that HCPRI was 
influenced by the PR level, thus without an acceptable level of security in rural areas the 
farmers won’t invest in education.  
We added that HCPRI is the unique endogenous factor that influences the NPKL. And 
the NPKL is the main tool to measure agriculture’s possibilities in the long term, so if 
the soil resources are managed better agriculture will thrive. Thereunto the DCPS 
increase should follow, lead by HCPRI. 
In others words, if we want the sustainable development of agriculture to happen and 
this progress to contribute to reduce poverty, both HCPRI and DCPS data should run 
together: the winning countries or the virtual group would have harmony between the 
two policies, while the stable group would have one dichotomy with low DCPS levels 
and the losers would try to lead the development through DCPS while reducing the 
education level. 
Finally, the enhancement of infrastructure can give good short-term effects and better 
outcomes in the long-term. When building the infrastructure the first impact is the 
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creation of jobs and the improvement of the local demand for goods, but in the long 
term, good infrastructures reduce the costs, facilitates the trades and spread welfare. 
The first assumption about infrastructure is that the landlocked countries depend on 
their infrastructure and, at the same time, the neighboring countries infrastructures reach 
the international market, thus, perhaps, the methodology cannot reflects 100 percent the 
real economy country by country. However, it is undeniable that constructing of 
infrastructure as well as other factors can help also landlocked countries and their 
agricultural environment i.e. Uganda’s case that has the second best performance in the 
sample. 
Nevertheless, the second round of effects, which is more important, can be destroyed by 
mismatching the other factor like PR, HCPRI and DCPS. In SSA – 9 the countries with 
the best level of infrastructures are also those which have the worst performance for 
poverty reduction – Rwanda, Burundi and Zimbabwe. 
The next graphs show the average of performances of the three groups: the winners with 
Ghana, Uganda and Mozambique. The “stable group” with Zambia, the United 
Republic of Tanzania and Malawi, and finally the so called Losers with Rwanda, 
Burundi and Zimbabwe (charts 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5). 
Chart 7.3: Winner group 
 
Source; calculated by author  
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Chart 7.4: Stable group   
 
Source; calculated by author 
Chart 7.5: Loser Group 
 
Source; calculated by author 
Thereby, with empirical results we can affirm that these implication policies are 
essential to reduce poverty in rural areas. But PR, HCPRI, DCPS and INFR can drive 
poverty reduction up to levels of 30 to 40 percent; subsequently, the countries needing 
the other kind of position should guide the agricultural development to the open market. 
During this delicate step we saw good and bad examples, and we highlighted three cases 
in SSA – 9. 
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7.3 The case of United Republic of Tanzania 
The United Republic of Tanzania changed after the end of the Nyerere era, the Mwinyi 
new president made a new democratic constitution in 1992, but as we said land tenure 
system was changing.  
The national land policy was enacted in 1995 and amended in 1997; the law became 
operational in 2001, but the three main laws were enacted only in 2007 – the land use 
plan, the town and country planning and the registration board act –; in 2008 the unit 
titles law followed and finally, in 2009, the mortgage financing act law was also enacted 
Thereby, after 17 years, Tanzania has a land tenure system very close to that of western 
countries. 
While the land tenure changed slowly because it depended on many political 
agreements, the agricultural market was opened with one single law, together with a 
new constitution in 1992. Many western institutions congratulated with the government 
of Tanzania. But, as we saw, the rural poverty line remained practically at the same 
level. 
The U. R. of Tanzania never had a free market before, agriculture had never developed 
by itself. As we described, East Africa didn’t have agriculture in the pre-colonial era; in 
1500 approximately the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama colonized the island of 
Zanzibar to use it as a bridge between European and Asian trades. The Portuguese 
introduced the cassava there in around 1600.   
After the Portuguese came the Germans, after Germans the British and finally the 
independence and the communist government. So the agricultural production has been 
driven by someone that allowed or prohibited to do anything. Then, with the beginning 
of the free market in 1992, agricultural prices fell to the international level, the flux of 
imports and exports grew well. 
The exports increased because farmers could sell on the free market and the government 
prices were lower than international prices, although the domestic prices were higher 
than the international ones. Imports grew, and for the same reason domestic government 
prices were higher than international prices. 
Without a monopolistic government position the trade market grew and after three 
harvests the market started to collapse in 1997 and many small farmers broke-down.  
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Due to the lack of a government to buy the goods, having no access to the credit market 
before the end of land tenure by 2007, many farmers sold their land and the rural 
poverty line did not grow because the urban poverty level had increased with the 
immigration flows.               
However, after the land tenure system was established, the U. R. of Tanzania was one of 
the countries with a greater FDI in the country. This FDI came mainly from China and 
UAE; the agricultural yield had grown well but rural poverty remained stable. That 
situation induced the FAO, IIED and IFAD to produce in 2009 a report alerting about 
the African land grab situation (Cotula et al 2009).       
The U. R. of Tanzania has an ambitious agricultural program, the government is trying 
to attract the FDI to the country to transform Tanzania into the main food supply to the 
Asian continent. Furthermore, Tanzania is the most important economy of East Africa 
and will be the ninth most populous country in the world by 2050 and the fifth in 2100 
(UN data) (chart 7.6).  
So, fixing the agricultural problem now and starting to reduce rural poverty will be 
essential to guarantees stability in the future. Because, despite the clear improvement of 
the agricultural environment, those benefices are not reaching the entire rural 
population.       
 Chart 7.6: UN population prospects 
      
Source U.N data  
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7.4 The case of Uganda 
Uganda is situated in one of the most fertile soils of SSA, has good rainfall conditions 
and reached a good civil stability after the Amin dictatorship. Between 1980 and 1986, 
Uganda had five presidents and the civil environment was very hostile, but Museveni 
brought stability and improved human rights protection and in 1993 the civil war was 
over and the country made a new constitution which restored the traditional kings. 
The traditional Kingdoms of Uganda came from before the pre-colonial era and had 
enjoyed cultural autonomy. The government supported by the six Kingdoms made the 
new Constitution in 1995. This Constitution recognized the four tenure systems existing 
before and the rural peace was installed.  
Simultaneously, the improvement of human rights allowed the liberalization of the 
agricultural market: the first one was the coffee market, after which other openings took 
place for tea, tobacco and cotton crops. The rural environment answered well and was 
modernized. Even though the rural population density increased from 315,25 people per 
one square kilometer of arable land in 1990 to 465,03 people in 2005, the national 
average of farm size remained of 2,2 hectares. 
Avoiding the “micro land” phenomenon is very important to develop agriculture and the 
main tool to prevent this event is improving the non-agricultural sector in rural areas. 
Surely, the coffee harvest is the most important actor of this process, however we 
should point out that the liberalization of coffee and others crops means that farmers 
have the right to plant these crops but the government, unlike Tanzania, is very present 
in all practices. 
The governmental presence has had good and bad results, the best one perhaps was the 
“coffee-banana techniques”, which were spread to all the rural environment allowing 
small farmers to use the same soil for food crops and cash crops: this method ensured 
the food supply and the farmers earned at the same time. 
The bad and good news, depending on the point of view, is that government prices can 
be bad because the gap between Ugandan prices and farm gate prices was – 20 percent 
for Arabica coffee and – 47 percent for Robusta coffee between 1992 and 2005. At the 
same time it can be good because, without the government intervention, almost all small 
farmers would be out of the coffee market like in Tanzania. 
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But the bad news indeed is that the Ugandan coffee price is lower than international 
prices because the quality of coffee in Uganda continues to go down. With the opening 
of the coffee market in 1991, the number of exporters increased and jumped from 18 in 
1991 to 120 in 1994, after that the market started to concentrate again and in 2005 there 
were only 30 coffee exporters in Uganda. 
After the end of the state farms monopoly in cash crops like coffee, Uganda spread 
welfare and reduced poverty from 65 percent of rural population in 1990 to 34,2 percent 
in 2005. But the inefficiency in managing the cash crops surplus blocked the progress of 
poverty reduction: two different paths could resolve this dilemma. 
First, the gap between Ugandan export prices and farm gate prices in Robusta coffee 
plantations should be decreased. Almost all the farmers who harvested Robusta are 
small and living in marginal areas. Thus, to decrease the gap, (chart 7.7) Ugandan 
authorities needed to reduce the inner costs of transportation and internal bureaucracy, 
and probably it meant a huge political problem.  
Second, the Arabica crops are usually planted by farmers with more land and in non-
peripheral areas, so the gap between Ugandan export prices and farm gate prices 
practically does not exist anymore (chart 7.8). But the quality of Ugandan coffee is very 
low; in this situation the improvement of agricultural, storage and transportation 
techniques can resolve the second gap, that between Uganda and international prices. 
There doesn’t exist a right or wrong side, but the inertia of authorities has, as main 
output, the apathy of rural social mobility that has slowed down poverty reduction. 
Chart 7.7: Coffee robust prices 
 
Source; Kleih et al 2006 
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Chart 7.8: Coffee Arabica prices 
 
Source; Kleih et al 2006 
 
7.5 The case of Ghana 
The agricultural history of Ghana blends with the cocoa crop. A typical Amazonian tree, 
the cocoa crops was introduced in Ghana in 1800-50 by European missionaries. In 1947 
the government created the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) an agency responsible 
for the development of cocoa crops and cocoa industry. 
Unlike Uganda, for which we had no regional data, in Ghana the difference between 
cocoa crops and traditional commodities as maize and sorghum is clear. Maize, for 
example, suffered from international competition, and Ghana was disadvantaged in 
productivity and technological and financial systems, compared with those of traditional 
producers in north America, south America and Europe, only because it had poor 
infrastructure, but it has saved the north Ghanaian farmers.   
On the other hand, Ghanaian cocoa crops have great natural advantages: are localized 
near the ports and have a good quality, acknowledged by buyers. They historically paid 
a premium price, furthermore these prices increased from 3 percent in 1990 to 4,9 
percent in 2005. 
Other advantages happened when farmers mixed cocoa in their farms with another food 
crop, cassava. This mix produced similar effects as the “coffee-banana techniques” in 
Uganda. 
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As a result, cocoa farmers were the biggest winners in Ghana’s agricultural environment 
between 1990 and 2005. The extreme poverty among cocoa farmers plummeted from 50 
percent in 1990 to 6 percent in 2005, similarly the extreme rural poverty in Ghana fell 
from 48 percent to 20 percent.  
We must emphasize that success as one important cause and one significant collateral 
effect.  
Cause: the COCOBOD have managed well the surplus of cocoa income, the quality of 
cocoa beans in Ghana is the best in the world, the agency finances new crops and 
provides seedling trees; after 1991 it withdrew a historical exchange rate charged to 
farmers and finally the gap between farmer gate and Ghana export prices shrunk.  
The gap in 1990 was 50,4 percent. Added to the exchange rate tax the real gap was 60,5 
percent; in 2005 this gap fell to 30,40 percent. Hence we can say that the prices for 
cocoa farmers in Ghana had in 2005 a gap corresponding to 26 percent of the world 
price, which meant that they had similar farm prices paid in the “free market” of cocoa 
as Brazil, Ecuador and Indonesia (chart 7.9).  
The world price of cocoa is based on Cote d'Ivoire prices, the biggest exporter in the 
world. The majority of producing countries have cocoa quality lesser than Cote d'Ivoire, 
consequently the prices pay for your goods are smaller than international price, Ghana 
is an exceptional case. 
Collateral effect: the other tree crops have gained weight in Ghanaian agriculture, the 
fruits of palm oil tree are used to make biodiesel and , as well as these farmers are 
planting groundnuts that are being used for food, cooking – vegetable oil – and also for 
biodiesel. 
Although this tropical commodity was born without one monopsony actor, Ghana’s 
government allowed the existence of private buyers and sellers, thus year after year the 
agricultural environment in Ghana has obtained a new victory and produces more 
welfare, but as all almost SSA countries, Ghana's government has taxed the exportation 
goods.  
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Chart 7.9: Cocoa prices 
 
Source; cocoa world price by ICCO, the export prices, farmer gate and exchange rate taxation of Ghana by COCOBOD   
 
7.6 Future for SSA – 9  
The SSA – 9 agricultural data confirmed what seems obvious: low-income agricultural 
countries are much more sensitive to international prices, their rural environment 
supported the majority of the entire population and different policies can improve 
gradually or deteriorate very quickly the agricultural business.   
Hence, the speed the country is running at does not matter, the most important element 
is the path, which means that western institutions should evaluate SSA – 9 agriculture 
for its steps towards land tenure system, infrastructure investment etc., differently on the 
past were the financial aid was conditioned simply on market opening. 
However, it is obvious that without a market opening domestic policies cannot resolve 
extreme rural poverty, because these countries are living one demographic phase with 
strong rate birth and they do not have the money to resolve rural and urban problems for 
the next two decades. 
Thus, doing the right choices is the most important phase for SSA – 9 governments, by 
assessing what crops have advantages in the international market, how to unburden 
agricultural chains and modernize the domestic market.  
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In other words, for some tropical commodities like cocoa, coffee, tea, tobacco, sugar 
cane and so on, it is advisable to build the route to the real free market, while for 
international commodities such as maize, soy beans, rice, wheat and so on, it is prudent 
to look for inner factors that threat local farmers and to withdraw charges as soon as 
possible, or whether or when it is possible.  
Finally, modernizing domestic market would mean to exploit, in the future, the good 
geographic position and export fruits and vegetable to European and Asian market. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS  
8.1 Final considerations  
Very different from the current days, where agricultural prices are highlighted around 
the world combined with alleged collateral effects as hunger and malnutrition, our 
research picked up a time series where agricultural business was ostracized. Between 
1990 and 2005 was possible to analyze the begging of agriculture globalization, the 
international prices was stabled at low level and contemporaneously it was happening 
the most severe level of the extreme poverty of the SSA history, around 64,6 percent of 
rural population was living below poverty line, nowadays this level is around 47,5 
percent. 
The literature said that rural poverty in SSA would be resolved through agriculture. It 
had not occurred because during 1990s the productivity was very low and the linkage 
between farmers and non-farmers business had not happened, thus without this process 
the rural poverty had not decreased. We seek to assess why this scenario remained. 
The first assertion is that we cannot look for only one answer to resolve rural poverty, 
find out a panacea for all SSA would be a “work of Hercules”. The countries should be 
divided by profiles as GDP per capita, the dependences of mineral and agriculture 
resources. 
Secondly, the agriculture in SSA is influenced by immeasurable factors interconnected, 
from the bad weather condition to the international aid coming from a SMS of a 
Norwegian citizen. Therefore the model is limited only to implications of local factors 
that can be managed, endogenous and exogenous factors with narrow relationship with 
agriculture.  
Following this limits, we saw that the agricultural countries with low-income had 
diverse performances in poverty reduction between 1990 and 2005, and agricultural 
growth had a weak link with poverty reduction.  
The agricultural environment gears are more complex that this simplistic assumption; 
poverty reduction showed sensitive to many other factors in a country as land tenure 
system or property rights (PR), infrastructure, rural density population, access to credit, 
mobility of GDP share and so on.  
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Moreover, a country as good macroeconomic performance could hide many inner 
problems; Ghana’s case of poverty trap brought up to us three affirmations, which agro-
ecological zones have a great weight in developing countries, to increase of productivity 
not means income growth, and high birth rate combined with low infrastructure level 
avoid the poverty reduction.   
Thus, the new model showed fit to use in low-income agricultural countries, but the 
empirical results showed that exist an hierarchy of priority that whether respected 
optimizes the agriculture linkages and consequently improves the process of poverty 
reduction. 
Property rights or land tenure (PR) together with political stability (PS) always started 
or destroyed the progression of the rural poverty reduction. The different trends of 
poverty reduction between two countries with the same level of PR and PS happen on 
behalf of some gears. 
Firstly the time factor, meaning how long this level of PR or PS is being maintained  
Secondly, whether the macroeconomic data, mainly the credit system (DCPS), is 
following the improvement of education level (HCPRI) 
Thirdly how is the infrastructure installed and in which path is it going? Is it sufficient 
to support the density of rural population? 
As much better are the answers, more efficient is the country in reducing the poverty. 
This hierarchy explain the dichotomy of results and an apparent dilemma between 
education level and poverty reduction in SSA, it happened because, the insistent aim of 
international aid in improve education levels but at the same time forgetting to assess 
the socio-economic environment context created the so called “education dilemma in 
SSA”. We considering that this mistake created an artificial stress to education level and 
it will continue not helping the poverty reduction.   
 
8.2 Future developments 
With the available database the model has been quite useful in order to identify the so 
called “inner factors” to reduce rural poverty. 
However many questions remained without answer and the future research may try to 
explain, also by upgrading the model in different ways. 
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For example, the PR index was taken from International Property Rights Index (IPRI). 
It was built by World Bank Doing Business and World Economic Forum database. We 
picked up variables of “Physical Property Rights ”, the protection of physical property 
rights and registering property that have a relation with property rights, because there 
does not exist a specific land tenure index in western institution. Hence to build a land 
tenure index will be more fit to model.  
With respect to HCPRI (human capital) nowadays it is very difficult to assess the 
education quality in these countries and thus, the improvement of HCPRI numbers not 
necessary means the improvement of human capital and social development.    
Access to credit system is essential tool to develop a agriculture, but we have 
considered the domestic credit to the private sector level (DCPS) from the World Bank 
database as representing the entire system; but the agricultural credit system could not 
following this index, so a index that show agricultural credit would be welcome to 
renew the model. 
Finally, and the most interesting relationship without a clear answer is the per capita 
GDP growth and the NPKL decreases. Despite of various support in many references, it 
is still not clear why this trend occurred, and a specific deeper research on the elasticity 
of supply and demand should be carried out. In others words, it should be investigated 
how much the earnings should increase to push the domestic demand and offset the 
worth paid to keep the soil quality. 
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Appendix I  
Abbreviations and acronyms  
AGRISYSTEM – The Doctoral School of Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 
ADMARC – The Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation in Malawi.  
AEC – African Economic Community. 
AEZ – Agro-ecological Zone.  
API – The agricultural gross per capita production index. 
APP – Agricultural Perspective Plan (The government of Nepal) 
AVA – The agriculture value added in percentile of GDP. 
AW – Tropical savanna climate (Kӧ ppen climate classification). 
BRD – Burundi.  
CAW – Humid subtropical climate (Kӧ ppen climate classification). 
CGE – Computable General Equilibrium Model. 
CHS – Cedi  
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency. 
COCOBOD – The Ghana Cocoa Board.       
COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.  
DCPS – Domestic credit to private sector.  
EAC – East African Community. 
EAP – East Asia and Pacific.  
EU 27 – European Union of 27 member states. 
EUROstat – European Statistical System. 
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization. 
FAOstat – Statistics of Food and Agriculture Organization. 
FDI – Foreign direct investment. 
FRELINO – The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique. 
GDP – Gross domestic product.  
GDPPC – Gross domestic product per capita. 
GHN – Ghana. 
GLSS – Ghana Living Standards Survey. 
HC – Human Capital. 
HCPRI – Human capital at primary school. 
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IAASTD – International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology of Development.  
ICCO – International Cocoa Organization. 
IEA – International Energy Agency. 
IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development.  
IIED – International Institute for Environment and Development. 
IMF – International Monetary Fund. 
INFR – Infrastructure (roads density and rail lines density) 
IPRI – International Property Rights Index. 
LAC – Latin America and Caribbean. 
LUS – land Use Systems. 
LUT – Land Use Type. 
MLW – Malawi. 
MNA – Median East and North African.  
MoFa – Ministry of Food & Agriculture Republic of Ghana. 
MZQ – Mozambique. 
NGO – Nongovernmental organization.  
NPK – Nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. 
NPKL – Loss of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium.  
OAPEC – Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.  
OECD – Organization for Economic co-operation and Development. 
PPP – Purchasing Power Parity.  
PR – Property right (land).  
PS – Political stability.  
RENAMO – The Mozambican National Resistence. 
RPDAL – Rural population density by arable land. 
RPF – Rwanda patriotic Front. 
RPL – Rural poverty line. 
RWD – Rwanda. 
SADC – Southern African Development Community. 
SAS – South Asia.  
SEM – Structural Equation Models  
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SOC – Soil organic carbon.  
SOEs – State-Owned Enterprise.  
SSA – 9 – Burundi, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, the United 
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
SSA – Sub-Saharan Africa.  
TFP – Total factor productivity.  
TZN – United Republic of Tanzania.  
UAE – United Arab Emirates. 
UGD – Uganda. 
UK –United kingdom. 
UN – The United Nations.  
UNAIDS – The United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.   
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 
US – United States. 
USD – Dollar. 
USDA – United States Department of Agriculture. 
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
WLD – Developing World. 
WWF – World Wildlife Fund. 
ZANU – Zimbabwe African Nation Union. 
ZAPU – Zimbabwe African People’s Union. 
ZBW – Zimbabwe. 
ZMB – Zambia. 
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Appendix II 
Model 1: Fixed-effects, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: HCPRI 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const 41.249 2.31636 17.8077 <0.00001 *** 
PS 0.846789 0.302591 2.7985 0.00590 *** 
PR 1.80248 0.530459 3.3980 0.00090 *** 
Mean dependent var  56.62715  S.D. dependent var  18.77939 
Sum squared resid  16963.50  S.E. of regression  11.29359 
R-squared  0.663631  Adjusted R-squared  0.638340 
F(10, 133)  26.23986  P-value(F)  6.44e-27 
Log-likelihood -547.6956  Akaike criterion  1117.391 
Schwarz criterion  1150.059  Hannan-Quinn  1130.666 
Rho  0.782271  Durbin-Watson  0.339392 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(8, 133) = 25.6231 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 133) > 25.6231) = 1.4268e-023 
 
 
Model 1: Random-effects (GLS), using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: HCPRI 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const 41.3677 5.78745 7.1478 <0.00001 *** 
PS 0.862188 0.297191 2.9011 0.00432 *** 
PR 1.76206 0.519291 3.3932 0.00090 *** 
Mean dependent var  56.62715  S.D. dependent var  18.77939 
Sum squared resid  43500.67  S.E. of regression  17.50265 
Log-likelihood -615.4989  Akaike criterion  1236.998 
Schwarz criterion  1245.907  Hannan-Quinn  1240.618 
 'Within' variance = 127.545 
 'Between' variance = 265.41 
 theta used for quasi-demeaning = 0.826694 
Breusch-Pagan test - 
 Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 
 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(1) = 356.499 
 with p-value = 1.62905e-079 
 
Hausman test - 
 Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent 
 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(2) = 0.263894 
 with p-value = 0.876387 
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Model 2: Fixed-effects, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: npkl 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const -52.963 13.3889 -3.9557 0.00012 *** 
Ava -0.797613 0.215273 -3.7051 0.00031 *** 
Gdppc -0.0384806 0.020262 -1.8992 0.05974 * 
Hcpri 0.176736 0.0969932 1.8222 0.07071 * 
Dcps 0.257647 0.172765 1.4913 0.13828  
Mean dependent var -78.89604  S.D. dependent var  40.07448 
Sum squared resid  28856.89  S.E. of regression  14.84189 
R-squared  0.874346  Adjusted R-squared  0.862835 
F(12, 131)  75.96184  P-value(F)  6.43e-53 
Log-likelihood -585.9481  Akaike criterion  1197.896 
Schwarz criterion  1236.504  Hannan-Quinn  1213.584 
Rho  0.871977  Durbin-Watson  0.336096 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(8, 131) = 55.005 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 131) > 55.005) = 3.13026e-038 
 
Model 2: Random-effects (GLS), using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: npkl 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const -51.3242 15.9857 -3.2106 0.00165 *** 
Ava -0.891581 0.219317 -4.0653 0.00008 *** 
Gpdpc -0.0283659 0.020019 -1.4170 0.15873  
Hcpri 0.152849 0.0990776 1.5427 0.12517  
Dcps 0.261412 0.174767 1.4958 0.13698  
Mean dependent var -78.89604  S.D. dependent var  40.07448 
Sum squared resid  189618.5  S.E. of regression  36.80242 
Log-likelihood -721.5000  Akaike criterion  1453.000 
Schwarz criterion  1467.849  Hannan-Quinn  1459.034 
 'Within' variance = 220.282 
 'Between' variance = 608.329 
 theta used for quasi-demeaning = 0.849561 
Breusch-Pagan test - 
 Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 
 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(1) = 289.888 
 with p-value = 5.26058e-065 
Hausman test - 
 Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent 
 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(4) = 13.9665 
 with p-value = 0.00740288 
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Model 3: Fixed-effects, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: api 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const 120.33 12.3122 9.7732 <0.00001 *** 
Npkl -0.11172 0.0569351 -1.9622 0.05184 * 
Rpdal -0.0955184 0.0275439 -3.4679 0.00071 *** 
Infr 0.227076 0.212495 1.0686 0.28719  
Mean dependent var  96.44472  S.D. dependent var  14.60903 
Sum squared resid  14842.32  S.E. of regression  10.60386 
R-squared  0.513679  Adjusted R-squared  0.473152 
F(11, 132)  12.67505  P-value(F)  4.09e-16 
Log-likelihood -538.0777  Akaike criterion  1100.155 
Schwarz criterion  1135.793  Hannan-Quinn  1114.637 
Rho  0.509282  Durbin-Watson  0.901967 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(8, 132) = 13.6178 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 132) > 13.6178) = 2.88712e-014 
 
Model 3: Random-effects (GLS), using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: api 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const 106.144 8.52443 12.4518 <0.00001 *** 
Npkl -0.119292 0.0517227 -2.3064 0.02256 ** 
Rpdal -0.0692854 0.0220525 -3.1418 0.00205 *** 
Infr 0.389327 0.182615 2.1320 0.03476 ** 
Mean dependent var  96.44472  S.D. dependent var  14.60903 
Sum squared resid  30506.58  S.E. of regression  14.70914 
Log-likelihood -589.9508  Akaike criterion  1187.902 
Schwarz criterion  1199.781  Hannan-Quinn  1192.729 
 'Within' variance = 112.442 
 'Between' variance = 126.339 
 theta used for quasi-demeaning = 0.764151 
Breusch-Pagan test - 
 Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 
 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(1) = 139.102 
 with p-value = 4.18339e-032 
Hausman test - 
 Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent 
 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(3) = 4.59916 
 with p-value = 0.203615 
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Model 4: Fixed-effects, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: rpl 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const 85.5245 13.9338 6.1379 <0.00001 *** 
Api -0.136445 0.0752567 -1.8131 0.07209 * 
Pr -1.30882 0.350597 -3.7331 0.00028 *** 
Rpdal -0.019211 0.0257769 -0.7453 0.45743  
Mean dependent var  57.72889  S.D. dependent var  17.40644 
Sum squared resid  8600.830  S.E. of regression  8.072038 
R-squared  0.801489  Adjusted R-squared  0.784947 
F(11, 132)  48.45009  P-value(F)  5.99e-41 
Log-likelihood -498.7928  Akaike criterion  1021.586 
Schwarz criterion  1057.223  Hannan-Quinn  1036.067 
Rho  0.740888  Durbin-Watson  0.257722 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(8, 132) = 38.065 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 132) > 38.065) = 9.46569e-031 
 
Model 4: Random-effects (GLS), using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: rpl 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const 72.2969 11.4232 6.3290 <0.00001 *** 
Api -0.0866034 0.0695377 -1.2454 0.21506  
Pr -1.57825 0.318587 -4.9539 <0.00001 *** 
Rpdal 0.00606864 0.0184908 0.3282 0.74325  
Mean dependent var  57.72889  S.D. dependent var  17.40644 
Sum squared resid  33469.66  S.E. of regression  15.40693 
Log-likelihood -596.6250  Akaike criterion  1201.250 
Schwarz criterion  1213.129  Hannan-Quinn  1206.077 
 'Within' variance = 65.1578 
 'Between' variance = 154.784 
 theta used for quasi-demeaning = 0.837796 
Breusch-Pagan test - 
 Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 
 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(1) = 379.77 
 with p-value = 1.39655e-084 
Hausman test - 
 Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent 
 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(3) = 6.38147 
 with p-value = 0.094456 
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Model Test 1 : Fixed-effects, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: rpl 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 56.7092 15.3256 3.7003 0.00032 *** 
pr -1.18163 0.436484 -2.7072 0.00774 *** 
ps -0.254944 0.200577 -1.2711 0.20607  
hcpri 0.223263 0.0601518 3.7117 0.00031 *** 
npkl -0.0332673 0.0429618 -0.7743 0.44019  
dcps 0.0665262 0.0825942 0.8055 0.42208  
ava 0.208835 0.124598 1.6761 0.09622 * 
gdppc -0.0537526 0.0102871 -5.2253 <0.00001 *** 
api -0.0688431 0.0693613 -0.9925 0.32286  
infr -0.293035 0.153225 -1.9124 0.05811 * 
rpdal 0.0359981 0.0245772 1.4647 0.14551  
Mean dependent var  57.72889  S.D. dependent var  17.40644 
Sum squared resid  6019.975  S.E. of regression  6.939726 
R-squared  0.861056  Adjusted R-squared  0.841049 
F(18, 125)  43.03587  P-value(F)  8.27e-45 
Log-likelihood -473.1049  Akaike criterion  984.2099 
Schwarz criterion  1040.636  Hannan-Quinn  1007.138 
rho  0.627068  Durbin-Watson  0.502157 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(8, 125) = 30.1884 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 125) > 30.1884) = 8.30511e-026 
Model test 2: Pooled OLS, using 144 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 16 
Dependent variable: rpl 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Const 62.3388 12.1568 5.1279 <0.00001 *** 
Hcpri 0.173258 0.0628876 2.7550 0.00669 *** 
Ps 0.600301 0.298125 2.0136 0.04607 ** 
Pr -3.79662 0.448878 -8.4580 <0.00001 *** 
Npkl 0.223887 0.0465766 4.8069 <0.00001 *** 
Dcps 0.132324 0.107436 1.2317 0.22025  
Ava -0.151522 0.153342 -0.9881 0.32488  
Gdppc -0.0341378 0.01122 -3.0426 0.00283 *** 
Api 0.142735 0.0742017 1.9236 0.05654 * 
Rpdal 0.0451603 0.017203 2.6251 0.00968 *** 
Infr 0.105129 0.143628 0.7319 0.46549  
Mean dependent var  57.72889  S.D. dependent var  17.40644 
Sum squared resid  17650.91  S.E. of regression  11.52014 
R-squared  0.592609  Adjusted R-squared  0.561978 
F(10, 133)  19.34680  P-value(F)  1.41e-21 
Log-likelihood -550.5557  Akaike criterion  1123.111 
Schwarz criterion  1155.779  Hannan-Quinn  1136.386 
rho  0.876187  Durbin-Watson  0.250142 
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            |               Robust test 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural   | 
  hcpri <-   | 
          ps |   1.090719   .3869292     2.82   0.005     .3323513    1.849086 
          pr |   .9107207    .381026     2.39     0.017     .1639235    1.657518 
       _cons |   44.74863   3.378096    13.25   0.000     38.12768    51.36957 
  -----------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ps <-      | 
         rpl |   .1115463   .0223155     5.00   0.000     .0678088    .1552838 
          pr |   1.156319   .1187188     9.74   0.000      .923635    1.389004 
       _cons |  -6.192064    1.18529    -5.22   0.000     -8.51519   -3.868939 
  -----------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  rpl <-     | 
         api |   .1427542   .0805356     1.77   0.076    -.0150927    .3006012 
          pr |  -3.081554   .4584549    -6.72   0.000    -3.980109   -2.182999 
       rpdal |   .0114159   .0069469     1.64   0.100    -.0021997    .0250315 
       _cons |   59.83396   8.573743     6.98   0.000     43.02973    76.63819 
  -----------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  npkl <-    | 
       hcpri |  -.5178058   .1197777    -4.32   0.000    -.7525657   -.2830458 
         ava |  -2.893115   .3136594    -9.22   0.000    -3.507876   -2.278354 
       gdppc |   .0249204   .0228588     1.09   0.276    -.0198821    .0697229 
        dcps |  -.6821757   .1811656    -3.77   0.000    -1.037254   -.3270976 
       _cons |   53.11861   19.49988     2.72   0.006     14.89955    91.33766 
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 api <-     | 
        npkl |  -.0222176    .036613    -0.61   0.544    -.0939777    .0495426 
       rpdal |  -.0481085   .0154333    -3.12   0.002    -.0783573   -.0178597 
        infr |   .5690708   .1374125     4.14      0.000     .2997472    .8383945 
       _cons |   102.0619    3.70535    27.54   0.000     94.79958    109.3243 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variance     | 
     e.hcpri |    301.801   51.60952                      215.8544     421.969 
        e.ps |   15.80868   2.680677                      11.33855    22.04113 
       e.rpl |   197.4635   17.26461                      166.3661    234.3738 
      e.npkl |   948.8345   107.7087                      759.5647    1185.267 
       e.api |   175.4519    19.2042                      141.5759    217.4337 
estat eqgof 
Equation-level goodness of fit 
             |             Variance            | 
     depvars |    fitted  predicted   residual | R-squared        mc      mc2 
-------------+---------------------------------+------------------------------ 
observed     |                                 | 
       hcpri |   349.727   47.80535    301.801 |  .1370383  .3701871  .1370385 
          ps |  23.65486   7.839863   15.80868 |  .3316943  .5759291  .3316943 
         rpl |  284.7275   87.18505   197.4635 |  .3064824  .5536086  .3064825 
        npkl |  2110.703   1161.489   948.8345 |  .5504651  .7419334  .5504651 
         api |  202.8404   27.31839   175.4519 |   .135025  .3674577  .1350252 
     overall |                                                       |  .8066027 
mc  = correlation between depvar and its prediction 
mc2 = mc^2 is the Bentler-Raykov squared multiple correlation coefficient 
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Appendix III 
Chapter 2 data. 
MONTHLY FOOD PRICE INDICES (2002-2004=100) Source FAO 
Date Food 
Price 
Index 
Date Food 
Price 
Index 
Date Food 
Price 
Index 
Date Food 
Price 
Index 
1/1990 106,9 10/1992 105,9 7/1995 126,5 4/1998 111,4 
2/1990 108,1 11/1992 107,9 8/1995 124,2 5/1998 109,8 
3/1990 106,4 12/1992 103,9 9/1995 125,3 6/1998 106,7 
4/1990 112,8 1/1993 105,2 10/1995 129,1 7/1998 105,1 
5/1990 109,9 2/1993 105,1 11/1995 127,9 8/1998 102,8 
6/1990 107,4 3/1993 106,7 12/1995 126,8 9/1998 101,2 
7/1990 104,2 4/1993 105,5 1/1996 128,8 10/1998 102,7 
8/1990 100,9 5/1993 105,5 2/1996 129,3 11/1998 103,1 
9/1990 102,4 6/1993 103,0 3/1996 130,8 12/1998 102,6 
10/1990 101,4 7/1993 103,3 4/1996 134,1 1/1999 101,1 
11/1990 101,1 8/1993 101,3 5/1996 137,3 2/1999 96,8 
12/1990 103,9 9/1993 101,9 6/1996 134,5 3/1999 94,7 
1/1991 103,1 10/1993 103,5 7/1996 133,1 4/1999 92,4 
2/1991 105,0 11/1993 106,5 8/1996 132,3 5/1999 91,7 
3/1991 103,6 12/1993 107,9 9/1996 127,0 6/1999 91,0 
4/1991 100,7 1/1994 109,1 10/1996 122,8 7/1999 88,3 
5/1991 99,5 2/1994 108,3 11/1996 119,9 8/1999 91,1 
6/1991 100,8 3/1994 107,9 12/1996 119,7 9/1999 91,7 
7/1991 100,9 4/1994 105,3 1/1997 118,1 10/1999 90,9 
8/1991 101,4 5/1994 108,5 2/1997 119,6 11/1999 90,4 
9/1991 103,6 6/1994 108,0 3/1997 122,3 12/1999 88,5 
10/1991 106,9 7/1994 105,7 4/1997 122,4 1/2000 87,8 
11/1991 108,9 8/1994 109,0 5/1997 122,0 2/2000 89,1 
12/1991 108,8 9/1994 113,4 6/1997 118,0 3/2000 89,0 
1/1992 108,8 10/1994 114,4 7/1997 115,1 4/2000 89,2 
2/1992 110,4 11/1994 118,4 8/1997 116,7 5/2000 89,3 
3/1992 109,1 12/1994 118,5 9/1997 116,1 6/2000 90,3 
4/1992 108,7 1/1995 118,2 10/1997 117,6 7/2000 90,7 
5/1992 109,8 2/1995 120,5 11/1997 118,5 8/2000 90,5 
6/1992 111,9 3/1995 121,8 12/1997 115,1 9/2000 90,2 
7/1992 109,7 4/1995 118,3 1/1998 113,6 10/2000 91,9 
8/1992 107,6 5/1995 118,6 2/1998 113,2 11/2000 91,9 
9/1992 108,1 6/1995 120,8 3/1998 112,8 12/2000 94,4 
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1/2001 92,2 7/2004 113,0 1/2008 199,8 7/2011 231,2 
2/2001 93,0 8/2004 112,4 2/2008 215,4 8/2011 230,6 
3/2001 94,3 9/2004 112,8 3/2008 218,3 9/2011 225,1 
4/2001 92,7 10/2004 112,1 4/2008 217,3 10/2011 215,8 
5/2001 94,2 11/2004 113,7 5/2008 218,5 11/2011 216,4 
6/2001 93,0 12/2004 114,4 6/2008 224,4 12/2011 210,8 
7/2001 95,5 1/2005 114,9 7/2008 220,4 1/2012 212,8 
8/2001 95,2 2/2005 114,2 8/2008 208,9 2/2012 215,6 
9/2001 93,7 3/2005 117,0 9/2008 196,7 3/2012 216,0 
10/2001 91,7 4/2005 114,8 10/2008 172,6 4/2012 213,0 
11/2001 92,6 5/2005 116,0 11/2008 157,3 5/2012 204,7 
12/2001 92,2 6/2005 117,1 12/2008 148,1 6/2012 200,4 
1/2002 90,1 7/2005 117,0 1/2009 146,3 7/2012 212,8 
2/2002 88,3 8/2005 116,9 2/2009 141,3 8/2012 212,6 
3/2002 88,3 9/2005 118,8 3/2009 143,1   
4/2002 86,7 10/2005 120,4 4/2009 147,4   
5/2002 85,2 11/2005 119,2 5/2009 157,6   
6/2002 86,0 12/2005 121,5 6/2009 158,1   
7/2002 88,1 1/2006 121,2 7/2009 154,2   
8/2002 89,6 2/2006 125,7 8/2009 159,5   
9/2002 92,9 3/2006 123,2 9/2009 159,9   
10/2002 93,4 4/2006 124,9 10/2009 163,0   
11/2002 95,1 5/2006 125,6 11/2009 174,9   
12/2002 94,6 6/2006 124,8 12/2009 178,1   
1/2003 95,5 7/2006 127,8 1/2010 180,0   
2/2003 97,2 8/2006 126,0 2/2010 176,1   
3/2003 95,3 9/2006 125,2 3/2010 168,5   
4/2003 94,5 10/2006 128,4 4/2010 170,2   
5/2003 95,4 11/2006 132,6 5/2010 169,6   
6/2003 95,7 12/2006 134,5 6/2010 168,2   
7/2003 94,8 1/2007 134,0 7/2010 172,7   
8/2003 96,3 2/2007 136,6 8/2010 183,0   
9/2003 98,2 3/2007 137,4 9/2010 194,2   
10/2003 100,8 4/2007 140,7 10/2010 205,0   
11/2003 103,6 5/2007 144,8 11/2010 212,9   
12/2003 105,3 6/2007 154,1 12/2010 223,3   
1/2004 108,5 7/2007 160,3 1/2011 231,3   
2/2004 109,6 8/2007 166,6 2/2011 237,9   
3/2004 113,2 9/2007 175,5 3/2011 232,0   
4/2004 113,4 10/2007 178,5 4/2011 234,9   
5/2004 111,9 11/2007 185,4 5/2011 231,6   
6/2004 114,0 12/2007 191,0 6/2011 233,4   
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incidence of extreme rural poverty  1990 1998 2005 
EAP 63,6 44,1 15,3 
LAC 25,7 21,8 8,8 
MNA 9,5 6,6 3,6 
SAS 55,9 53,8 45,2 
SSA 51,7 64,6 61,6 
WLD 54 48,4 34,2 
 
Chapter 4 data. 
date country rural 
poverty 
line 
agricultural trade balance 
(million USD) 
gross per capita 
production index 
GDP per 
capita 
(USD) 
1990 Brd 36,20 46,72 128,68 199,27 
1991 Brd 60,22 62,19 129,36 201,05 
1992 Brd 84,24 44,80 130,54 183,01 
1993 Brd 84,06 29,56 124,41 156,06 
1994 Brd 83,89 56,92 107,97 151,71 
1995 Brd 83,72 44,08 109,73 162,22 
1996 Brd 83,54 14,75 110,29 139,67 
1997 Brd 83,37 36,03 109,08 155,26 
1998 Brd 83,20 53,72 101,76 141,60 
1999 Brd 81,41 28,28 103,92 126,72 
2000 Brd 79,62 11,96 98,07 109,55 
2001 Brd 77,83 8,92 103,80 100,30 
2002 Brd 76,04 -7,68 105,86 92,82 
2003 Brd 74,25 -5,77 102,66 85,54 
2004 Brd 72,46 -27,33 101,54 92,78 
2005 Brd 70,68 17,62 99,58 107,87 
1990 Ghn 48,00 225,56 55,15 397,88 
1991 Ghn 46,90 150,03 79,92 433,72 
1992 Ghn 45,80 69,75 76,87 409,60 
1993 Ghn 44,70 125,90 81,03 370,41 
1994 Ghn 43,60 149,75 74,44 328,64 
1995 Ghn 42,50 181,84 82,93 379,92 
1996 Ghn 41,40 599,38 87,94 397,35 
1997 Ghn 40,30 370,83 84,39 385,55 
1998 Ghn 39,20 357,33 89,69 408,84 
1999 Ghn 36,58 265,71 93,18 411,94 
2000 Ghn 33,96 215,11 89,66 259,71 
2001 Ghn 31,34 -9,05 90,33 270,43 
2002 Ghn 28,72 177,39 96,88 306,23 
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2003 Ghn 26,10 525,37 97,59 369,91 
2004 Ghn 23,48 532,18 99,29 420,07 
2005 Ghn 20,87 149,49 99,97 495,40 
1990 Mlw 51,70 303,70 71,13 198,99 
1991 Mlw 53,55 378,25 75,74 227,62 
1992 Mlw 55,40 198,37 62,05 183,45 
1993 Mlw 57,25 130,15 78,98 209,46 
1994 Mlw 59,10 123,25 64,29 118,41 
1995 Mlw 60,95 291,20 77,10 137,76 
1996 Mlw 62,80 329,42 87,63 219,48 
1997 Mlw 64,65 404,42 83,37 248,68 
1998 Mlw 66,50 372,70 90,44 158,05 
1999 Mlw 64,73 427,74 98,48 155,00 
2000 Mlw 62,96 380,55 111,59 147,36 
2001 Mlw 61,19 317,35 116,27 140,77 
2002 Mlw 59,43 155,41 90,59 212,32 
2003 Mlw 57,66 309,83 100,48 187,79 
2004 Mlw 55,90 299,61 101,31 197,72 
2005 Mlw 54,14 307,33 85,57 201,80 
1990 Mzq 83,90 -170,01 91,80 181,88 
1991 Mzq 81,80 -199,77 80,38 194,40 
1992 Mzq 79,70 -242,68 68,74 137,51 
1993 Mzq 77,60 -193,58 74,72 136,47 
1994 Mzq 75,50 -338,68 71,17 140,29 
1995 Mzq 73,40 -220,84 93,50 140,90 
1996 Mzq 71,30 -171,17 100,84 193,45 
1997 Mzq 68,60 -128,16 104,89 222,16 
1998 Mzq 65,90 -171,76 108,64 244,69 
1999 Mzq 63,25 -152,59 106,76 250,20 
2000 Mzq 60,60 -164,25 93,39 232,82 
2001 Mzq 57,95 -187,94 100,34 217,38 
2002 Mzq 55,30 -238,84 98,60 218,14 
2003 Mzq 52,83 -189,11 99,78 235,86 
2004 Mzq 50,36 -305,22 100,89 280,54 
2005 Mzq 47,90 -273,23 94,60 315,75 
1990 Rwd 51,70 45,40 95,54 361,43 
1991 Rwd 53,57 39,59 111,45 277,66 
1992 Rwd 55,45 13,12 123,86 316,94 
1993 Rwd 57,33 -31,66 96,66 333,02 
1994 Rwd 59,21 -79,48 70,18 135,90 
1995 Rwd 61,09 -50,69 88,14 237,75 
1996 Rwd 62,97 -38,71 93,82 244,22 
1997 Rwd 64,85 -18,25 88,28 301,02 
1998 Rwd 66,73 -46,29 89,84 292,52 
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1999 Rwd 66,41 -5,09 89,33 259,46 
2000 Rwd 66,10 -14,28 93,87 218,02 
2001 Rwd 65,72 -32,11 88,48 201,53 
2002 Rwd 65,34 -36,53 104,80 192,14 
2003 Rwd 64,96 -20,35 97,37 212,56 
2004 Rwd 64,58 -36,69 95,77 236,84 
2005 Rwd 64,20 -11,08 100,70 287,05 
1990 Ugd 65,00 144,79 112,28 242,76 
1991 Ugd 62,65 138,51 111,43 180,92 
1992 Ugd 60,30 90,00 106,08 150,40 
1993 Ugd 57,98 126,74 109,32 163,94 
1994 Ugd 55,66 159,19 105,66 196,62 
1995 Ugd 53,34 312,50 106,76 274,69 
1996 Ugd 51,02 382,11 102,12 279,62 
1997 Ugd 48,70 244,97 99,50 281,28 
1998 Ugd 44,93 226,02 104,11 286,61 
1999 Ugd 41,16 177,82 106,97 253,24 
2000 Ugd 37,40 126,94 105,14 253,48 
2001 Ugd 40,05 74,36 108,14 231,62 
2002 Ugd 42,70 98,92 109,68 237,31 
2003 Ugd 39,86 -107,98 107,77 235,65 
2004 Ugd 37,03 40,89 104,59 304,87 
2005 Ugd 34,20 49,66 99,89 313,60 
1990 Tzn 41,35 196,75 92,22 167,31 
1991 Tzn 41,35 135,03 91,83 188,36 
1992 Tzn 40,80 130,35 84,91 169,02 
1993 Tzn 40,52 136,13 82,30 151,22 
1994 Tzn 40,25 192,39 76,53 155,12 
1995 Tzn 39,97 263,41 81,79 175,34 
1996 Tzn 39,70 295,07 80,92 210,76 
1997 Tzn 39,42 227,83 74,69 242,82 
1998 Tzn 39,15 -10,95 79,05 287,96 
1999 Tzn 38,87 194,56 80,65 291,44 
2000 Tzn 38,60 118,20 76,80 298,43 
2001 Tzn 38,42 64,10 83,36 296,45 
2002 Tzn 38,25 68,26 97,23 300,51 
2003 Tzn 38,08 86,68 84,67 315,71 
2004 Tzn 37,91 52,30 94,89 338,01 
2005 Tzn 37,74 181,61 100,34 362,54 
1990 Zmb 83,00 -38,42 98,88 415,71 
1991 Zmb 85,50 -2,63 101,25 414,75 
1992 Zmb 88,00 -110,28 82,13 380,06 
1993 Zmb 90,10 -37,33 107,52 380,16 
1994 Zmb 92,20 -26,95 93,37 377,95 
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1995 Zmb 88,20 -53,59 80,89 381,83 
1996 Zmb 84,20 -29,28 94,57 348,93 
1997 Zmb 85,60 -12,77 88,50 405,36 
1998 Zmb 87,00 -125,20 83,20 326,16 
1999 Zmb 83,82 44,39 96,09 306,98 
2000 Zmb 80,65 1,44 89,29 309,32 
2001 Zmb 77,47 0,57 87,26 339,15 
2002 Zmb 74,30 -14,08 87,22 338,68 
2003 Zmb 75,80 -38,32 97,08 389,86 
2004 Zmb 77,30 185,85 98,20 472,72 
2005 Zmb 76,80 129,07 100,14 609,69 
1990 Zbw 20,00 628,16 120,59 839,66 
1991 Zbw 27,00 662,26 117,77 803,98 
1992 Zbw 34,00 149,47 83,48 612,82 
1993 Zbw 41,00 347,12 109,00 582,57 
1994 Zbw 48,00 1045,40 114,16 599,24 
1995 Zbw 46,00 696,02 91,41 607,11 
1996 Zbw 44,00 884,60 120,35 718,06 
1997 Zbw 44,50 894,85 123,53 705,40 
1998 Zbw 45,00 710,17 119,38 522,71 
1999 Zbw 48,71 627,54 117,01 547,46 
2000 Zbw 52,42 926,09 132,88 530,42 
2001 Zbw 56,14 815,79 125,06 540,63 
2002 Zbw 59,85 351,63 102,25 502,60 
2003 Zbw 63,57 511,49 103,15 452,27 
2004 Zbw 67,28 381,43 109,04 453,98 
2005 Zbw 71,00 181,25 93,11 447,56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
208 
 
Chapter 5 data  
Date Maize Producti
on 
Area Yield Fertil
izer 
use 
bag 
50kg 
Fertil
izer 
price
s 
Labour 
ha 
used 
Labour 
salary 
CHS 
Farmgate 
prices CHS 
2001 Western  75000 54099 0,7213 1 500 4,2354 148500 962543,74 
2002 Western 86200 61570 0,7142 1 800 4,2354 193050 860015,28 
2003 Western 86520 61800 0,7142 1 8000 4,2354 248400 959568,47 
2004 Western 85479 59634 0,6976 1 9000 4,2354 302400 1358139,07 
2001 Central   118000 91012 0,7712 1 500 4,2354 148500 962543,74 
2002 Central 199670 91010 0,4558 1 800 4,2354 193050 860015,28 
2003 Central 247110 94740 0,3833 1 8000 4,2354 248400 959568,47 
2004 Central 159622 87160 0,5460 1 9000 4,2354 302400 1358139,07 
2001 Eastern   201000 147744 0,7350 1 500 4,2354 148500 962543,74 
2002 Eastern 332690 201530 0,6057 1 800 4,2354 193050 860015,28 
2003 Eastern 244000 150600 0,6172 1 8000 4,2354 248400 959568,47 
2004 Eastern 241621 141950 0,5874 1 9000 4,2354 302400 1358139,07 
2001 Volta  63840 43350 0,6790 1 500 7,3019 89100 962543,74 
2002 Volta  63850 45100 0,7063 1 800 7,3019 115830 860015,28 
2003 Volta  58630 45500 0,7760 1 8000 7,3019 149040 959568,47 
2004 Volta  53868 40730 0,7561 1 9000 7,3019 181440 1358139,07 
2001 Ashanti   170000 119473 0,7027 1 500 4,2354 148500 962543,74 
2002 Ashanti 269480 170120 0,6312 1 800 4,2354 193050 860015,28 
2003 Ashanti 193920 119620 0,6168 1 8000 4,2354 248400 959568,47 
2004 Ashanti 183032 113639 0,6208 1 9000 4,2354 302400 1358139,07 
2001 Brong 
Ahafo 
168000 99277 0,5909 1 500 3,0424 148500 962543,74 
2002 Brong 
Ahafo 
268980 160730 0,5975 1 800 3,0424 193050 860015,28 
2003 Brong 
Ahafo 
295680 176800 0,5979 1 8000 3,0424 248400 959568,47 
2004 Brong 
Ahafo 
281267 167900 0,5969 1 9000 3,0424 302400 1358139,07 
2001 Northern  69878 104088 1,4895 1 500 4,0566 59400 962543,74 
2002 Northern  94560 157020 1,6605 1 800 4,0566 77220 860015,28 
2003 Northern  79050 89060 1,1266 1 8000 4,0566 99360 959568,47 
2004 Northern  74566 66255 0,8885 1 9000 4,0566 120960 1358139,07 
2001 Upper 
West  
50738 36250 0,7144 1 500 4,0566 59400 962543,74 
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2002 Upper 
West  
62560 36730 0,5871 1 800 4,0566 77220 860015,28 
2003 Upper 
West  
60710 37790 0,6224 1 8000 4,0566 99360 959568,47 
2004 Upper 
West  
60801 40260 0,6621 1 9000 4,0566 120960 1358139,07 
2001 Upper 
East  
15000 9995 0,6663 1 500 6,9719 59400 962543,74 
2002 Upper 
East  
18390 11410 0,6204 1 800 6,9719 77220 860015,28 
2003 Upper 
East  
20370 11920 0,5851 1 8000 6,9719 99360 959568,47 
2004 Upper 
East  
14650 11040 0,7535 1 9000 6,9719 120960 1358139,07 
 
Date Cocoa Producti
on 
Area Yield Fertilizer 
use bag 
50kg 
Fertilize
r prices 
USD 50 
kg 
Pest 
used 
50kg 
pest 
prices 
USD 
50kg 
2001 Western  203,627 648,64 0,3139 0,45 0,070 0,14 0,14 
2002 Western 181,658 578,66 0,3139 0,45 0,100 0,14 0,21 
2003 Western 276,586 728,11 0,3798 5,14 0,920 0,94 1,94 
2004 Western 419,71 1104,88 0,3798 5,14 1,000 0,94 2,10 
2001 Ashanti 72,994 229,91 0,3174 0,45 0,070 0,14 0,14 
2002 Ashanti 57,011 179,57 0,3174 0,45 0,100 0,14 0,21 
2003 Ashanti 82,445 223,13 0,3694 5,14 0,920 0,94 1,94 
2004 Ashanti  121,233 328,11 0,3694 5,14 1,000 0,94 2,10 
2001 Brong Ahafo  33,109 107,29 0,3085 0,45 0,070 0,14 0,14 
2002 Brong Ahafo 31,432 101,86 0,3085 0,45 0,100 0,14 0,21 
2003 Brong Ahafo 45,309 125,57 0,3608 5,14 0,920 0,94 1,94 
2004 Brong Ahafo 69,688 193,13 0,3608 5,14 1,000 0,94 2,10 
2001 Central   32,136 146,20 0,2198 0,45 0,070 0,14 0,14 
2002 Central  30,039 142,79 0,2103 0,45 0,100 0,14 0,21 
2003 Central  39,989 183,01 0,2185 5,14 0,920 0,94 1,94 
2004 Central  56,631 167,58 0,3379 5,14 1,000 0,94 2,10 
2001 Eastern  46,225 210,30 0,2198 0,45 0,070 0,14 0,14 
2002 Eastern 39,343 187,01 0,2103 0,45 0,100 0,14 0,21 
2003 Eastern 51,604 236,17 0,2185 5,14 0,920 0,94 1,94 
2004 Eastern 67,804 200,64 0,3379 5,14 1,000 0,94 2,10 
2001 Volta  1,68 7,64 0,2198 0,45 0,070 0,14 0,14 
2002 Volta 1,079 5,12 0,2103 0,45 0,100 0,14 0,21 
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2003 Volta 0,913 4,17 0,2185 5,14 0,920 0,94 1,94 
2004 Volta 1,909 5,64 0,3379 5,14 1,000 0,94 2,10 
2001  Ghana  398,771 1350 0,2953 0,45 0,070 0,14 0,14 
2002 Ghana  340,562 1195 0,2849 0,45 0,100 0,14 0,21 
2003 Ghana  496,846 1500 0,3312 5,14 0,920 0,94 1,94 
2004 Ghana  736,975 2000 0,3684 5,14 1,000 0,94 2,10 
 
Date  Cocoa Labour ha used Labour salary USD Farmgate prices USD 
2001 Western  5,03 21 533,26 
2002 Western 5,03 24 848,75 
2003 Western 1,69 29 769,56 
2004 Western 1,69 34 639,78 
2001 Ashanti 5,03 21 533,26 
2002 Ashanti 5,03 24 848,75 
2003 Ashanti 1,69 29 769,56 
2004 Ashanti  1,69 34 639,78 
2001 Brong Ahafo  5,03 21 533,26 
2002 Brong Ahafo 5,03 24 848,75 
2003 Brong Ahafo 1,69 29 769,56 
2004 Brong Ahafo 1,69 34 639,78 
2001 Central   5,03 21 533,26 
2002 Central  5,03 24 848,75 
2003 Central  1,69 29 769,56 
2004 Central  1,69 34 639,78 
2001 Eastern  5,03 21 533,26 
2002 Eastern 5,03 24 848,75 
2003 Eastern 1,69 29 769,56 
2004 Eastern 1,69 34 639,78 
2001 Volta  5,03 12,6 533,26 
2002 Volta 5,03 14,4 848,75 
2003 Volta 1,69 17,4 769,56 
2004 Volta 1,69 20,4 639,78 
2001  Ghana  5,03  533,26 
2002 Ghana  5,03  848,75 
2003 Ghana  1,69  769,56 
2004 Ghana  1,69  639,78 
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Chapter 6 data. 
date Country hcpri ps pr npkl dcps ava Gdppc 
1990 Brd 30,485008 3 4,317838 -153 8,614541 55,8787 199,26 
1991 Brd 33,895710 3 4,317838 -155 10,74847 54,31071 201,04 
1992 Brd 40,640968 3 4,317838 -157 10,72101 53,53346 183,01 
1993 Brd 36,839887 3 4,317838 -160 14,0312 52,6187 156,05 
1994 Brd 37,261564 3 4,317838 -153,3 14,73612 46,77811 151,71 
1995 Brd 50,004356 3 4,317838 -146,68 12,26566 48,1446 162,22 
1996 Brd 50,826972 3 4,317838 -140 14,23341 57,2216 139,66 
1997 Brd 48,594000 7 5,062126 -133,37 11,8717 49,19258 155,26 
1998 Brd 52,956066 10 5,620342 -126,7 13,53521 46,32378 141,59 
1999 Brd 55,442488 10 5,620342 -120 15,39021 43,69426 126,72 
2000 Brd 41,148960 10 5,620342 -113,4 24,97746 40,39854 109,54 
2001 Brd 38,759767 5 3,573247 -104,3 25,91138 39,52496 100,30 
2002 Brd 36,400538 5 4,689982 -95,2 31,1032 40,53309 92,82 
2003 Brd 34,120851 9 3,945694 -86,1 29,27067 40,07917 85,54 
2004 Brd 33,630811 9 3,945694 -77 26,37291 40,07917 92,77 
2005 Brd 41,732166 9 4,563713 -83,4 22,26747 34,84865 107,87 
1990 Ghn 58,757334 3 8,286258 -72,75 4,928698 45,06752 393,25 
1991 Ghn 55,798483 3 8,286258 -75 3,65734 45,55957 428,50 
1992 Ghn 56,511026 3 8,286258 -77,25 4,941929 44,96376 404,50 
1993 Ghn 56,511037 3 8,286258 -79,5 4,838176 41,36654 365,63 
1994 Ghn 60,056262 3 8,286258 -77,85 5,250033 41,97789 324,17 
1995 Ghn 57,893646 3 8,286258 -76,21 5,073565 42,70311 374,44 
1996 Ghn 63,690618 6 9,138610 -74,57 6,005079 43,87821 391,20 
1997 Ghn 63,389837 9 9,990962 -72,92 8,195094 40,05235 379,13 
1998 Ghn 62,380970 9 9,990962 -71,28 9,358847 40,23304 401,60 
1999 Ghn 63,089182 9 9,990962 -69,64 12,56208 39,92779 404,36 
2000 Ghn 61,577502 9 9,990962 -68 13,97149 39,41372 254,87 
2001 Ghn 60,876123 12 8,593966 -65,5 11,88439 39,32504 265,46 
2002 Ghn 62,757512 12 8,593966 -63 12,14954 39,2114 300,83 
2003 Ghn 61,702697 12 8,722160 -60,5 12,49305 40,23846 363,84 
2004 Ghn 60,544670 12 8,722160 -58 13,17249 41,54732 413,89 
2005 Ghn 63,518821 12 10,025187 -63,6 15,54407 40,93535 489,17 
1990 Mlw 43,36953 1 1,00000 -118,8 10,94942 45,00002 198,99 
1991 Mlw 46,33245 1 1,00000 -115,2 11,55163 43,72188 227,62 
1992 Mlw 53,04434 1 1,00000 -111,6 14,69475 38,81648 183,45 
1993 Mlw 55,49504 1 1,00000 -108 9,393337 48,9042 209,46 
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1994 Mlw 55,87594 1 1,00000 -113,57 12,5602 25,07651 118,41 
1995 Mlw 56,43569 1 1,00000 -119,14 6,496234 30,39803 137,76 
1996 Mlw 61,15695 1 1,00000 -124,71 4,509538 34,6901 219,48 
1997 Mlw 76,26039 1 1,00000 -130,28 4,289617 32,58982 248,67 
1998 Mlw 82,85438 2 2,00000 -135,85 7,108802 35,58186 158,05 
1999 Mlw 89,79562 16 8,60269 -141,42 7,960646 37,84101 155,00 
2000 Mlw 133,38654 16 8,60269 -147 9,075887 39,53955 147,36 
2001 Mlw 130,11229 16 8,60269 -128,25 8,420598 38,78214 140,77 
2002 Mlw 123,60955 16 8,60269 -109,5 5,802062 36,73927 212,31 
2003 Mlw 116,95058 16 8,66122 -90,75 5,460706 35,73723 187,78 
2004 Mlw 114,80251 16 8,66122 -72 6,042057 34,63307 197,71 
2005 Mlw 115,10938 16 8,60632 -75,28 7,912583 32,63406 201,79 
1990 Mzq 57,023342 3 2,000000 -28,35 17,58611 37,11874 181,87 
1991 Mzq 46,512491 3 2,000000 -26,4 14,9875 39,14283 194,39 
1992 Mzq 36,804886 3 2,000000 -24,45 16,94389 34,51174 137,50 
1993 Mzq 31,041645 3 2,000000 -22,5 12,13511 38,26789 136,47 
1994 Mzq 30,573383 3 2,000000 -26,85 11,56524 33,25365 140,29 
1995 Mzq 37,528595 4 3,000000 -31,21 11,48171 34,79753 140,90 
1996 Mzq 41,277685 4 3,000000 -35,57 9,435957 35,22374 193,45 
1997 Mzq 40,678091 4 3,000000 -39,92 11,75394 34,85253 222,15 
1998 Mzq 40,964018 15 7,261203 -44,28 12,73895 30,84486 244,69 
1999 Mzq 42,605104 15 7,261203 -48,64 14,88582 28,56484 250,20 
2000 Mzq 44,975609 15 7,261203 -53 16,74163 24,0098 232,81 
2001 Mzq 43,739467 15 7,261203 -52,5 12,55739 22,50525 217,37 
2002 Mzq 42,230248 15 7,791731 -52 12,88452 27,82138 218,14 
2003 Mzq 40,632275 15 7,791731 -51,5 11,40441 28,03652 235,86 
2004 Mzq 42,678298 15 8,186166 -51 9,465281 27,41313 280,54 
2005 Mzq 44,617574 15 8,186166 -54,2 11,8419 26,96016 315,75 
1990 Rwd 43,166847 3 3,000000 -134,48 6,920656 32,54599 361,43 
1991 Rwd 46,842046 3 3,000000 -135,12 5,1197 32,13271 277,66 
1992 Rwd 47,855810 3 3,000000 -135,76 5,675161 33,23762 316,94 
1993 Rwd 48,359407 3 3,000000 -136,4 6,329145 33,73489 333,01 
1994 Rwd 48,824387 3 3,000000 -139,48 9,88228 49,75875 135,89 
1995 Rwd 48,553139 3 3,000000 -142,57 8,414883 44,00045 237,74 
1996 Rwd 50,100632 3 3,000000 -145,65 6,806436 47,18929 244,22 
1997 Rwd 54,510837 3 3,000000 -148,74 8,090274 45,96095 301,02 
1998 Rwd 56,049706 3 3,000000 -151,82 8,759214 45,51746 292,52 
1999 Rwd 57,516828 4 5,953936 -154,91 9,34216 41,93518 259,46 
2000 Rwd 58,810365 4 5,953936 -158 10,41283 37,18671 218,01 
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2001 Rwd 65,214283 4 4,025602 -137,75 10,3719 37,33604 201,52 
2002 Rwd 67,112167 4 4,025602 -117,5 10,87657 35,49449 192,13 
2003 Rwd 71,557793 4 4,791062 -97,25 9,768594 37,00705 212,55 
2004 Rwd 77,385944 4 4,791062 -77 10,80417 38,56196 236,84 
2005 Rwd 84,787286 6 5,268421 -85,58 11,20636 38,39036 287,04 
1990 Ugd 46,690058 3 1,827611 -82,16 0 56,5769 242,76 
1991 Ugd 43,999830 3 1,827611 -84,04 0,000000 52,82168 180,91 
1992 Ugd 47,074698 3 1,827611 -85,92 4,001072 51,12052 150,40 
1993 Ugd 49,562088 3 1,827611 -87,8 4,42597 51,5401 163,94 
1994 Ugd 46,852119 3 1,827611 -87,4 4,366991 49,92329 196,61 
1995 Ugd 44,894842 3 1,827611 -87 4,589903 49,39077 274,69 
1996 Ugd 43,973837 3 1,827611 -86,6 5,287803 45,14212 279,61 
1997 Ugd 38,467464 6 5,179327 -86,2 4,831661 41,98402 281,28 
1998 Ugd 40,606984 6 5,179327 -85,8 5,617737 42,07154 286,61 
1999 Ugd 40,415497 6 5,179327 -85,4 6,355036 38,45645 253,24 
2000 Ugd 41,000287 6 9,212607 -85 6,234175 29,38456 253,48 
2001 Ugd 41,506756 6 9,212607 -80,25 7,108612 29,69154 231,61 
2002 Ugd 68,273933 6 9,325654 -75,5 7,949801 24,90403 237,31 
2003 Ugd 71,527263 6 9,325654 -70,75 8,402405 26,14874 235,64 
2004 Ugd 74,965571 6 8,622546 -66 7,971469 22,91541 304,86 
2005 Ugd 76,348603 6 8,622546 -84,3 8,630845 26,70464 313,59 
1990 Tzn 49,976639 4 4,000000 -80,03 13,902 45,95766 167,30 
1991 Tzn 45,787600 4 4,000000 -83,32 14,03012 48,13969 188,35 
1992 Tzn 43,641356 4 4,000000 -86,61 9,74467 47,9969 169,02 
1993 Tzn 41,683618 4 4,000000 -89,9 10,79704 48,10843 151,21 
1994 Tzn 41,815917 4 4,000000 -86,91 9,699474 44,98056 155,11 
1995 Tzn 43,634025 4 4,000000 -83,92 6,655024 47,14438 175,33 
1996 Tzn 44,535365 4 4,000000 -80,94 3,093606 48,03032 210,75 
1997 Tzn 42,960421 5 5,000000 -77,95 3,545348 46,7994 242,81 
1998 Tzn 42,561293 5 5,000000 -74,97 3,861583 33,76269 287,96 
1999 Tzn 42,495649 5 5,000000 -71,98 4,183627 34,12771 291,44 
2000 Tzn 42,526153 9 9,000000 -69 4,087733 33,48266 298,42 
2001 Tzn 42,443505 9 8,728765 -67 5,381469 32,86714 296,45 
2002 Tzn 42,447451 9 8,728765 -65 6,83473 32,45784 300,51 
2003 Tzn 40,789533 9 8,628638 -63 8,083006 32,52526 315,71 
2004 Tzn 40,689873 9 8,628638 -61 9,240734 33,32772 338,00 
2005 Tzn 40,757688 9 8,752319 -65,04 10,18105 31,75921 362,54 
1990 Zmb 67,570608 1 1,000000 -21,6 8,875596 20,6048 415,70 
1991 Zmb 66,535186 1 1,000000 -24,4 7,257744 17,42769 414,74 
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1992 Zmb 65,884532 1 1,000000 -27,2 0 23,81227 380,06 
1993 Zmb 66,622499 1 1,000000 -30 4,789315 34,10152 380,15 
1994 Zmb 66,804006 1 1,000000 -26,71 6,267216 15,49243 377,94 
1995 Zmb 66,637685 16 1,396328 -23,42 8,451328 18,40538 381,82 
1996 Zmb 67,298282 16 1,396328 -20,14 9,463993 17,57157 348,92 
1997 Zmb 65,390083 16 1,396328 -16,85 7,998531 18,65556 405,36 
1998 Zmb 63,945241 16 1,396328 13,57 7,025409 21,13795 326,16 
1999 Zmb 62,439788 16 1,396328 -10,28 7,401809 24,18489 306,98 
2000 Zmb 61,208701 11 7,891818 -7 8,551136 22,31072 309,31 
2001 Zmb 61,446551 11 7,891818 -11,5 7,484198 22,12078 339,15 
2002 Zmb 61,998726 11 8,728454 -16 6,290813 22,06894 338,68 
2003 Zmb 61,817157 11 8,728454 -20,5 6,725026 22,57418 389,86 
2004 Zmb 60,646974 11 8,403201 -25 8,082964 23,02555 472,72 
2005 Zmb 60,885171 15 8,508889 -31,02 7,72088 23,31833 609,69 
1990 Zbw 93,972910 11 11 -51,5 23,03992 16,4763 839,66 
1991 Zbw 79,833670 4 7,309740973 -50 26,16616 15,26726 803,97 
1992 Zbw 76,771205 4 7,309740973 -48,5 28,77094 7,413793 612,81 
1993 Zbw 73,691187 4 7,309740973 -47 29,84063 15,03891 582,57 
1994 Zbw 72,777138 4 7,309740973 -48 28,40845 18,9734 599,24 
1995 Zbw 64,444683 4 7,309740973 -49 33,83775 15,23519 607,10 
1996 Zbw 63,859238 4 7,309740973 -50 31,23235 21,77111 718,05 
1997 Zbw 61,182109 4 7,309740973 -51 38,59646 18,93408 705,40 
1998 Zbw 60,447107 4 7,309740973 -52 34,70909 21,78853 522,71 
1999 Zbw 59,004019 4 7,309740973 -53 22,56969 19,41935 547,45 
2000 Zbw 57,919959 4 6,638664492 -54 27,45365 18,49225 530,41 
2001 Zbw 56,768819 4 6,638664492 -53,75 34,61456 17,35378 540,62 
2002 Zbw 56,170936 4 7,308399631 -53,5 104,4689 14,14226 502,59 
2003 Zbw 56,170936 7 8,889939214 -53,25 57,73111 16,79741 452,27 
2004 Zbw 56,170936 7 4,591611711 -53 18,45178 20,10993 453,97 
2005 Zbw 56,170936 6 4,06443185 -57,04 16,27979 19,19832 447,56 
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Date Country api rpdal rd rld infr rpl 
1990 Brd 128,68 572,402 52,03018 0 52,03018 36,2 
1991 Brd 129,36 583,898 52,03018 0 52,03018 60,22 
1992 Brd 130,54 593,9454 52,03018 0 52,03018 84,24 
1993 Brd 124,41 602,5088 52,03018 0 52,03018 84,06 
1994 Brd 107,97 609,6024 52,03018 0 52,03018 83,89 
1995 Brd 109,73 608,8256 52,03018 0 52,03018 83,72 
1996 Brd 110,29 612,8069 52,03018 0 52,03018 83,54 
1997 Brd 109,08 609,1973 52,03018 0 52,03018 83,37 
1998 Brd 101,76 612,2 52,03018 0 52,03018 83,2 
1999 Brd 103,92 610,5809 52,03018 0 52,03018 81,41 
2000 Brd 98,07 618,2702 52,03018 0 52,03018 79,62 
2001 Brd 103,8 619,4605 50,47934 0 50,47934 77,83 
2002 Brd 105,86 626,01 48,92849 0 48,92849 76,04 
2003 Brd 102,66 639,2236 47,37765 0 47,37765 74,25 
2004 Brd 101,54 659,7842 45,8268 0 45,8268 72,46 
2005 Brd 99,58 705,8358 44,27596 0 44,27596 70,68 
1990 Ghn 55,15 352,568 15,99103 0,399514 16,39054 48 
1991 Ghn 79,92 345,759 15,37268 0,399514 15,7722 46,9 
1992 Ghn 76,87 351,7064 15,51103 0,399514 15,91054 45,8 
1993 Ghn 81,03 357,6735 15,59487 0,399514 15,99438 44,7 
1994 Ghn 74,44 363,4607 15,67871 0,399514 16,07823 43,6 
1995 Ghn 82,93 344,3344 15,76256 0,399514 16,16207 42,5 
1996 Ghn 87,94 327,0628 15,8464 0,399514 16,24591 41,4 
1997 Ghn 84,39 294,2448 16,0724 0,399514 16,47191 40,3 
1998 Ghn 89,69 281,895 16,29608 0,399514 16,69559 39,2 
1999 Ghn 93,18 281,1952 16,52092 0,399514 16,92043 36,58 
2000 Ghn 89,66 276,8712 16,52092 0,402868 16,92379 33,96 
2001 Ghn 90,33 272,1073 17,69165 0,406221 18,09787 31,34 
2002 Ghn 96,88 266,7959 18,86239 0,409575 19,27196 28,72 
2003 Ghn 97,59 268,9794 20,03312 0,409575 20,44269 26,1 
2004 Ghn 99,29 283,8028 22,76809 0,40706 23,17515 23,48 
2005 Ghn 99,97 285,9929 24,15276 0,404545 24,55731 20,87 
1990 Mlw 71,13 371,3386 8,612424 0,665935 9,278359 51,7 
1991 Mlw 75,74 362,7538 11,66357 0,665935 12,32951 53,55 
1992 Mlw 62,05 374,1155 11,94379 0,665935 12,60972 55,4 
1993 Mlw 78,98 375,5648 11,94885 0,665935 12,61479 57,25 
1994 Mlw 64,29 413,6545 11,98852 0,665935 12,65446 59,1 
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1995 Mlw 77,1 382,3859 12,31769 0,665935 12,98363 60,95 
1996 Mlw 87,63 373,7942 12,31769 0,599257 12,91695 62,8 
1997 Mlw 83,37 375,6819 13,88504 0,599257 14,4843 64,65 
1998 Mlw 90,44 364,4794 13,88504 0,599257 14,4843 66,5 
1999 Mlw 98,48 361,4642 13,88504 0,599257 14,4843 64,73 
2000 Mlw 111,59 364,8383 13,88504 0,599257 14,4843 62,96 
2001 Mlw 116,27 361,0156 13,88504 0,599257 14,4843 61,19 
2002 Mlw 90,59 369,7955 13,88504 0,599257 14,4843 59,43 
2003 Mlw 100,48 378,4738 13,88504 0,599257 14,4843 57,66 
2004 Mlw 101,31 367,8751 13,88504 0,599257 14,4843 55,9 
2005 Mlw 85,57 376,4084 13,88504 0,617615 14,50266 54,14 
1990 Mzq 91,8 309,7276 3,368305 0 3,368305 83,9 
1991 Mzq 80,38 308,5313 3,443157 0 3,443157 81,8 
1992 Mzq 68,74 312,6513 3,518008 0 3,518008 79,7 
1993 Mzq 74,72 320,1182 3,580384 0 3,580384 77,6 
1994 Mzq 71,17 323,0951 3,642136 0 3,642136 75,5 
1995 Mzq 93,5 322,4037 3,730086 0 3,730086 73,4 
1996 Mzq 100,84 319,4238 3,792462 0 3,792462 71,3 
1997 Mzq 104,89 311,7816 3,792462 0 3,792462 68,6 
1998 Mzq 108,64 308,0276 3,792462 0 3,792462 65,9 
1999 Mzq 106,76 315,9458 3,792462 0 3,792462 63,25 
2000 Mzq 93,39 324,2781 3,792462 0 3,792462 60,6 
2001 Mzq 100,34 321,2171 3,791386 0 3,791386 57,95 
2002 Mzq 98,6 293,3498 3,79031 0 3,79031 55,3 
2003 Mzq 99,78 294,6442 3,789234 0 3,789234 52,83 
2004 Mzq 100,89 292,5611 3,788159 0 3,788159 50,36 
2005 Mzq 94,6 303,256 3,787083 0,382989 4,170071 47,9 
1990 Rwd 95,54 768,6569 49,84109 0 49,84109 51,7 
1991 Rwd 111,45 735,7046 51,07832 0 51,07832 53,57 
1992 Rwd 123,86 682,7617 52,21339 0 52,21339 55,45 
1993 Rwd 96,66 646,7057 52,97011 0 52,97011 57,33 
1994 Rwd 70,18 731,0726 54,10518 0 54,10518 59,21 
1995 Rwd 88,14 712,6978 55,24026 0 55,24026 61,09 
1996 Rwd 93,82 683,7439 56,37533 0 56,37533 62,97 
1997 Rwd 88,28 688,1266 52,71787 0 52,71787 64,85 
1998 Rwd 89,84 733,1438 49,06041 0 49,06041 66,73 
1999 Rwd 89,33 750,3244 45,40295 0 45,40295 66,41 
2000 Rwd 93,87 762,1801 45,40295 0 45,40295 66,1 
2001 Rwd 88,48 710,177 47,30231 0 47,30231 65,72 
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2002 Rwd 104,8 648,2065 49,20167 0 49,20167 65,34 
2003 Rwd 97,37 634,2649 51,10102 0 51,10102 64,96 
2004 Rwd 95,77 638,392 53,00038 0 53,00038 64,58 
2005 Rwd 100,7 645,0883 53,00038 0 53,00038 64,2 
1990 Ugd 112,28 315,2549 7,774228 0,511118 8,285347 65 
1991 Ugd 111,43 324,7105 7,340939 0,514852 7,855791 62,65 
1992 Ugd 106,08 334,21 6,90765 0,514852 7,422502 60,3 
1993 Ugd 109,32 345,0924 6,474361 0,514852 6,989213 57,98 
1994 Ugd 105,66 354,648 6,041072 0,514852 6,555924 55,66 
1995 Ugd 106,76 365,6526 5,607783 0,518586 6,126369 53,34 
1996 Ugd 102,12 376,891 5,174494 0,518586 5,69308 51,02 
1997 Ugd 99,50 388,2383 4,741205 0,518586 5,259791 48,7 
1998 Ugd 104,11 399,8309 4,307916 0,381877 4,689793 44,93 
1999 Ugd 106,97 411,851 3,874627 0,245049 4,119676 41,16 
2000 Ugd 105,14 424,4361 3,441338 0,108281 3,549618 37,4 
2001 Ugd 108,14 434,2079 12,07767 0,107451 12,18512 40,05 
2002 Ugd 109,68 447,9097 20,71993 0,107451 20,82738 42,7 
2003 Ugd 107,77 453,3102 29,35032 0,107451 29,45777 39,86 
2004 Ugd 104,59 459,0334 29,35032 0,107451 29,45777 37,03 
2005 Ugd 99,89 465,0342 29,35032 0,107451 29,45777 34,2 
1990 Tzn 92,22 229,3745 8,987901 0,47022 9,458121 41,35 
1991 Tzn 91,83 236,1125 9,095695 0,471913 9,567608 41,35 
1992 Tzn 84,91 243,3789 9,203489 0,471913 9,675402 40,8 
1993 Tzn 82,3 250,7176 9,311283 0,471913 9,783195 40,52 
1994 Tzn 76,53 257,909 9,311283 0,471913 9,783195 40,25 
1995 Tzn 81,79 264,7509 9,321864 0,472442 9,794305 39,97 
1996 Tzn 80,92 271,0387 9,332445 0,275635 9,60808 39,7 
1997 Tzn 74,69 278,4484 9,332445 0,288015 9,620459 39,42 
1998 Tzn 79,05 285,9514 9,332445 0,288015 9,620459 39,15 
1999 Tzn 80,65 293,4991 9,332445 0,484822 9,817266 38,87 
2000 Tzn 76,8 301,364 9,332445 0,484822 9,817266 38,6 
2001 Tzn 83,36 304,295 9,004116 0,484822 9,488938 38,42 
2002 Tzn 97,23 304,0193 8,675788 0,484822 9,160609 38,25 
2003 Tzn 84,67 298,5569 8,347459 0,484822 8,832281 38,08 
2004 Tzn 94,89 304,2828 8,530151 0,484822 9,014972 37,91 
2005 Tzn 100,34 311,2377 8,712842 0,275106 8,987948 37,74 
1990 Zmb 98,88 209,1461 4,690344 0,169145 4,859489 83 
1991 Zmb 101,25 230,797 4,796641 0,169145 4,965786 85,5 
1992 Zmb 82,13 236,7637 4,876364 0,169145 5,045508 88 
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1993 Zmb 107,52 243,8121 4,963926 0,169145 5,13307 90,1 
1994 Zmb 93,37 246,3832 5,07567 0,169145 5,244815 92,2 
1995 Zmb 80,89 280,5506 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 88,2 
1996 Zmb 94,57 262,2949 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 84,2 
1997 Zmb 88,5 279,968 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 85,6 
1998 Zmb 83,2 305,9904 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 87 
1999 Zmb 96,09 288,8772 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 83,82 
2000 Zmb 89,29 306,7265 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 80,65 
2001 Zmb 87,26 326,2153 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 77,47 
2002 Zmb 87,22 358,5111 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 74,3 
2003 Zmb 97,08 318,9733 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 75,8 
2004 Zmb 98,2 327,1184 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 77,3 
2005 Zmb 100,14 354,2238 8,873254 0,169145 9,042399 76,8 
1990 Zbw 120,59 257,0033 23,08322 0,70606 23,78928 20 
1991 Zbw 117,77 258,4749 23,16 0,70606 23,86606 27 
1992 Zbw 83,48 259,3645 23,30791 0,70606 24,01397 34 
1993 Zbw 109 259,702 23,31329 0,70606 24,01935 41 
1994 Zbw 114,16 259,5384 14,01896 0,70606 14,72502 48 
1995 Zbw 91,41 258,9068 4,724639 0,70606 5,430699 46 
1996 Zbw 120,35 254,6624 7,245528 0,70606 7,951588 44 
1997 Zbw 123,53 250,1415 9,766417 0,70606 10,47248 44,5 
1998 Zbw 119,38 254,2046 12,87307 0,701965 13,57503 45 
1999 Zbw 117,01 255,1454 14,80819 0,697871 15,50607 48,71 
2000 Zbw 132,88 255,2771 17,32908 0,693776 18,02286 52,42 
2001 Zbw 125,06 254,6156 19,84997 0,689671 20,53964 56,14 
2002 Zbw 102,25 249,4373 22,37086 0,685577 23,05644 59,85 
2003 Zbw 103,15 247,6865 24,89175 0,681482 25,57323 63,57 
2004 Zbw 109,04 238,4624 24,89175 0,677388 25,56914 67,28 
2005 Zbw 93,11 229,7853 24,89175 0,673293 25,56504 71 
 
 
